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ABSTRACT 
The aim and intention of this thesis is to critically describe the theoretical and practical 
applications of labour relations practices in the public sector internationally and in South 
African local authorities. In particular, this objective involves a description of the 
following key themes: A background to labour relations theory, the role of parties to the 
labour relationship, the premises of labour relations, the causes of labour conflict, the 
processes of dispute resolution and settlement, and applied dispute settlement 
approaches. 
A literature survey highlights the key concepts and principle labour conflict resolution 
measures applied internationally. In South Africa the above-noted labour relations 
themes are examined by means of a standardised-schedule delphi questionnaire which 
addresses the approaches adopted and related concerns of all Grade 10-15 local 
authorities (as in 1992). 
This thesis highlights the desire to institutionalise labour conflict in. the organisation as a 
dynamic management concern. Findings indicate that in the public sector internationally 
labour relations are complicated by a number of unique environments, notably, the 
political, social, economic, legislative and the organisational environments, within which 
the organisation must function. Subsequently, applied practices are characterised by 
restrictive measures which limit the scope of fundamental labour rights, especially the 
right to associate, the right to bargairi and the right to strike. In this context, it is 
submitted that the use of power-driven processes, as commonly employed by public 
sector organisations, fail to institutionalise labour conflict effectively. This finding is 
based on the evidence of increasing labour disputes in this sector since the 1960's. 
ii 
Similarly, a variety of unique environmental pressures and constraints have resulted in 
piecemeal labour relations arrangements in South African local authorities. Therefore, in 
terms of the above indicators, this thesis concludes that the recent growth in the 
incidence of labour disputes reflects a failure on the part of these organisations to 
effectively institutionalise labour conflict. In particular, this failure is ascribed to 
inflexible or inconsistent legislation, a lack of shared commitment by parties to the 
labour relationship, an inequitable distribution of powers and the provision of inadequate 
safeguards for protecting group interests. 
In conclusion it is submitted that the currently restrictive power-driven measures or 
processes applied by South African local authority employers ought to be replaced by 
consensus-based practices. This involves accommodating trade union interests, simplifying 
existing legislation, streamlining dispute settlement structures. and facilitating measures or 






Labour relations is a recent management function, having evolved during the latter 
part of this century.1 Three key actors comprise the labour relationship, namely: 
employers, trade unions and the State. The primary purpose of labour relations is to 
institutionalise endemic labour conflict, notably between employers and trade unions. 
Such conflict can be either functional (by engendering new dynamics within the 
service or production process) or dysfunctional (by disrupting the service mission of 
an organisation2). Therefore, it can be seen that the latter form of conflict 
undermines the labour relationship and threatens to disrupt organisational services or 
outputs. Subsequently, a variety of processes, structures and mechamsms can be 
applied to regulate labour disputes. However the viability of a labour relations system 
is contingent on its approval by the parties concerned. 
Labour disputes, notably industrial action, have increased in the public sector 
internationally (International Labour Office, 1986:69; Treu,T. et al, 1987:7-22). This 
trend can be attributed to a number of unique political, social, economic, legislative 
and organisational environments. These factors have usually led to the adoption of 
highly restrictive labour relations practices within this sector. Subsequently, it can be 
said that these labour relations systems have failed to institutionalise dysfunctional 
conflict effectively. 
Similar developments in South African local authorities have led to an increase in the 
incidence of industrial action. The use of such processes can be ascribed to a 
fundamental desire for the redistribution of pmver within the labour relationship. 
1 
However, the desire to accommodate trade union interests in an equitable and 
effective manner is undermined by a variety of factors which ultimately entrench the 
existing status quo of parties to the labour relationship within South African local 
authorities. 
This thesis analyses and describes these factors within a South African local 
authorities labour relations context and its application in the public sector 
internationally. A more detailed explanation of this intent follows. 
2. Objective of this thesis: 
The objective of this thesis is to critically describe and examine the nature of labour 
relations, and in particular, the manner in which labour disputes are resolved and· 
settled in South African local authorities. This description and analysis involves the 







A background to labour relations; 
The parties to the labour relationship; 
The premises of labour relations; 
The causes of labour conflict; 
The processes of dispute resolution and settlement; and 
The approaches to dispute settlement. 
The objective of each Chapter is summarised below. 
2.1 Chapter One: 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce a background to the features and issues 
relating to the nature of labour relations in South African local authorities, the 
research methodology applied and the limitations of this thesis. 
2 
2.2 Chapter Two: 
The objective of this chapter is to describe a background to the nature of labour 
relations theory and practice. 
2.3 Chapter Three: 
The objective of this chapter is to outline a background to 
the nature of labour disputes and their settlement. 
2.4 Chapter Four: 
The objective of this chapter is to outline a background to the nature of labour 
relations in the public sector from an international perspective. 
2.5 Chapter Five: 
The objective of this chapter is to outline a background to the nature of labour 
disputes and their settlement in the public sector from an international perspective. 
2.6 Chapter Six: 
The objective of this chapter is to outline the nature of labour relations practice in 
South African local authorities. 
2. 7 Chapter Seven: 
The objective of this chapter is to outline the nature of labour disputes and their 
settlement in South African local authorities. 
3 
2.8 Chapter Eight: 
The objective of this chapter is to set out the perceptions and opinions of local 
authority labour relations practitioners, trade unionists and other relevant officials 
regarding the current state of labour relations in South African local authorities. 
2.9 Chapter Nine: 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of the key findings and trends 
described in previous chapters, to critique labour relations practices in South African 
local authorities and in this context, to list a number ofrecommendations for 
improving applied processes within this sector. 
3. Methodologv: 




A literature review; 
Interviews; and 
A delphi questionnaire. 
3.1 Literature review: 
A literature review was used in_ order to establish a relevant topic and the framework 
for analysis. Sources used' were books, newspapers, periodicals, journals, unpublished 
papers, research reports, public documents, government gazettes and primary forms of 
media. 
3.2 Interviews: 
A preliminary survey was performed by face-to-face non-schedule interviews with 
personnel managers and trade unionists in the Cape Town City Council between June 
4 
and July 1990. The purpose of this survey was to corroborate these findings with those 
made in the initial literature review, thereby indicating further possible avenues for 
research. 
A second sur\rey was conducted in all the four provinces ( ore-1993 constitution) 
between July 1990 and May 1992 by means of face-to~face and telephonic, open-
schedule interviews. The purpose of the survey was to establish key labour relations 
developments and trends in South African local authorities. Cities chosen for this 
survey included: Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Kimberley, Port 
Elizabeth and Pretoria. The sample target group, from a wide variety of backgrounds, 
comprised labour relations practitioners, trade unionists, State officials and academics 






Tertiary institutions (Universities); 
Local authorities (Grade 10-15); 
Trade unions and professional associations; 
Government bodies and advisory groups; 
Industrial Courts; and 
Industrial Councils. 
The data gleaned during both South African surveys laid the foundations for a deiphi 
questionnaire, t.he findings of which are discussed in Chapter Eight. 
3.3 Delphi questionnaire: 





The target group; 
The questionnaire design; 
The questionnaire process; and 
The response rate. 
5 
3.3.1 Target group: 
The questionnaire surveyed the opinions of the most senior individuals involved in 
local authority labour relations. 




Employers: Grade 10-15 local authority officials involved in labour 
relations practices; 
Trade unions: Senior members of trade unions and professional 
associations represented in Grade 10-15 local authorities; and 
the State: Senior members of institutions assisting in the regulation of 
labour rela,tions practices and labour disputes in local authorities. 
Annexure lA outlines a list of the respondents' occupations. 
The selection of Grade 10-15 local authorities3was based on their size and 
. 
geographic representation (i.e. all the major town and city local authorities in all four 





Employers: 29 local authorities; 
Trade Unions: 29 local authority trade unions and professional 
associations; and 
The State: 17 individuals representing various Industrial Councils, 
Industrial Courts, mediatory organisations, government departments and 
advisory bodies. 
6 
3.3.2 Questionnaire design: 
A standardised schedule of common themes4was submitted in three formats to each 
party, namely the e'!1ployers, (rade unions and the State. The questions were derived 
from the preliminary surveys and comprised fixed-alternative and scale item choices.5 
Space for additional commentary was provided at the end of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire provided a covering letter which explained the nature and purpose 
of this survey. Respondents were assured of their anonymity and they were offered a 
synopsis of findings .in return for their participation. A stamped self-addressed envelop 
was included to assist the rate of response. 
Annexure 18-lD are samples of the questionnaire sent to each party. 
3.3.3 Process: 
This questionnaire was posted in September 1992 to the target group described 
above. Questionnaire returns were received between November 1992 and October 
1993. Reasons given for late returns included: misfiled documentation, incorrec~ 
addresses, and a number of vacant posts to which this questionnaire was sent. Each 
participant was notified and thanked for their response and advised that a synopsis of 
findings was being sent to them. These findings were posted to all the respondents 
between October and November 1993. 
3.3.4 Response rate: 
The response rate was calculated by a comparison of questionnaires sent and 
returned for each party. The response rate was: 
* Employers = 69% 
* Trade Unions = 42% 
* The State = 30%. 
7 
It can be concluded that the above return rate was highly successful on a mean 
expected average return rate of 25%. 
3.4 Overseas research: 
International research, in the form of a literature review and non-scheduled face-to-
face interviews, was conducted during February 1991 in Zimbabwe (Harare and 
Buluwayo Town Councils). 
Further research was conducted between May and July 1992 in various European and 
East European countries. The sample group included academics and local authority 
officials in Belgium (The Commission of the European Communities), Poland 
(University of Warsaw, the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy and the New 
Democracy and Local Governance International Research Program), Switzerland 
(University of Zurich and the International Labour Organisation in Geneva)_and the 
United Kingdom (London School of Economics). The purpose of these surveys was to 
establish a comparative background to key labour relations trends and issues in the 
public sector, and wherever possible, in local authorities. 
These findings form part of Chapter Four and Chapter Five. 
4. Limitations of this thesis: 
The following shortcomings could possibly have impeded the analysis and findings 
presented in this thesis: 
* 
* 
The paucity of material on labour relations in local authorities, both 
internationally and in South Africa; 
The limitations of the trends established in. Chapter Seven regarding the 





The potential influence of participant bias or subjectivity on the findings 
established in Chapter Eight; 
By their nature, some of the questions might have lacked statistical 
rigour in qualifying responses to the delphi questionnaire; and 
The writer's own interpretation of the above themes.7 
5. Conclusion: 
In spite of the inherent limitations of this thesis, it is submitted that the current 
labour relations approach in South African local authorities requires a number of 
modifications. These recommendations are listed in Chapter Nine. 
9 
CHAPTER TWO 
A BACKGROUND TO LABOUR RELATIONS. 
1. Introduction. 






The concept of labour :i;elations; 
Applied labour relations frames of reference; 
The parties comprising the labour relationship; and 
The premises on which labour relations are conducted. 
2. The concept of Labour Relations. 




"Work" and the working person; 
The problems and issues of modern, industrial and post-industrial society; 
and 
The existing relations within any applied paradigm. 
(Bendix, 1989:3) 
These foci are influenced by a multiplicity of disciplines, notably, economics, psychology, 
anthropology, political science, and sociology (Gerber, Nel & van Dyk, 1992:375). 
Subsequently, labour relations can be characterised as an inter-disciplinary concept. 
10 
2.1 A definition of Labour Relations: 
A variety of definitions are applied in practice (Green in Mol & Swanepoel, 1993:56; 
Siegel & Myrtle, 1985:383). However, labour relations can be broadly described as an 
interactive framework in which parties partake in the "making, change, interpretation and 
administration [of] terms and conditions of employment and the rules of work" 
(Poppleton, 1985:10). This process is characterised by the "active management (own 
italics) of every aspect of the working relationship" through relevant group interests (Fick 
& Hugh High, 1987:52). 
For the purpose of this thesis, labour relations refers to: 
A process of interaction between significant parties to the. labour relationship 
regarding matters of mutual interest. 
3. Frames of reference: 
Due to their dynamic nature, a variety of labour relations approaches can be adopted. 
Such practices are based on a "common ideology or set of beliefs". (Bendix, 1989:13; 
Poppleton, 1985:12) These tenets can be broadly distinguished by three main frames of 
reference, namely, the Unitarist, Pluralist and Radicalist perspectives.1 
3.1 The Unitarist frame of reference: 
The Unitarist frame of reference states that all parties to the labour relationship share a 
common goal, namely to fulfil organisational objectives. This process involves the right of 
employers to determine and regulate the employment relationship. On the other hand, 
trade unions are subject to the constraints imposed upon them by management. 
Subsequently, they are nominally expected to advise2or seek consensus3with 
employers4over matters of mutual concern. (Bendix, 1989:14; Childs, 1987:74) 
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3.2 The Radicalist frame of reference: 
The Radicalist frame of reference states that all parties to the labour relationship have 
common interests and are therefore united in their goal to serve society. This view is 
founded on the notion that no true balance of power can be established.5 (Bendix, 
1989:16; Hethy, 1989:115) 
3.3 The Pluralist frame of reference: 
The Pluralist frame of reference states that parties to the labour relationship share a 
common organisational vision. A key feature of this process is the need for a balance of 
powers between all parties in the labour re,lationship. Subsequently, employers and trade 
unions are expected to negotiate matters of mutual concern i:o. the workplace. (Bendix, 
1989: 14; Childs, 1987:74) 
3.4 Frame of reference applied to this thesis: 
All three models are useful for understanding the prevailing dynamics of labour 
relations. It is even suggested that a new perspective, incorporating all three approaches, 
is a likelihood in the future (Bendix, 1989:16). For the purposes of this thesis, the 
Pluralist frame of reference is applied. 
4. Parties to the labour relationship: 
The labour or tripartite relationship is made up of three principle parties, namely, the 
employers, trade unions and the State. The role of each of party within the labour 
relationship is briefly described. 
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4.1 Employers: 
A definition and brief description of the role of employers in the labour relationship 
follows. 
4.1.1 A definition of emvloyer: 
An employer can be defined as: 
"any person whosoever who employs or provides work for any person and 
remunerates or expressly or tacitly undertakes to remunerate him or who 
.... permits any person whomsoever in any manner to assist him in the 
carrying on or conducting of his business." 
(Bendix, 1989:388) 
4.1.2 Role of employers in the labour relationship: 
Employers "provi4e or withhold employment and ... reward those in employment" in 
order to fulfil organisational outputs or service objectives6 (Alfred, 1984:19). Therefore, 
. the primary role of employers in the labour relationship is to protect their fundamental 







The right to choose competent labour; 
The right to provide instruction or training of employees and to ensure the 
satisfactory fulfilment of job demands; 
The right to dismiss or retrench employees on the basis of incompetence, 
incompatibility, misconduct or general redundancy; 
The right to replace labour where withheld; and 
The right to refuse wages where conditions of employment are not fulfilled. 
(Landman, 1990b:6) 
lJ 
Furthermore, these rights and interests can be protected by representative associations 





Regulating and identifying organisational service matters; 
Consolidating views on key matters and concerns;7 
Constructing labour relations services and personnel practices if necessary; 
and 
Formulating specific approaches to changing social pressures or labour 
legislation. 
(Sing & Maharaj, 1990:46; Windmuller & Gladstone, 1984:1) 
4.2 Trade unions: 
A definition and brief description of the role of trade unions in the labour relationship 
follows. 
4.2.1 A definition of trade union: 
A trade union can be defined as: 
"A continuing permanent organisation created by workers to protect 
themselves at their work, to better the conditions of their lives, and to 
provide a means of.expression for the workers views on matters of society." 
(International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Du Toit, 1976:1) 
4.2.2 Role of trade unions in the labour relationship: 
The role of trade unions in the labour relationship is to protect workers or their 
members in "certain favourable situations" and to defend their interests in less favourable 
circumstances8 (Stagner in Du Toit, 1976:6).9 Specific trade union concerns include, 
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employer injustices, employee grievances and the need to secure greater workplace 
control (Sing & Bendix, 1993:61). The ability of trade unions to ~chieve these goals is, 







The right to work; 
The right to a freedom of association; 
The right to collective bargaining; 
The right to strike; 
The right to protection; and 
The right to training and development. 
(Gerber, Nel & van Dyk, 1992:380; Reddy & Sing, 1988:86) 
(Aaron, Najita & Stern, 1988:53; Flanders in Douwes Dekker, n.d.:46; Freeman, 1986:76; 
Sing & Bendix, 1993:61). 
4.3 The State: 
A definition and brief description of the role of the State in the labour relationship 
follows. 
4.3.1 A definition of the State: 
The State can be defined as: 
A representative abstraction of all individuals in a society, which is commonly 
perceived as a system of government. (Adopted from Bendix, 1989:66) 
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4.3.2 Role of the State in the labour relationship: 
The State fulfills a variety of functions which can be characterised by its role as both 
master and se1Vant in the labour relationship (Gerber, Nel & van Dyk, 1992:376). These 
functions include the role of the State as legislator, conciliator, regulator, and advisor. In 
this context, the manner in which the Judiciary and Police influence the labour 
relationship is also a crucial consideration (Bendix, 1989:71). · 
4.3.2.1 The State as Legislator: 
The States' functions as legislator include: selective sanctioning of employer and trade 
union rights and determining the nature of collective bargaining processes and dispute 
settlement procedures.11 (Bendix, 1989:71) 
4.3.2.2 The State as Conciliator: 
The States' functions as Conciliator include: establishing conciliatory procedures for 
resolving disputes. Mechanisms which can be applied include arbitration, conciliation and 
mediation. (Bendix, 1989:72) 
4.3.2.3 The State as Regulator: 
The State's function as Regulator involves the application of various measures which 
influence the labour relationship. Examples include, the promulgation of emergency 
policies, such as "wage freezes" in the public sector, and the application of specific legal 
requirements for recognition agreements.12 (Bendix, 1989:72) 
4.3.2.4 The State as Advisor: 
The State's function as Advisor involves monitoring or advising employers and trade 
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unions on specific matters. This function highlights its capacity to "influence the 
development of industrial relations in society". (Bendix, 1989:72) 
4.3.2.5 The State and the Judiciary: 
Although formally distinguished by separate responsibilities, it can be said that the 
judiciary "remains an instrument of the State". However, the recent need for a specialised 
knowledge of labour relations has led to the adoption of distinct labour relations 
jurisprudence which has underscored the level of judicial independence from State 
influence. (Bendix, 1989:72). 
4.3.2.6 The State and the Police: 
The police ostensibly play the role of public protector, especially in the case of labour 
disputes which threaten the property or life of civilians. However, police intervention in 
labour disputes is contentious. Therefore the State, which is responsible for maintaining 
public order, must decide on the nature and role of the police force in disciplining 
parties in the labour relationship (International Labour Organisation, 1989b:20).13 
(Bendix, 1989:73) 
5. Conducting the labour relationship: 




The purpose and objectives of a regulatory system; 
The premises adopted by such an approach; and 
The subsequent interpretation of rights in this regard. 
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5.1 Regulating the labour relationship: 
The primary purpose of labour relations is to "confine the adversary's discretion in order 
to secure the actualisation of ones' own policy" (Dlugos, Dorow & Weiermair, 1988:112). 
However, despite the variety of modus operandi applied in labour relations systems, a key 
objective is to secure a stable and mature society. This goal involves the recognition of 
the inherency of conflict and the need to institutionalise, rather than suppress it (Douwes 
Dekker, 1990:24; Kahn-Freund, 1977:27; Pretorius in Steadman, 1993:44).14 According 
to Pretorius (in Steadman, 1993:44), a mature society can therefore be measured, in part, 
by the degree to which its members take responsibility for the conflicts and disputes that 
inevitably exist within it. To sum up, labour relations involves the following objectives: 
* 
* 
To resolve conflict in a rational and methodical manner; and 
To localise the existing adversity of key parties. 
(Kahn-Freund, 1977:27) 
These goals can be characterised by the following key labour relations premises. 
5.2 Key premises for conducting the labour relationship: 





The flexibility of rules of conduct applied; 
The prevailing climate of trust and understanding between parties; 
The mutual interdependence of employers and trade unions by the 
distribution of powers; and 
The protection of group interests and rights. 
(Poppleton, 1985:15-18; Purcell in Douwes Dekker, n.d.:34) 
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5.2.1 Flexible rules of conduct: 
Because of the dynamic nature of labour relations, the viability of applied rules of 




The application of restrictive or dogmatic legislation which can exacerbate 
existing tensions; and 
The application of indistinct or indeterminant legislation (i.e. a lack of 
distinct rules) which can result in the adoption of alternative measures, 
such as processes of power, in resolving labour conflicts.15 
(Bendix & Swart, 1982:2; Heneman & Schwab, 1978:272; International 
Labour Office, 1986:66; Kahn-Freund, 1977:21-50; Reese, 1983:51). 
Therefore, the manner in which labour legislation supports or restrains social power is 
contingent on its flexibility and the distinction of rules applied. These regulations must 
also take into account the pragmatic realities of the relationship (Kahn-Freund, 1977:13). 
As Reese (1983:51) explains: 
"Organisational reality is ever-changing, and labour legislation ultimately 
can do nothing but acknowledge these changes by continually amending the 
statutes." 
5.2.2 Trust: 
A crucial element of successful labour relations is the degree to which parties can trust 
one another within this process. It is suggested that trust is contingent on the extent to 
which parties participate in the regulation of the labour relationship (i.e. voluntary 
systems of labour relations) and the degree of "openness" enjoyed between such parties 
(Poppleton, 1985:19; Purcell in Douwes Dekker, n.d.:34). However, complete trust is 
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undermined by the inherent nature of conflict in the labour relationship (Douwes 
Dekker, n.d.:34 ). 
5.2.3 Distribution of p·owers: 
The distribution of powers between parties within a labour relationship influences the 
nature of ensuing practices. Sources of power differ among the parties. Trade union 
· power is usually determined by the size of its membership or its constituency, 16 while 
employer power, is derived from the accumulation and/or control of available human 
and material resources (Coetzee, 1985:143; Hernandez, 1983:3). It is proposed that an 
equitable distribution of powers is fundamental for ensuring a stable labour relations 
system (Flanagan, 1990:305).17 
5.2.4 Protection of group interests: 
The protection of group interests is fundamental to stable labour relations. In particular, 






Right of peaceful assembly; 
Freedom of opinion; 
Protection against arbitrary arrest; 
Right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial court; Protection 
against inhuman treatment; and 
Protection of trade union property based on "widely recognised principles 
of participation by workers' and employers' organisations in balanced 
economic and social development". 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989b:3) 
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Subsequently, a lack of recognition for trade union interests can lead to a "loss of faith in 
trade unionism itself, to the detriment not only of the workers, but in the long run to 
society as a whole" (International Labour Organisation, 1989b:22). (International Labour 
Office, 1986:24) 
!n this context, rights play a key role in entrenching the above premises. 
5.3 A description of Rights: 







Each element sets particular conditions for establishing principle rights arguments. For 
example, with regard to the right to strike, the Universality argument states that a choice 
can be made between the right to strike as a right in rem (i.e. a universal right) or a right 
in personam (i.e. a local or citizen right). Therefore, those advocating a right to strike 
would adopt the view that this right is fundamentally a right in rem (i.e. a universal 
right). On the other hand, those opposing a right to strike would support the notion that 
this right is a right in personam (i.e. a local or citizen right). (Ben-Israel, 1988:29-30; 
Cranston in Brassey et al, 1987:124)18 
6. Overview of Chapter Two:_ 
This chapter described a variety of conceptual, theoretical and practical features of 






The concept and definition of labour relations; 
A description of the main frames of reference, notably the Unitarist, 
Radicalist and Pluralist perspectives; 
The constitution and role of parties (employers, trade unions and the 
State) and the nature of their rights in the workplace; and 
The key premises for conducting the labour relationship. 
For the purposes of this thesis, labour relations was described as an interactive framework 
for parties to regulate matters of mutual concern. Finally, it was noted that the Pluralist 
frame of reference was to be applied for this thesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A BACKGROUND TO LABOUR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT. 
1. Introduction: 






The concepts of conflict and inherent conflict; 
The causes of labour conflict; 
The concept of labour disputes; 
The processes of labour dispute resolution and settlement; and 
The approaches to labour dispute settlement. 
2. The concepts and a definition of conflict and inherent conflict: 
Conflict can be described as "a clash between different group principles or interests" 
(Presidents Council Report, 1990:2). 






That it is perceived; 
That it follows a number of stages; 
That it involves opposition; 
That it includes a scarcity of resources; and 
That it provokes an obstruction.to agreement 
(Fox in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:175). 
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Conflict can be either functional or dysfunctional. Functional conflict involves a variety of 
pressures which improve the organisational function, for ex~ple, more effective policy-
making or planning, undoing "groupthink" tendencies and motivating individuals to be 
more innovative (Fox in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:174). On the other hand, 
dysfunctional conflict can be characterised by a breakdown in organisational services or 
outputs due, inter alia, to generic employment issues or bargaining imbalances (Fox in 
Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:174; Fox in Wood, 1989:258).1 
For the purposes of this thesis, the following definition of conflict applies: 
"A process within which an intentional attempt is made by party A to 
thwart party B by way of obstruction that will result in frustrating party B 
in attaining his objectives or furthering his interests" 
(Robbins in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:175). 
Inherent conflict can therefore be described as a natural or inevitable phenomenon of 
society, which in terms of labour relations, is the key dynamic between employers (or 
management) and trade unions (or labour). (Kahn-Freund, 1977:28; Pillay & Bendix, 
1993:45)2 
3. Causes of labour conflict: 
A variety of factors can trigger labour conflict. In general, these factors can be ascribed 
to the inherent imbalances of "social demands, [the] employment relationship and the 
spirit and possibilities of the common law" (Kahn-Freund, 1977:12). 







Behavioural factors; and 
Structural factors. 
3.1 JEnvironmental factors: 
Environmental factors can be distinguished by the political, social, economic, legal and 
organisational environments. Each of these environments is briefly described. 
3.1.1 The political environment: 
Politics involves the shaping of power, rule and authority (Wood, 1989:7). In the 
workplace, the political environment can influence the nature. of the labour relationship 
by restricting certain party privileges or rights. Subsequently, political factors can trigger 
conflict in a number of ways. According to Hernandez (1983:11) such causes involve: 
"Any measures adopted to prohibit, restrict or impair the ability of wage-
earners to organise themselves for collective industrial action [in] an effort 
to control the power distribution of society." 





Trade union opposition to public policies; 
The use of unfair rules and regulations; 
The use of police or military intervention for settling labour disputes; 
The application of excessive prohibitions by the State or employers against 
trade unions; and 
Limited or non-existent democratic (human) rights. 
(Hernandez, 1983:11; Wood, 1989:247) 
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3.1.2 The social environment: 
Labour conflict can be caused by ineffective community structures (Ben-Israel, 1988:1; 
Hernandez, 1983:7; Wood, 1989:55). Subsequently, employees which are poorly 
integrated with the "wider society" may feel isolated and threatened by an "alien working 
environment" (Eldridge in Wood, 1989:55). Consequently, the need for "group cohesion" 
or a "consciousness of collective grievance" and the protection of self interests can result 
in labour conflict (Hernandez, 1983:7). 
3.1.3 The economic environment: 
Labour conflict can be caused by the nature or state of the economic environment at a 
point in time (Wood, 1989:58,247). For example, during a per.iod of economic growth the 
focus of specific conflicts or disputes usually includes demands .for higher wages3 and 
better working conditions (Hernandez, 1983:4-10). On the other hand, during a 
recessionary period concomitant labour hardships can trigger demands for job security 
and work-related matters (Ben-Israel, 1988:1)4• It is also suggested by Cronin that labour 
conflict can itself influence the "character and nature of the economic system" (in Wood, 
1989:58). 
3.1.4 The legislative environment: 







The use of "punitive strike law"; 
The use of prejudiced and inflexible legislation; 
The use of inappropriate or superfluous legislation; 
The application of unfair judicial discretion; 
The prohibition of key labour rights, such as the right to strike; and 
- ' 
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* The absence of acceptable rules of procedure. 
(Bendix & Swart, 1982:8; Freeman, 1986:43,66-68; International Labour 
Organisation, 1989b:108; Hernandez, 1,983:7; Lieberman, 1980:28; Morris, 
1985:234) 
3.1.5 The organisational environment: 
A variety of organisational factors can contribute 







Feelings of workplace alienation; 
Poor or unsatisfactory work conditions; 
Concerns over job security (crisis of redundancy, technological change, and 
new skill requirements); 
Dissatisfaction with existing management or administrative practices; 
Failed or frustrated employee aspirations; and 
Unrealistic organisational demands or expectations of the workforce. 
(Blauner and McCord in Wood, 1989:56; Hernandez, 1983:7-13) 
3.2 Behavioural factors: 




A fear of change in the workplace; 
Group beliefs and the lack of confidence in key actors; and 
Different expectations by held the parties with regard to the labour 
relationship. 
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The:se concerns will be briefly described. 
3.2.l Fear of change: 
A fear of change in the workplace can result in the process of redefining principle 
"structures and customs of radical differentiation and control" into new paradigms (Du 
Plessis, 1990:63 ). Therefore, the loss of employer and trade union control and a general 
sense of insecurity with the future can be "accompanied by conflict, protest, uncertainty 
and even possibly violence" (Du Plessis, 1990:63). Findings by Terreberry (in Baker, 
1973:178) and Warwick (1974:101) support this notion and suggest that an inverse 
relationship exists between unstable or unpredictable environments and the lack of 
potential for management change.5 Consequently, such an unstable environment can 
lead to labour conflict. 
3.2.2 Group beliefs and a lack of confidence: 
Group beliefs and a lack of confidence in certain actors in the labour relationship can 
also trigger conflict. Therefore, a key concern involves the desire to satisfy certain 
rudimentary or "non-negotiable" needs, namely: acceptance, recognition, human dignity, 
identity, security and human development. Other contributing factors include heightened 
emotions during party or individual interactions in the labour relationship and a lack of 
confidence in the negotiators' persuasive skills. (Burton in the Presidents Council Report, 
1990:86; Hernandez, 1983:7; King, 1990:17) 
3.2.3 Divergent expectations: 
A divergence of expectations can lead to labour conflict. Farber & Bazerman (1989:99-






The employer's inability to fulfil union demands; 
The extremity of demands made by unions and the concomitant reluctance 
of employers to agree; and 
Unfulfilled expectations held by both parties with regard to the ·potential 
outcome.6 
Subsequently, conflict can be triggered by uncertainty, misinformation or a miscalculation 
of the bargaining process (Flanagan, -1990:311). 




Trade union challenges to the existing employer status quo; 
Intra-union competition (especially during periods of rapid unionisation); 
and 
The desire for trade union recognition. 
(Ben-Israel, 1988:1; Bendix, 1989:217; Cronin in Wood, 1989:58; Flanders 
in Bendix and Swart, 1982:8; Hernandez.1983:4-7). 
3.3 Structural factors: 
A poor labour relations climate can be precipitated by inappropriate, inadequate or 
poorly regulated policies and procedures (Boshoff & Bendix, 1993:37; International 
Labour Organisation, 1989b:120; Wissink in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:198). 
Subsequently, conflict can be triggered by specific structural inadequacies or concerns. 
These include, a denial of certain fundamental labour rights, the use of an inappropriate 
bargaining level7and the use of poor or ineffective communications structures.8 
(Hernandez, 1983:7; Hyman, 1975:166; Sing & Bendix, 1993:67). 
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4. The concept of labour disputes: 
Because of their mercurial nature, labour disputes have resulted in a wide variety of 
meanings, such as, strife, discord, controversy or disunity (Presidents Council Report, 
1990:2). Therefore, the notion of labour dispute varies internationally. In the context of 
labour relations, labour disputes broadly typify forms of disagreement between employer; 
and trade unions. These forms include matters of "common interest, any work-related 
factor affecting their relationship or any processes and structures established to maintain 
such relationships" (Bendix, 1992:227; Treu, T. et al., 1987:27). Labour disputes are 
' furthermore distinguished by disputes of right and disputes of interest. 
4.1 The concept of disputes of right: 
Disputes of right directly violate or challenge existing rights. Rights broadly reflect agreed 
or legislated standards of practice which are non-negotiable. Consequently, disputes in 
this category must be interpreted according to existing legal provisions or clauses which 
regul.ate employment. Rights may however also be interpreted according to customary 
workplace practices. (Bendix, 1989:202; Douwes Dekker, 1990:294; Pankert, 1980:723) 
The manner in which disputes of right are resolved or settled is described further on. 
4.2 The concept of disoutes of interest: 
Disputes of interest concern issues where no definitive standards or legal measures are 
applied. They normally arise during the course of collective bargaining or negotiations. 
The outcome however, can result in the adoption of new rights or standards which if 
challenged, subsequently become disputes of right. (Bendix, 1989:203; Douwes Dekker, 
1990:294; Pankert, 1980:723) The manner in which disputes of interest are .resolved or 
settled is described further on. 
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5. Processes of labour dispute resolution and settlement. 
The primary objective of labour relations is to regulate "inevitable and necessary 
conflicts" by means of "reasonably predictable procedures" (Kahn-Freund, 1977:27; 
Hyman in Wood, 1989:263). In terms of this goal, a variety of mechanisms can be 
adopted by disputants for resolving or settling labour disputes in the workplace (Farber 





Power driven processes; 
Processes of right; and 
Processes of interest. 
5.1 Power driven processes: 
Power driven processes involve those measures adopted by parties in a conflict situation 
or labour dispute which are characterised by coercive confrontation or cajolery. 
Examples of these processes include industrial action, lock-outs and litigation. 
Subsequently, their resolution usually involves accommodation or compromise. 
(Steadman, 1993:42; Wissink in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:191-192) 
A brief description of the above processes follows. 
5 .1.1 Industrial action: 




The concept and a definition of industrial action; 
Categories of industrial action; 
Types of industrial action; 
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* Stages of industrial action; and 
* Factors influencing the adoption of industrial action. 
5.1.1.1 The concept and a definition of industrial action: 
A variety of definitions of industrial action are applied (Wood, 1989:6). However, 
industrial action can be broadly described as the manifestation of unresolved conflict 
(Pillay & Bendix, 1993:45). A common characteristic of all the above definitions is the 
breakdown of negotiations between employers and the trade unions.9 Subsequently~ 




A cessation of work or refusal to obey management; 
A commencement of concerted and concurrent collective action; and 
A notice of a demand. 
(Bendix, 1989:213; Brassey et al, 1987:126; Camer~n, Cheadle & 
Thompson, 1989:72; Hernandez, 1983:3; Miles, 1988:2; Rycroft & Jordaan, 
1990:215-220). 
For the purposes of this thesis, the following definition of industrial action applies: 
A collective action where workers withdraw from the labour process as a 
means of gaining a particular demand or demands. (Adapted from Hyman in 
Wood, 1989:6) 
5.1.1.2 Features of industrial action: 
The following forms of industrial action will be described: 









Levels of industrial action; and 
Specific types of industrial action . 
5 .1. l.2.1 Categories of industrial action: 
Industrial action can be categorised into trial of strength strikes10and demonstration 
·stoppages. Trial of strength strikes are characterised by prolonged disputes which transpire 
when all other means of resolving an issue have failed to bring about a satisfactory 
settlc:!ment to the dispute. They are normally embarked upon as a last resort. On the 
other hand, demonstration stoppages are usually adopted when trade unions believe that 
an inadequate or unsatisfactory outcome to their demands is imminent. They are usually 
adopted for a short period of time to persuade or redress imbalances in the negotiation 
proci:!ss. (Bendix, 1989:217; Hyman in Wood, 1989:7) 
Strikes can also be characterised by their spontaneity. Spontaneous or wildcat strikes 
generally occur without prior warning. This category of industrial action is usually illegal 
or unconstitutional and often takes place once a trade unions "existence has become 
largely irrelevant" to a particular conflict11(Turner et al in Hyman, 1975:156). (Bendix, 
1989:218; Hernandez, 1983:4; Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:220) 
Strikes can also be characterised by their sympathetic nature. 
Sympathy strikes entail a show of support by those trade unions not directly involved in a 
labour dispute with employers. Therefore, this process involves the application of indirect 
pressure for the demands of another trade union in direct dispute with employers. 
(Bendix, 1989:217-218; Hernandez, 1983:4; Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:220) 
5.l.1..2.2 Levels of industrial action: 
Industrial acticrn can occur at all the levels of industry. These range from the plant-level 
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~~~---------------------........................ .. 
or organisational strikes to industry, inter-industry and even national strikes. (Bendix, 
1989:218; Hernandez, 1983:4) 
The nature of disputes at each level is also contentious. For example, Bendix (1989:218) 
suggests that industrial action at the higher levels of industry are usually characterised by 
political matters or issues. On the other hand, Hernandez (1983:4) counters that at all 
levels, the principle goal of industrial action involves the improvement of economic 
matters for the workforce. 
5.1.1.2.3 Types of industrial action: 
A number of specific types of industrial action can be adopted. These include: Overtime 
bans, work-stoppages, work-to-rule, go-slows, sit-ins, picketing/boycotts and other 
approaches. Each of these types is briefly described. 
5.1.1.2.3.1 Ove11ime bans: 
Overtime-bans involve the prohibition of the workforce by trade unions to work 
after-hours in an organisation. This entails a curtailment of contractual or voluntary 
labour hours, during or after formal working hours. Overtime-bans are usually adopted in 
organisations which are dependent on the completion or continuation of the work 
process "after-hours". (Bendix, 1989:223; Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:216).12 
5.1.1.2.3.2 Work-stoppages: 
Work-stoppages involve a refusal by trade unions to work for no reason (i.e. they do not 
set an industrial demand). This form of industrial action is often spontaneous and can be 
invoked without the permission of a trade union (Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:218). 
~~----------------------.................. _ 
5.1.1.2.3.3 Work-to-rule: 
Work-to-rule involve a continuation of work within the organisation but strictly according 
to the letter_ of the employment contract. This form of industrial action can result in a 
drop of production or service standards while pay incomes are continued. Furthermore, 
the work-to-rule is particularly effective when adopted by skilled employees. (Bendix, 
1989:224; Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:219). 
5.1.1.2.3.4 Go-slows: 
Go-slows involve a similar process as work-to-rule but differ in that they specifically limit 
outputs or the standard of service provided during working hours. (Bendix, 1989:223; 
Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:219). 
5.1.1.2.3.5 Sit-ins: 
Sit-ins involve the occupation of the workplace by trade unions which refuse to work and 
seek a halt in production or service. The goal of this approach is to deny employers 
access to production in order to promote trade union demands (Rycroft & Jordaan, 
1990:220). 
5.1.1.2.3.6 Picketing/Boycotts: 
Picketing/boycotts or stayaways involve "large-scale and serious actions" which disrupt the 
work cycle. Characteristic measures adopted include the prevention of "scab labour" from 
continuing work, persuading fellow employees to join the cause, declaring the dispute 
publicly and preventing clientele from the benefits of the service or product. (Bendix, 
1989:224; Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:221; Wood, 1989:6). 
3.5 
5.1.1.2.3.7 Other: 
Other types of industrial action can include, absenteeism and industrial sabotage (Wood, 
1989:8). 
5.1. l.2.4 Fae-tors influencing the use or choice of industrial action: 
Industrial action can be triggered by consensus or conduct. Consensus mobilisation occurs 
when industrial action is approved by a trade unions' membership (i.e. a passive 
approach). Action mobilisation is characterised by the use of militant behaviour in order 
to stimulate general support for industrial action (i.e. an active approach). (King, 







The potential cost or punishment for such action; 
The possible reward or discipline for participation; 
The usefulness of such an approach in fulfilling specific goals; 
The overall advantages and disadvantages of each type of industrial action; 
and 
The potential support for such action by the membership of a trade union. 
(King, 1990: 19-20) 
5 .1.1.2.5 Phases and the development of industrial action: 
In terms of the above, the industrial action process can be summed up by the following 
phases and developments: 
* The prevalence of conditioning factors or circumstances in the workplace, 





The generation of specific triggers or causes;13 
The occurrence off acilitators or inhibitors in determining the course of 
events to follow. Examples include, existing trade union and management 
expertise as well party strategies; 
The measures and approach adopted for settling industrial action; and 
The determination of either a substantive outcome (i.e. real gains such as a 
wage increases) or procedural outcomes (i.e. procedures adopted for future 
Industrial Relations practices). 
(Hernandez, 1983: 1-15) 
5.1.2 Lock-outs: 
Employers have recourse to a lock-out in the event of industrial action. The main 
purpose of a lock-out is to prevent striking workers from entering the workplace 
premises. The reason given for this action is usually ascribed to the employer's concern 
with regard to the potential damage of industrial action in the workplace.14 (Ben-Israel, 
1988:2; Douwes Dekker, 1990:291; Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:221) 
5.1.3 Litigation: 
Litigation is a process whereby disputes are settled in a court of law or other quasi-legal 
institutions, such as Industrial Courts. It is particularly useful in the case of disputes of 
right which require formal interpretation. (Independent Mediation Society of South 
Africa, 1985:1; Wissink in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:200) 
5.2 Processes of right: 
Processes of right are designed to settle disputes by means of an "independent standard 
of right or fairness which judges what the parties want" (Steadman, 1993:42). Processes of 
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right are characterised by the use of the arbitration mechanism. 
5.2.l Arbitration: 
Arbitration can be described as an "amorphous form of third-party intervention" which 
involves a binding settlement between disputing parties. (Bendix, 1989:211; Bloch, 
-1989:35; Independent Mediation Society of South Africa, 1985:3; Swart, 1988:121; 
Thompson, 1992:504) 




The purpose of arbitration; 
The approaches to arbitration; and 
The application of arbitration. 
5.2.1.1 Purpose of arbitration: 
The purpose of arbitration is to encourage parties to settle disputes by negotiation. 
Failing this, a narrowing of demands by both parties is sought as far as possible before 
its application. A key element of arbitration is the uncertainty of the award outcome by 
the arbitrator. This serves as a key impetus for negotiations or a narrowing down of 
demands to an "acceptable level of loss" by either party. (Bloch, 1989:36; Farber & Katz 
in Farber & Bazerman, 1989:103; Freeman, 1986:70; Weiler, 1980:229). 
5.2.1.2 Approaches to arbitration: 
Common forms of arbitration involve the use of conventional arbitration, last offer and 
pendulum arbitration. 
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5.2. l.2.1 Conventional Arbitration: 
Conventional arbitration is characterised by an equitable split in award by the arbitrator. 
Both parties in dispute can therefore expect a number of rewards and costs for their 
demands. (Bendix, 1989:211; Farber & Bazerman, 1989:100). 
5.2.1.2.2 Last Offer and Pendulum Arbitration: 
Last offer, best offer or last best offer arbitration is characterised by the selection of one or 
the other parties" final offer (or last offer) by the arbitrator. Pendulum, either-or or one-
or-the-other arbitration however, involves the selection of either parties final offers on an 
issue-by-issue basis. (Bendix, 1989:211; Farber & Bazerman, 1989:100; Independent 
Mediation Society of South Africa, 1985:3; Lewin, D. et al., 1~88:339-43; Weiler, 
1980:232) 
5.2.1..3 Applying arbitration: 
Although arbitration is commonly applied to settle disputes of right, it can also be applied 
to disputes of interest. The latter approach is characterised by the use of voluntary 
arbitration where both parties apply for this mechanism and select an arbitrator by 
mutual consent. Arbitration is usually the final step in dispute settlement. In some 
services (such as essential services) it also displaces certain key labour rights, such as the 
right to strike. (Alfred, 1984:66; Independent Mediation Society of South Africa, 1985:5; 
Kochan in Bendix, 1989:211; Subbarao, 1988:122) 
5.3 Processes of interest: 
Processes of interest are designed to settle disputes by means of negotiation. This process 
involves a consideration of the "needs, desires, concerns, and fears which lie behind what 
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the parties say they want" (Steadman, 1993:42). Processes of interest are characterised by 
the use of collective bargaining, mediation and conciliation. 
5.3.1 Collective bargaining: 




The concept and a definition of collective bargaining; 
The purpose of collective bargaining; and 
The scope and content of collective bargaining. 
5.3.1.1 The concept and a definition of collective bargaining: 
Collective bargaining involves an engagement between two or more parties in the labour 
relationship to find agreement or accommodation. This process involves identifying or 
analyzing both dif.f ering and shared needs and interests and optimising common 
ground15with regard such matters of mutual concern. Such parties are represented by 
employer and trade union interests. (Alfred, 1984:8; Craythorn, 1990:278; Fox in Fox, 
Schwella & Wissink, 1991:178; Horwitz, 1991a:76; Public Services International in Sing & 
Bendix, 1993:63; Wiehahn, 1988:71)16• 
Collective bargaining is described as the keystone of labour relations. However no 
universal definition of collective bargaining is applied. The lack of a uniform definition 
can be attributed to the number of contexts in which bargaining can take place17• 
For the purposes of this thesis, the following self-applied definition of collective 
bargaining applies: 
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A process of interaction between parties in the labour relationship seeking 
agreement through negotiation on substantive and procedural matters 
pertaining to their employ. 
5.3.1.2 The purpose of collective bargaining: 
The purpose of collective bargaining is to settle 
employment disputes in a peaceful and predictable manner18• 




Securing employment justice; 
Ensuring equitable participation by all; and 
Providing the means for a fair regulation of industrial disputes. 
(Cameron, Cheadle & Thompson, 1989:69; TroHip, 1990b:22; Van Coller, 
1986:8) 
These objectives are applied within the collective bargaining process. 
5.3.1.3 The scope and content of collective bargaining: 




Steps in the collective bargaining process; 
Forms of collective bargaining; and 
The collective bargaining structure. 
. 5.3.1.3.1 Steps in the collective bargaining process: 






Mandate: Parties seek a mandate from their members in order to clarify 
key issues for bargaining;19 
Strategising: A process of "strategising" follows, whereby demands and 
counterproposals are exchanged between the participant trade unions and 
employers. This step is used for assessing the likelihood of opposing 
expectations and for securing the best possible gains; 
Bartering: Bartering involves a "whittling-down" of original demands as 
submitted by both parties before consensus can be achieved; and 
Consensus: Finally, where the "costs of disagreement" outweigh the "costs of 
agreement" consensus can b~ reached and bargaining completed. 
(Chamberlain and Kuhn in Lewin, D. et al, 1988:194; Douwes Dekker, 
n.d.:41; Horwitz, 1991a:66; Lewin, D. et al., 1988:194; Trollip, 1990a:35) 
5.3.1.3.2 Forms of collective bargaining: 
A wide variety of collective bargaining forms exist. As Reese (1983:32) comments: 
"The right to collective bargaining covers a whole spectrum of systems and 
styles, reflecting to a large extent the cultural values prevailing in a 
particular industrialised society." 





Dynamic and Static bargaining; and 
Distributive and Integrative bargaining. 
5.3.1.3.2.1 Dynamic and Static bargaining: 
Collective bargaining can be either dynamic or static. The dynamic approach involves a 
variety of formal interventionary bilateral mechanisms, such as Industrial Councils and 
Conciliation Boards, for settling disputes. The static approach involves informal voluntary 
mechanisms for finding an agreement between disputing parties. Both approaches can 
adopt either a distributive or integrative bargaining style. (Kahn Freund, 1977:52; Lewin, 
D. et al., 1988:193). 
5.3.1.3.2.1 Distributive and Integrative bargaining: 
Distributive or win-loose bargaining apportions awards between disputing parties. 
Distributive bargaining is characterised by the use of adversarial tactics, notably threats 
and bluffs, in order for parties to ensure a better outcome to their demands.20 This 
approach is usually adopted where disputes of interest occur, for example economic issues 
such as wages. (Klinger, 1980:342; Lewin, D. et al., 1988:194) 
Integrative or win-win bargaining involves a fair "split" of awards between parties. 
Integrative bargaining is characterised by an open and honest manner which parties adopt 
in an effort to find a settlement. This approach can be applied in disputes of right, such as 
contractual and other non-economic issues. (Klinger, 1980:342; Lewin, D. et al., 
1988:194) 
In practice, a mixture of both the above approaches is often adopted. This trend can be 
ascribed to the integratjve nature of the employment relationship and the distributive 
nature of group interests. (Walton-McKersie in Lewin, D. et al., 1988:193). 
5.3.1.3.3 The collective bargaining structure: 
The collective bargaining structure adopted is contingent upon "the interests, preferences, 
and characteristics of labour and management". Notably, these structural features are 
influenced by "the economic, legal, and political characteristics of the immediate 
environment". (Lewin, D. et al., 1988:124) 




Bargaining representation and unit determination; 
Bargaining scope; and 
· Bargaining levels. 
5.3.1.3.3.1 Bargaining representation and unit determination: 
The size or representation of parties within the bargaining process can fundamentally 
affect the balance of bargaining power, the norm being: the larger or more 
representative th~ party, the greater its influence in the bargaining process21(Lewin, D. 
et al., 1988:125). A bargaining unit can be defined as: 
"A group recognised as appropriate for representation by an employee 
organisation for the purposes of collective and/or meet-and-confer 
discussions." 
(Freeman, 1986:76) 




The similarity of bargaining duties expected by negotiators; 
The diversity of bargaining topics; 
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* The potential number of barga~ning representations; and 
* Th~ extent to which administrative and managerial functions are 
centralised. 
(Lewin, D. et al., 1988:125) 
5.3.1.3.3.2 Bargaining scope: 
The bargaining scope is characterised by a variety of social and economic demands. 
Common examples include conditions of service, wages, trade union recognition and the 
bargaining procedures themselves. The selection of bargaining topics is however 
dependent on the relevance of such concerns to participants and the flexibility with 
which they can be bargained for. (Aaron, Najita & Stern, 198~:211; Lewin, D. et al., . 
1988:511; Lieberman, 1980:27; Pankert, 1980:733) 
5.3.1.3.3.3 Bargaining levels: 
Collective bargaining can occur at either the organisational (local), sectoral, industry or 
even inter-indust1y (central) level (Patel, 1990:50). Determining the: appropriate level for 
bargaining to occur is however complex. This dilemma is illustrated by the following list 
of possible advantages and disadvantages of a central bargaining level: 





The efficient use of negotiators; 
The setting of both minimum and equitable standards for whole industries; 
The provision of clear, uniform and congruous job rates; and 
The promotion of "economies of scale" or cost-effectiveness, thereby 
allowing individual organisations more time to concentrate on other key 
responsibilities. 
(Knowles, 1988:227; Patel, 1990:50-1) 




The lack of organisational autonomy; 
The potential lack of fair representation by some trade unions at the 
central level due to their limited membership number; and 
The lack of consideration given to minority views. 
(Knowles, 1988:227; Patel, 1990:50-1) 
Subsequently, as noted above, the selection of a particular level for collective bargaining 
is dependent on the predominant interests and needs of parti~s at the time of the dispute 
(Bendix & Swart, 1982:7). 
5.3.2 Mediation: 
Mediation encompasses "a wide variety of dispute resolution behaviours" (Lewin, D. et 




Purpose of mediation; 
Approaches to mediation; and 
Applying mediation. 
5.3.2.1 Purpose of mediation: 
The purpose of mediation is to facilitate negotiation with parties which cannot reconciie 
their differences w1thout outside intervention22(Bendix, 1989:208; Independent 
Mediation Society of South Africa, 1985:1). 
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5.3.2.2 Approaches to mediation: 





Non-directive strategies; and 
Directive strategies. 
5.3.2.2.1 Reflexive strategi.es: 
Reflexive strategies can be applied in circumstances where an agenda or format for 
dispute resolution has already been established by the disputants. Subsequently, the 
mediators23 role in settling a dispute becomes symbolic with little or no intervention 
' 
during the process. (Lewin, D. et al., 1988:359) 
5.3.2.2.2 Non-directive strategi.es: 
Non-directive strategies are similar to the above approach but differ in that some 
mediatory guidance may be sought in formulating resolutions (Lewin, D. et al, 1988:359). 
5.3.2.2.3 Directive strategies: 
Directive strategies, on the other hami, are distinguished by the commitment of the 
mediator to settle the process in an active manner. This strategy is usua_lly_ adopted in the 
case of obstinacy or a loss of initiative during prior_ engagements which threaten the 
possibility of a final settJement. (Lewin, D. et al., 1988:359) 
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5.3.2.3 Applying mediation: 
Mediation is suitable for both disputes of right and disputes of interest (Alfred, 1984:66; 
Bendix, 1989:211; Douwes Dekker,n.d.:71). 
Mediation, as noted above, is facilitated by a third party. This party can embody either an 
individual or agency appointed by the government, privately, or by the parties 
themselves. A key quality of the mediator is that such an individual or group are neutral 
to the debate. 2-i (Bendix, 1989:208; Lewin, D. et al., 1988:352; Wissink in Fox, Schwella 






Identifying and confronting issues of importance; 
Providing favourable circumstances and conditions for .conflict resolution; 
Removing barriers to effective communication; 
Re-establishing the values for effective negotiation such as persuasion 
rather than coercion, mutual respect and openness; and 
Finding workable solutions to both parties, and making them acceptable to 
all those involved. 
(Wissink in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:199-200). 
Mediation can be applied at any stage of the bargaining process, and followed or 
preceded by other dispute settlement mechanisms (Independent Mediation Society of 
South Africa, 1985:4 ). The approach is usually "relatively informal and unstructured, 
reflecting the personal style of the mediator, the preferences of the union and employer 
representatives, and the intensity of the dispute" (Lewin, D. et al., 1988:334). In spite of 
its somewhat nebulous nature, mediation is characterised by three procedural phases: 
* 
* 
An introduction and establishment of a mediators' credibility;25 
Active mediatory input and counsel on matters pertaining to the dispute;26 
and 
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* Attaining a settlement or acknowledging the need for other mechanisms to 
resolve the dispute. 
(Kochan in Bendix, 1989:207-10). 
5.3.3 Conciliation: 
Conciliation can be described as a process of facilitating disputes in a non-substantive 





Purpose of conciliation; 
Approaches to conciliation; and 
Applying conciliation. 
5.3.3.1 Purpose of conciliation: 
The purpose of conciliation is to establish a bargaining forum where parties in dispute 
can be guided or. controlled by the facilitator who is neutral to the debate (Bendix, 
1989:207). 
5.3.3.2 Approaches to conciliation: 
The role of the conciliator is restricted to the process of refereeing a dispute, while 
avoiding any part in the substantive matters being discussed or negotiated by the 
disputants (BendiX, 1989:207). 
. 5.3.3.3 Applying conciliation: 
Conciliation is suitable for all forms of dispute, but especially for disputes of interest. 
Conciliation can be voluntarily adopted by parties in dispute or statutorily imposed by 
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the State. This mechanism is usually applied when all other means of negotiation have 
failed. This involves the establishment of a negotiating forum where disputing parties 
confront each other. If a stalemate or a breakdown in the process occurs then a "cooling 
off' period is allowed. This step ensures the maximum possible opportunity for resolving 
disputes by avoiding "heat of the moment events". (Bendix, 1989:207; Independent 
Mediation Society of South Africa, 1985:2) 
5.4 Other dispute resolution and settlement mechanisms: 
Several alternative mechanisms or combinations of the above can also be applied for 
settling disputes. Two primary mechanisms which will be described briefly include: Fact-
finding and Mediation-Arbitration. 
5.4.1 Fact-finding: 
Fact-finding involves "the systematic collection of facts" by parties for disputants in order 
to present such data to a third party facilitator. A key characteristic of this process is the 
facilitators task of providing a non-binding decision. (Lewin, D. et al., 1987:337-8; 
Wissink in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:200) 
5.4.2 Mediation-Arbitration: 
Mediation-Arbitration, as the name suggests, is a mixture of both these mechanisms. The 
process involves the establishment of a voluntary forum for negotiations, where the 
grounds for possible agreement are mediated and finally arbitrated. (Independent 
Mediation Society of South Africa, 1985:3) 
6. Approaches to labour dispute settlement: 









Avoidance: Staying out of potential conflict situations or avoiding topics 
which could generate conflict; 
Cajolery: Or forms of "persuasion", whereby a party tactically approaches 
the urgency of an issue by focusing on the opposing parties "psyche"; 
Smoothing: One side or party adopts an attitude which reduces the 
perceived gravity of the conflict situation; 
Accommodation: Reaching an agreement in which both parties to the 
dispute accommodate the demands of the opposing party; 
Compromise: Where both parties shift their demands in order to reach 
satisfactory arrangements in which both have felt that "gains" have been 
made; 
Consensus: Similar to compromise but with both parties focusing on an 
exchange of benefits; and 
Bargaining: Involves a setting out of minimum demands which must be 
complied with in order to achieve a satisfactory outcome. 
(Blake & Mouton in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:191-192; Dlugos, 
Dorow & Weiermair, 1988:112, Steadman, 1993:41). 
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6.1 Selecting a suitable mechanism for dispute settlement: 
To sum up, the choice of an appropriate mechanism for dispute settlement depends on 
the interests of the disputing parties and applied statutory limitations (Dlugos, Dorow & 
Weiermair, 1988:112). However, whatever form or mechanisms are adopted in this 




That both parties reach agreement by negotiation; 
That one party's views prevail; or 
That a third party intervenes and sets a binding decision. 
(Weiler, 1980:223-4 ). 
6.2 Institutional structures for dispute settlement: 
A variety of institutional structures are applied for settling labour disputes. Three key 





Industrial Councils; and 
Advisory Groups or Boards. 
6.2.1 Labour Courts: 
Labour Courts are specialised institutions whose primary purpose is to "interpret and 
enforce aspects of labour law" within a particular industrial society (McCarthy, 1990:98). 
However, criticisms of this process include: 
* 
* 
The judges' limited knowledge of shopfloor issues, especially in terms of 
-the informal network of shared understandings and norms; and 
The potential for the Court to interfere in the su_bstance of any agreements 
52 
made, thereby undermining the viability of long-terms arrangements. 
(McCarthy, 1990:99; Trollip, 1990a:39). 
These drawbacks can however be alleviated by: the use of specialised expertise, the 
adoption of a flexible approach to dispute settlement and the encouragement of informal 
processes before its application (McCarthy, 1990:98-9). 
6.2.2 Industrial Councils: 
Industrial Councils are formal institutions which regulate conditions of employment and 
wages, and settle disputes. They comprise trade union and employer representatives and, 
in some cases, a third party which facilitates or adjudicates on matters concerning these 
member organisations. (Bendix, 1989:463-4; Horwitz; 1991b:6 .. 7)27 
6.2.3 Advisory Groups or Boards: 
A variety of independent or State-owned Groups or Boards are available for facilitating 
the dispute settlement process. These structures usually offer mediatory or conciliatory 
services. In some cases, on the request of disputing parties, Advisory Groups or Boards 
can apply adjudicative powers for settling a labour dispute. (Independent Mediation 
Society of South Africa, 
1985:2-3) 
6.3 Dispute resolution and settlement priorities: 
The primary objective of a dispute settlement system is to ensure the longevity of 
agreements on substantive or procedural matters (Douwes Dekker, n.d.:62). However the 
approach or m.echanism applied is contingent on numerous endemic conditions within 
present industrial society. Subsequently, a variety of approaches are applied28(True et 
al, 1987:29). To sum up, the following factors contribute to the form of dispute 
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settlement adopted within a labour relations system: 
1. The predisposition of parties to certain mechanisms or structures for 
resolving disputes; 
2. The causes (or nature) and frequency of labour disputes; 
3. The critically assessment of existing practices; and 










The concepts and a definition of conflict and inherent conflict; 
The environmental, behavioural and structural causes of labour conflict; 
The concept of labour disputes, notably disputes of right and disputes of 
interest; 
The processes of labour dispute resolution and settlement, namely power 
driven processes, processes of right and processes of interest; and 
The approaches to labour dispute settlement involving the selection of 
suitable mechanisms, institutional structures and priorities. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR. 
1. Introduction: 
This Chapter outlines a background to international labour relations practice in the 






The concepts and definition of Public Administration ap.d Public 
Management; 
The composition, purpose, characteristics and environment of the public 
sector, and in this context, the Public Personnel Management function; 
The characteristics of labour relations in the public sector and key models; 
The characteristics and role of parties to the labour relationship; and 
The issue of rights in the labour relationship. 
2. Key nomenclature: 
The following terms are described and defined: 
* 
* 
Public Administration; and 
Public Management. 
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2.1 The concept and a definition of Public Administration: 
The term Public Administration can be disaggregated into public and administration. 
2.1.1 The term Public: 
Public loosely refers to everybody, everybody but us or people in general as compared to 
our group (Dunsire, 1975:166). The term therefore, broadly refers to a community or the 
populace of a State. 
2.1.2 The term Administration: 
Administration is defined in a variety of ways (Hanekom, Rowland & Bain, 1985:12; 
Harris, 1990:3 ). These definitions can be broadly distinguished by the context within 









The constitutional law view; 
The institutional view; 
The business economic view; 
The implementation view; 
The comprehensive view; 
The conventional view; 
The management view; and 
The generic view. 
(Hanekom, Rowland & Bain, 1985:12). 
In South Africa, a generic view of administration has traditionally been adopted (Cloete, 
1986:1). However, in the last decade a shift towards the management view has been 
noted. This trend in discussed further on. The generic view describes administration as: 
The process of directing and servicing an organisation by means of policy-
making, organising, financing, staffing, work procedures and controlling. 
(Adapted from Cloete, 1986:1; Dunsire, 1975:1; Morrow, 1980:2).1 
2.1.3 The term Public Administration: 
As with the above terms, a plethora of definitions of Public Administration are applied. 
According to Waldo (in Nigro & Nigro, 1980:3), this is because "a serious definition of 
the term inevitably contains several abstract words or phrases which in the process 
become fogged and lost". The lack of a universal definition can also be ascribed to 
historical developments in terms of its paradigmatic status.2However, Public 







It is a cooperative group effort in a public setting; 
It covers all three branches of government, i.e. the ~xecutive, judicial and 
legislative functions; 
It plays an important role in public policy formulation and is therefore part 
of the political process;3 
It differs in significant ways from private administration; 
It is closely associated with private groups and individuals in providing 
community society. 
It involves "people, organisations, society, and the world environment" 
(Jun, 1986:30; Nigro & Nigro, 1980:14) 
2.1.4 A definition of Public Administration: 
Public administration can therefore be defined as: 
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The provision of seTVices by government organisations to the public by means 
of policy-making, legislative, judicial, seTVice, supeTVisory, inspectoria~ 
representational, transaction-policy processing and production fu,nctions 
sponsored by the State. 
{Adapted from Garret, 1972:9; Parker & Subramaniam in Dunsire, 
1975: 166-175).4 
However, for the purposes of this thesis, the concept of public management applies. 
2.2 The concept and a definitfon of Public Management: 




_The emergence of the Public Management view in the public sector; 
The key characteristics of Public Management; and 
A definition of Public Management. 
2.2.1 Emergence of the Public Management view: 
The traditional mechanistic or generic model of public administration is distinguished by 
hierarchically set lines of command and the allocation of specific functional duties to 
personnel (Brynard, 1992:4 ). This view is further characterised by the adoption of an 
incremental policy approach to organisational functioning. However, as noted above, the 
nianagement view in Public Administration ·has emerged in stature as a public sector 
approach to administration.5This can be attributed to a variety of factors, notably the 
disadvantages of the traditional generic view as applied by many public sector 
organisations, namely: 






An absence of incentives; 
Poor or little competition; 
Limited management autonomy; and 
An overall decline in the status of public employment. 
(Boston and Mascarenhas in Brynard, 1992:3; Treu, T. et al., 1987:4). 
2.2.2 Characteristics of Public Management: 
Public management is characterised by a businesslike approach6 (Brynard, 1992:3). The 
key objective of this approach is to improve organisational performance. Public 
Management can therefore be described as a dynamic form of market-liberalism which 
involves the deregulation of services (i.e. decentralisation of State authority) and the 
transposition of selected business principles to government administration (Boston in 
Brynard, 1992:3-4; Denhart, 1984:43). Examples of these principles include: 
* 
* 
Expanding the awareness of cost; 
Promoting efficiency through responsibility (i.e. accountability) in the 
allocation of resources; and 
Increasing productivity by merit and performance pay fixtures. 
(Rayner in Brynard, 1992:3) 
2.2.3 A definition of Public Management: 
As with other related nomenclature, no universal definition of Public Management is 
applied (Allison in Golembiewski & Gibson, 1983:3; Denhart, 1984:51-52; Fox, Schwella 
& Wissink, 1991:2-4 ). However, Allison concludes , that Public Management is 
essentially "a mixture of reflection on personal experience and speculation" (in 
Golembiewski & Gibson, 1983:3). 
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For the purposes of this thesis, the following definition of Public Management applies: 
"The organisation and direction of resources to achieve a desired result." 
(Allison in Golembiewski & Gibson, 1983:3). 
3. The public sector: 




The composition of the public sector; 
The purpose of public sector organisations; and 
The characteristics of public sector organisation. 
3.1 Composition of the public sector and the public service: 
The public sector comprises a variety of government-owned or sponsored organisations. It 
may also include the public service, whose institutions are involved in the administration 
of the State, but usually excludes "government owned enterprises engaged in industrial 
and/or commercial activities"7(Stieber, 1986:3). The scope of services provided by the 
public sector is determined by the "constitutional, political and social system" of each 
country (Treu, T. et al., 1987:4). Subsequently, local government can form part of either 
the public sector or public service depending on the applied interpretation of each term by 
a State (Stieber; 1986:4 ). 
For the purposes of this Chapter, and the following Chapter (Chapter Five), both the 
public sector and public service include local government. 
' 
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3.2 Purpose of public sector organisations: 
Public sector organisation render a variety of basic services to the community 
(Gildenhuys, 1983; Lewin, D. et al., 1988; Lieberman, 1980). These can be categorised 
into order and protection, social welfare or economic welfare needs (Gildenhuys, 1983:30). 
The types of services rendered by the State vary according to their shortage or a need to 
realise "a governments' goals and objectives" (i.e. broader policy objectives) (Gildenhuys, 
1983:31). However, a number of characteristics distinguish public sector organisations. 
3.3 Characteristics of public sector organisations: 
The characteristi~s of public sector organisations are described in the following contexts: 
* 
* 
The difference between public sector organisations and private sector 
organisations; and 
The unique constraints of public sector organisational functioning. 
3.3.1 A comparison of public and private sector organisations: 




Time perspective: Political necessities and a budgetary calendar limit time 
scope for public managers while "market developments, technological 
innovation and investment, and organisation building" extend time 
perspectives for private sector managers; 
Se1Vice duration: Appointed public managers have a limited service period 










Perfonnance measurement: Limited performance measures are applied to 
public service managers whereas in the private sector a host of checks and 
balances such as financial returns and market share apply; 
Personnel constraints: In the public sector the interests of elected and non-
elected personnel may conflict with one another; 
Equity and efficiency: In- the public sector emphasis is placed on the 
equitable provision of services while the private sector the "profit motive" is 
underscored by efficiency; 
Process: Public sector management tends to be··open to public scrutiny (i.e. 
"transparency") while in tbe private sector such practices are less exposed; 
Press and media handling: Public sector decisions can be closely followed 
and critically debated by the media, whereas private sector decisions 
normally remain confidential in the face of competition; 
Persuasion and direction: A wide variety of pressures often dictate a degree 
of compromise a~ongst public officials, while in the private sector uniform 
decisions are commonly the order of the day; 
Legislative and judicial impact: Public sector managers often remain closely 
scrutinised by "legislative oversight groups or even judicial orders", while 
this practice is uncommon in the private sector; and 
The lack of a clear bottom line: Public sector managers are constrained by a 
the lack of a clear bottom line which is established in the private sector by 





(Dunlop in Golembiewski & Gibson, 1983:5-6; Metcalf & Richards in Brynard, 
1992:6-10) 
These differences can be summed up by the following constraints influencing the 
function of public sector organisations. 
3.3.2 Constraints faced by public sector organisations: 







Unavoidability: Citizens must contribute to public sector organisations in 
order to be served;8 
Allegiance: Organisations are backed by the powers of the State and are 
therefore expected to owe allegiance to it; 
Priorities: Organisations have a moral obligation to prioritise and render 
services on an equitable and continuous basis;9 
Size: The variety of services needed can result in a large number of 
multi-purpose organisations (for example local authorities); 
Politicisation: Organisations are managed by top bureaucrats or officials, 





Performance: Managers experience difficulty in assessing relative 
performance standards due to their ambiguity, and the corollary of 
endeavouring to qualify these in the face of high public expectation;11 
Dual standards: Public managers are expected to perform as "paragons of 
virtue" under public scrutiny (i.e. be above reproach); and 
Monopolistic: Public services are usually unique in that no alternative 
services of a similar nature are provided. 
(Caiden, 1982:14-16; Jun, 1986:22; Mikesell in Gildenhuys, 1983:31-32). 
From the above, it can be said that public sector organisations function within a number 
of unique environments. 
3.4 The public sector environment: 
Public management, as described above, is shaped by a variable environment which 
public organisations must function within (Jun, 1986:31; Nigro & Nigro, 1980:4-11). This 
can be illustrated by the wide variety of policies applied, for example, those controlling 
organisational accountability and regulating specific employment practices (Heneman & 
Schwab, 1978:271; International Labour Organisation, 1989a:110; Lewin, D. et al., 
1988:23; Treu, T. et al., 1987:5). 
In this context, the following environments are described and their influences on labour 
relations noted: 
* The Political environment; 




The Legislative environment; and 
The Organisational environment. 
Furthermore, a brief outline of related environmental influences on labour relations 
practice is included. 
3.4.1 The political environment: 
The State has a civic duty (Freeman, 1986:44) to safeguard the public interest (Aaron, 
Najita & Stern, 1988:213). However, the manner and substance of applied policies "in the 
sense of what is decided, and how actions are decided" is determined by a prevailing 
realpolitik (Aaron, Najita & Stern, 1988:213; Corby, 1991:39; Lewin, D. et al., 1988:148). 
Realpolitik is characterised by a mixture of political beliefs and loyalties as expressed by 
"public officfals, executives or (local) legislators" whose relative strengths regulate the 
body politic (Lewin, D. et al., 1988:98; Treu, T. et al., 1987:11). 
3.4.1.1 Influence on public sector labour relations: 
The political environment can influence labour relations in a number of ways. In the 
case of divided political loyalties the political environment can create a sense of 
uncertainty or animosity amongst the parties to the labour relationship by engendering 
"differences of approach and random results in the process of determining conditions of 
employment" (Treu, T. et al., 1987:11). On the other hand, a more unitary political 
system can entrench uniform labour policy12although extra-parliamentary group 
pressure can still be brought to bear on the government. 
However, a particular issue is the influence of the political dichotomy of elected and 
non-elected officials in public sector organisations. This is briefly described below. 
· 3.4.1.1.1 The political pressures of elected officials: 
The dichotomy of interests between elected and non-elected employers officials can 
undermine the labour relationship in public sector organisations. Subsequently, 
difficulties encountered in formulating key labour policies can be ascribed to undue 
political influence or bias due, for example, to party-political interests.13Prior to 
elections this dichotomy is usually most apparent in local or national electioneering 
campaigns which may, for example, make calls for "tougher" measures on labour 
disruptions and tighter fiscal policy. (International Labour Organisation, 1989a:105-106) 
3.4.2 The socio-economic environment: 
Public sector organisations operate on an equity basis, whereby services are provided at 
cost to the public. Public sector expenditure must therefore conform to set budgetary 
allowances or incomes accrued from society, inter alia, by means of taxation. (Bendix, 
1989:73; Lewin, D. et al., 1988:148; Lieberman, 1980:51) 
3.4.2.1 Influence on public sector labour relations: 
The States' duty to "manage the national economy and determine the level of 
expenditure" highlights the vulnerability of public sector trade-unions to State fiscal 
policy and "changing economic conditions" (Horton in Hays & Kearney, 1983:199; 
Rhodes, 1985:303).14This situation can be illustrated by periods of escalating budgetary 
costs which are generated by inflationary spirals, thereby requiring some form of fiscal 
discipline, inter alia, limiting (or "freezing") public employment salary levels15 (Hays & 
Kearney, 1983:191). 
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3.4.3 The legislative environment: 
The legislative environment is shaped by the prevailing "social, political and economic 
systems" and the "accepted norms of the population, at that time" (Fick & Hugh High, 
1987:126). 
3.4.3.1 Influence on public sector labour relations: 
The legal environment influences labour relations in a number of ways. In the public 
sector, labour law modifies the labour relationship by limiting the "extent of public sector 
unionisation" and directing "the process and outcome of negotiations" (Lewin, D. et al., 






The interventionary nature of the State itself; 
The subsequent rigour with which legislation is applied; 
The nature of public employment;16 
Whether actual or customary processes are adhered to; and 
The complex and bureaucratic disposition of labour legislation. 
(Heneman & Schwab, 1978:275; Ibbs in Corby, 1991:39; International 
Labour Organisation, 1989a:108). 
3.4.4 The organisational environment: 
The organisational environment is broadly characterised by the unique policies and 
practices adopted within. 
3.4.4.1 Influence on public sector labour relations: 
A ubiquitous organisational culture, coloured by the beliefs, customs and values of 
management and unions, shapes the modus operandi of the labour relationship (Metcalf 
67 
'I 
& Richards in Brynard, 1992). Although informal, the prevailing organisational climate 
determines the nature of applied practices. Examples include, deep-rooted employee or 
employer intransigence and "controversial, difficult, and time-consuming" changes to the 
workforce attitude (Van der Merwe in Brynard, 1992:10). 
3.5 Public Personnel-Management in public sector organisations: 




A description of the term Personnel Management; 
Characteristics of Public Personnel Management; and 
A definition of Personnel Management. 
3.5.1 A description of Personnel Management: 
As with the above-described features of Public Management, Public Personnel 
Management can be distinguished from Public Personnel Administration by its dynamic 
nature. Subsequently, Public Personnel Management is characterised by a holistic and 
more flexible approach with regard to the management of personnel within an 
organisation (Shafritz, 1975:x). However, both terms are often interchangeably applied in 
practice- (Stahl, 1962: 15). 
3.5.2 Characteristics of Public Personnel Management: 
The emergence of Public Personnel Management is ascribed to a variety of contributing 
trends, namely: 
* A growing need for specialised skills; 
* A changing managerial perception of the nature of its workforce; and 
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* A recognition by management of labours' integral role in improving 
organisational performance.17 
(De Wet, 1987:14; Siegel & Myrtle, 1985:ix; Whicker & Areson, 1990:181) 




The application of labour policies;18 
The establishment of funds; and 
The development of key staff structures. 
(De Wet, 1987:14) 
Subsequently, this management function has led to the further establishment of 
specialised personnel functions, notably Labour Relations. This trend can be illustrated in 
the case of local government where the Labour Relations Units function in, inter alia, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. (Lewin, D. et al., 1988; 
Siegel & Myrtle, 1985; Treu, T. et al., 1987) However, the nature of the public personnel 
management approach or the specialised personnel function adopted by organisations, is 
contingent on the historical and legal foundations of that organisation (Siegel & Myrtle, 
1985:10) .. 
3.5.3 A definition of Public Personnel Management: 
For the purposes of this thesis, the following definition of Public Personnel Management 
applies: 
The totality of concern by a public sector organisation with its workforce and 
the application of related policy for its procurement, deployment, and 
maintenance. 
(Adapted from Siegel & Myrtle, 1985:2; Stahl, 1962:15) 
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4. Characteristics of labour relations in the public sector: 





The wide variety of methods employed for determining conditions in the 
public sector; 
A detailed and rigorous application of regulatory controls; and 
A restricted bargaining scope, more frequent use of joint consultation 
(particularly with regard to wages and management rights) and the 
proscription of the right to strike. 
(Treu, T. et al., 1987:14-25) 
These characteristics can be categorised into a number of labour relations models. 
4.1. 1 Labour relations models for the public sector: 
In summation, public sector labour relations practices can be distinguished by three 




The private sector model: Whereby public employees are granted similar 
rights as those of their private sector counterparts; 
The modified private sector model: Which excludes certain private sector 
practices or rights, such as the right to strike or bargain and entrenches the 
practice of merit performance promotions;19 and 
The restricted model: Where, for example, the bargaining scope, grievances 
and lay-offs are proscribed in addition to those conditions found in the 
modified private sector model. 
(Stieber, 1986:6-7) 
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5. Parties to the labour relationship: 





The trade unions; and 
The State. 
5.1 Employers: 
The following .aspects of employers will be briefly described: 
* Their characteristics as a party; and 
* Significant trends in public sector labour relations. 
5.1.1 Characteristics: 
Employers are responsible for a wide range of functions in public sector organisations. 
However, this has led to confusion with the generic qualities of the term employer. 
Factors contributing to this confusion include: 
* 
* 
The general misperception that all "public sector managers" are employers; 
The inability to distinguish between the State as employer and its other 
cardinal duties as legislator, conciliator and regulator; and 
The commonly-held notion by unions that "employers" comprise the 
"public" as well in all matters pertaining to the labour relationship.20 
(Bendix, 1989:73; Weiler, 1980:239) 
As noted above, a major characteristic of public sector employers is the distinction 
between elected and non-elected employer officials. Elected employer officials are voted 
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into administrative office for a specified period of time, while non-elected employer 
officials are promoted into positions of responsibility, usually for a life-long career. 
5.1.2 Employers in the labour relationship: 
A significant trend in public sector labour relations has been 
the growth in the number of employer associations representing employer interests in the 
labour relationship. 
5.1.2.1 Growth in emplover representation: 
The need for unified employer representation has become a significant issue in public 
sector labour relations; This can be ascribed to two broad co~cerns, namely: 
* 
* 
The rapid unionisation of the public sector workforce; and 
The more effective challenge posed by trade unions with regard to 
employer authority or sovereignty. 
(Lewin, D. et al., 1988:148) 
Such representation can take place at a number of levels, notably, the organisational 
level, sectoral level, national level or a mixture of these levels (Stieber, 1986:5)21• 
5.2 Trade unions: 
The following aspects of trade unions will be briefly described: 
* Their characteristics as a party; and 
* Significant trends in public sector labour relations. 
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5.2.1 Characteristics: 
Public sector trade unions comprise a "bewildering variety of principles and 
organisational forms" (Winchester in Treu, T. et al., 1987:217). In summation however, 




Their large membership; 
Limited bargaining powers; and 
Lack of certain fundamental labour rights. 
(Stieber, 1986:5) 
In this context, a description of their role in the labour relations follows. 
5.2.2 Trade unions in the labour relationship: 
The following features of trade unions in the labour relationship will be described: 
* 
* 
Growth of public sector trade unionism; and 
Type and level of membership. 
5.2.2.1 Growth in public sector trade unionism: 
A key feature of public sector trade unionism is its relatively rapid growth since the late 
1960's and 1970's (International Labour Organisation, 1989a:lll; International Labour 
Office, __ 1986:69; Pankert, 1980; Treu, T. et al, 1987:5-7).· This trend can be ascribed to a 
number of major developments during this period, inter alia: 
* The promulgation of International Labour Organisation Convention 151 of 
1978, which recognises the right to associate in the public sector and the 







determining terms and conditions of their employ;22 
The perceptual changes in managerial attitude towards the role of the 
workforce (as potential assets rather than givens); 
The growing scarcity of skilled personnel; 
The concerted effort by public sector trade unions for the protection of 
workforce interests, especially during turbulent economic and political 
periods;23 
The relatively stable nature of public employment; and 
The growing de facto recognition of employee associations. 
(De Wet, 1987; Freeman, 1986:44; International Labour Office, 1986:71; International 
Labour Organisation, 1989a:lll; Treu, T. et aL, 1987:208; Whicker & Areson, 1990:181; 
Winchester in Treu, T. et al., 1987:217). 
5.2.2.2 Type and level of membership: 
The type of membership represented by public sector trade unions varies internationally. 
Generally, trade union membership categorisation in the public sector involves either 
class, specific grade (i.e. low, middle and high), occupational or organisational 
qualifications, or a mixture of the above. Similarly, as with the employers, public sector 
employees can be represented by their trade unions at the organisational level, industrial 
level, national level or a mixture of the above. (International Labour Organisation, 
1989a:110-115) 
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Examples of both the type of membership represented and the level at which such 





Workforce grade and class representation: in Nigeria, Sri Lanka, the United 
Kingdom and Venezuela;24 
National representation: in Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Mexico -
where a single public sector trade union25represents the interests of all 
public sector employees;26 
Organisational representation: in Peru and Malaysia27 where a highly 
devolved level of worker representation exists; 
Occupational representation: in Australia, Peru and some States in the 
United States of America. 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:108-115) 
5.3 The State: 
In .summation, the rapid growth in public sector unionisation and subsequent trade union 
pressure for key labour rights, has challenged the role of the State in the labour 
relationship in terms of the degree of interventionism applied. A key dilemma for the 
State in the labour relationship is determining a suitable midpoint between the provision 
of uniform and continuous public services and the sanction of fundamental labour 
rights'.28 (Lewin, D. et al, 1988; Nyembe, 1992; Pankert, 1980) 
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. 6. Conducting the labour relationship in the public sector: 
As noted before, the primary objective of public sector labour relations is to 
institutionalise labour conflict. However, a variety of labour relations practices have 
evolved. These approaches can be distinguished by the relative powers and level of co-
operation enjoyed between the parties (Stieber, 1986). 
The distribution of powers in the public sector is characterised by the "financial power 
and control of the central union and government bodies over their sectoral and local 
constituents; the scope of the unit where decisions are made; [and] the extent to which 
the lower levels of decision-making are constrained by rules laid down at a higher level" 
(Treu, T. et al., 1987:25). 
The distribution of powers and protection of group interests is a particular concern in 
public sector labour relations: the key issue being the conflict of interests between 
employers and trade unions in terms of their relative rights in the workplace. This issue 
is described in the following manner: 
* 
* 
The issue of employer sovereignty; and 
The issue of trade union rights. 
6.1 The issue of employer sovereignty: 
Although not a right in the true sense of the term, the issue of employer sovereignty 
within public sector organisations is nevertheless" contentious. Essentially, employer 
sovereignty implies the restriction or curtailment of various trade union rights which 
impinge on the right of employers to determine workplace policies. This "right" is 
therefore justified on the grounds that the State must safeguard the interest and welfare of 
the public by providing public ser\rices on a continuous, efficient and cost-effective basis. 
(Christie, 1992:12-15; Heneman & Schwab, 1978:270; International Labour Organisation, 
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1989b:19-20; Wellington in Freeman, 1986:49-52). 
Subsequently, it is contended by the State (as employer) that an extension of any 




Threatening the provision of services, which due to their monopolistic 
nature, if prevented, could not be easily replaced; 
Putting extraordinary pressure on employers to acquiesce speedily to trade 
union objectives in order to secure the provision of services halted; and 
Doing so at the cost of the public by means of increased taxation. 
(Bendix, 1989:214; Lewin, D. et al., 1988:29; Rhodes, 1985:303-304; Siegel 
& Myrtle, 1985:377-378; Wellington in Freeman, 1986:49-52). 
6.2 The issue of trade union rights: 
On the other hand, it is maintained that private and public sector employees should be 
treated alike (International Labour Organisation in Bennett, 1988:70). This view is based 
on the notion of civil rights, where public sector employees, as with the rest of the 
citizenry, must contribute to taxes in order to subsidise public services (Bendix, 1989:73). 
Subsequently, it is proposed that trade unions ought to have a moral right to participate 
in decisions relating to their own fate (Bendix, 1989:73; International Labour 
Organisation, 1989b: 19). 
In terms of the above arguments by the State, justifying a prohibition of the fundamental 
labour rights in the public sector, it is counter-proposed that such rights would not harm 








That trade unions are sensitive to public opinion; 
That trade unions have a moral obligation to perform their civic duties; 
That trade unions are influenced by the "disciplinary effect" of the budget 
in terms of limiting their potential wage demands; 
That the costs of dispute generally outweigh their potential reward;29 
That the citizenry is free to move to more "favourable" locales (in the case 
of local government), thereby undermining their potential source of power; 
and 
That trade unions generally recognise the need for conditional rights in truly 
essential services. 
(Freeman, 1986:49-52, International Labour Organisation, 1989b:20) 
These issues are examined in more detail with regard to three fundamental labour rights 




The right to associate; 
The right to bargain; and 
The right to strike. 
6.2.1 The right to associate: 




Justifying the right to associate; and 
Current trends. 
6.2.1.1 Justifying the right to associate: 
The desire for greater "individual freedom, broader representation and participation, 
individual recognition, and the improvement of the quality of working life" for public 
employees has led to the demand for the right to associate (Jun, 1986:31). 
6.2.1.2 Current trends: 
The right of public sector employees to associate is endorsed by Convention No. 87, 
Artf~le 2 of the International Labour Organisation. However, it exempts the p-olice and 
armed forces from this right. (International Labour OrganisatiOn, 1989b:20) 
Convention No.87 is founded on the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention No. 98 
of 1978 (No.151) and Recommendation of 1978 (No.159). Significantly, Convention No.87 
appeals for "protection against anti-union discrimination and interference in the affairs of 
public employees' organisations" by the State. (International Labour Organisation, 
1989b:20) 
Convention No.98 (No.151) interlinks the right to associate with the right to bargain. 
Furthermore, this Convention defines the "procedures for determining the terms and 
conditions of employment of public employees, whether through collective bargaining or 
otherwise, and settlement of disputes". (International Labour Organisation, 1989b:20) 
6.2.2 The right to bargain: 




Justifying the right to bargain; and 
Current trends. 
6.2.2.1 Justifying the right to bargain: 
Factors which have been suggested to contribute to the demand for a right to bargain in 





A changing attitude in industrial society towards the importance of 
fundamental labour rights; 
A growing shortage of skilled labour; 
An increasing concern with productivity; and 
The need for fairness in the face of pragmatic realities. 
Each of these factors is described and, in some instances, counter-arguments added. 
6.2.2.1.1 A changing attitude by industrial society: 
In summation, the changing attitude of employers with regard to extended bargaining 




The relative growth in trade union power undermining the contention of 
State sovereignty;30 
The need public demand for greater accountability by all parties to the 
labour relationship; and 
The desire for service stability in the face of increasing industrial action. 
(Lieberman, 1980:15; Pankert, 1980:724; Summers in Lewin, D. et aL, 1988:90-92; Siegel 
& Myrtle, 1985:377-383). 
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6.2.2.1.2 A shortage of skilled labour: 
Growing shortages of skilled labour have undermined the service capacity of public 
sector organisations. Therefore, a key concern is the attraction and retention of a 
qualified workforce. However, a poor employment image due to the "relatively low wages 
and the poor likelihood of progressing in the organisation through promotions" has raised 
the need for a competitive salary scale as determined by market conditions. This trend, 
in effect, has highlighted the usefulness of collective bargaining in determining such wage 
adjustments. (Hays & Kearney, 1983:194) 
6.2.2.1.3 Productivity: 
Two opposing views in terms of the effect of collective bargaining rights on productivity 
are proposed. 
On the one hand, employers contend that a prohibition of bargaining rights for public 
, employees would safeguard the State from trade union exigencies, thereby avoiding 
subsequent low levels of productivity and the need to compromise on service 
quality31(Hays & Kearney, 1983:193-195). On the other hand, trade unions assert that 
collective bargaining would improve productivity by motivating the workforce as a result 
of consensus (Flanagan, 1990; Freeman, 1986:62; Lewin, D. et al., 1988:516).32 
In the latter context therefore, productivity is described as an attempt through the process 
of collective negotiations to obtain changes in work rules or practices that will permit the 
employer to reduce the cost or improve the quality or quantity of the services it provides. 
(Lewin, D. et al., 1988:224). 
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6.2.2.1.4 Need for fairness and pragmatic realities: 
Finally, "elementary principles of fairness" as a result of the de facto growth of informal 
bargaining practices in the public sector, have contributed to a growing pressure for a 





The commonplace application of collective bargaining in the private 
sector34 
' 
The relative benefits accrued by its practice in some States;35 and 
The subsequent growth of public interest in public affairs.36 
(Lieberman, 1980:24; Weiler, 1980:214-217). 
6.22.2 Current trends: 
Essential service workers are generally prohibited from collective bargaining on the 
grounds that, in particular, this right would threaten the States' "economic development" 
(Pankert, 1980:733; Whicker & Areson, 1990). -In the case of truly essential services, it 
remains a bone of contention for unions in services whose qualification as "essential" is 
challenged. As a result,· the provision of limited consultation or bargaining rights in these 
services has in many States been spurned as a form of compromise (International Labour 
· Organisation, 1989b:20). 
The right to bargain for public sector trade unions is underwritten by Convention No. 151 
and Recommendation No.159 of the International Labour Organisation (International 
Labour Organisation, 1989b:20). Significantly, Convention No. 87 states that "legislation 
prohibiting negotiations in respect of matters relating to conditions of work is 
inconsistent with the principles of Convention No.98" (which interlinks the right to bargain 
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with the right to associate) (International Labour Organisation, 1989b:19). A further 
characteristic of these Conventions is their stipulation for equitable collective bargaining 
rights in the public sector. 
Many States have recognised the right to bargain as the "primary method for determining 
wages and work conditions" in the public sector (Lewin, D. et al, 1988:23; Treu, T. et al., 
1987:17). Examples include, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden and nearly 40 States in the United States of America 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a: 110-115). 
6.2.3 The right to strike: 
\__ 
The issue of the right to strike, as with the above rights, is cont.entious in the public 
sector (Christie, 1992:14; Freeman, 1986:42; International Labour Office, 1986:72; Treu, 
T. et al., 1987:35; Weiler, 1980:213-214). The following aspects of the right to str~ke for 




The justification for and against a right to strike; 
Key features regarding the issue of the right to strike; and 
Key trends in this regard. 
6.2.3.1 Justifying the right to strike: 





The need to safeguard public employee interests; 
The need to curtail State exigencies; 
The need for a principle of fairness; 
The lack of public sector market constraints; and 
* The continued use of the strike weapon. 
6.2.3.1.1 The need to safeguard public employee interests: 
Extensive legislation is often provided for securing public employee jobs and protecting 
workers in terms of unfair labour practice. However, due to a potential for the employers 
misuse of powers, a right to strike is viewed as an essential mechanism for keeping 
employer decisions in check. (Aaron, Najita, & Stern, 1988:161; Siegel & Myrtle, 
1985:378; Sing & Bendix, 1993:68; Wissink in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:199) 
6.2.3.1.2 The need to curtail State exigencies: 
As noted above, trade unions are concerned with unchecked employer powers. This 
notion is grounded on an evident lack of trust between both parties and often at trade 
union incredulity with the States' self-appointed role as fair and impartial broker in its 
own personnel matters.37 (Morris, 1986:194; Sikula, 1976:416)38 
6.2.3.1.3 The need for a principle of fairness: 
The commonplace sanction of the right to strike in the private sector and the belief that 
strikes in that sector can also threaten the public welfare, is suggested to justify this right 
for public sector trade unions. Subsequently, the right to strike is viewed as an integral 
feature of democratic society (Ben-Israel, 1988:18; Douwes Dekker, n.d.:37-61; 
Hernandez, 1983:3; Lieberman, 1980:26; Sing & Bendix, 1993:45-68; Weiler, 1980:223) 
6.2.3.1.4 The lack of public sector market constraints: 
Unlike the private sector, the public sector has a broad tax- base and enjoys relative 
service stability (Siegel & Myrtle, 1985:378). Consequently, it is suggested that any 
potential strike damage on the public would be relatively minimal. (Freeman, 1986:42; 
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Weiler, 1980:219) 
6.2.3.1.5 The continued use of the strike weapon: 
Finally, as with collective bargaining and other rights, the continued occurrence of strikes 
in the public sector has undermined the rationale for a prohibition of this right.39 A 
trend in this regard has been the adoption of surrogate forms of industrial action, such as 
go-slows or work-to-rules, which are more difficult to regulate. (Morris, 1986:198; Pillay & 
Benqix, 1993:46,55; Siegel & Myrtle, 1985:378-9; Sing & Bendix, 1993:68; Stieber, 1986:7; 
Weiler, 1980:219; Whicker & Areson, 1990:210) 
In conclusion, Thompson (in Benjamin, Jacobus & Albertyn, 1988:69) suggests that: 
"The right to strike figures as the acid test for any system of Labour 
Relations. Its affirmation mend both efficacy and integrity to the bargaining 
process, while its denial amounts to an undercutting of that process." 
6.2.3.2 Justifying a prohibition of a right to strike: 






The threat to State sovereignty; 
The essential nature of public services; 
The potential for excessive trade union powers; and 
The increase in financial and other costs. 
6.2.3.2.1 The threat to State sovereignty: 
As noted above, it is asserted that a right to strike in the public sector would undermine 
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State sovereignty. Specifically, it is suggested that the duties of public officials serving the 
community would be disrupted by a small minority (i.e. the trade unions) whose demands 
would be at the cost of the broad majority (i.e. the public)."°ln addition, in a broader 
context, a right to strike would also distort the political process by challenging 
democratically elected governments in their duties to the community. 
(Ben-Israel, 1988:23; Brassey et al, 1987:124; Christie, 1992:14-19; International Labour 
Organisation, 1989a:120; Lewin, D. et al., 1988:324; Morris, 1986:198; Pillay & Bendix, 
1993:45; Siegel & Myrtle, 1985:377; Sing & Bendix, 1993:68; Treu, T. et aL, 1987:27; 
Weiler, 1980:139,218-220). 
6.2.3.2.2 The essential nature of public services: 
The essential nature of public services is a key reason for prohibiting the right to strike. 
The State contends that a right to strike could imperil the lives and welfare of its 
citizenry as a result of the disruption of such services. As Lewin, D. et al (1988:415) 
explains: 
" ... the public is a monolithic entity that is rather helpless in the face of 
collective withdrawal of important public services and hence needs and 
wants to be protected from such withdrawals." 
(Lewin, D. et al., 1988:415; Rhodes, 1985:304; Sing & Bendix, 1993:68; Wissink in Fox, 
Schwella & Wissink, 1991:199) 
6.2.3.2.3 The potential for excessive trade union powers: 
As noted above, it is contended that a right to strike would extend trade union powers 
which would increase the possibility for a disruption of services. This view is particularly 
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ascribed to the monopolistic nature of the public sector. (International Labour 
Organisation, 1989a:120; Lewin, D. et al, 1988:324; Pillay & Bendix, 1993:45; Rycroft & 
Jordaan, 1990:214; Weiler, 1980:219) 
6.2.3.2.4 The increase in financial and other costs: 
It is contended that a right to strike would inevitably cause an increased tax burden on 
the community. Other costs incurred would include: lost wages, a decline in productivity 
\ 
levels, wasted time and human resource skills, potential retrenchments and a loss of 
public sympathy. Finally, it is asserted that even the "threat" of a trade union strike is 
costly due to it unpredictability. As Morris (1986:11) explains: 
"Sanctions short of strikes can sometimes cause damage equivalent to that 
. of a total strike and many public sector campaigns have been based on 
such tactics." 
(Aaron, Nijita & Stern, 1988:162; Miewald in Shafritz, 1975:38; Morris, 1986:12~; Pillay 
& Bendix, 1993:48; Treu, T. et al., 1987:35; Whicker & Areson, 1990:208; Wissink in Fox, 
Schwella & Wissink, 1991:199) 
6.2.3.3 Approaches to the right to strike: 
A number of optional approaches concerning the right to strike in the public sector can 
be applied, namely: 
* 
* 
No right to strike (no compulsory arbitration); 
An extensive right to strike with minor limitations including: a prohibition of 




action and the employers' right to recall certain workers where essential 
disruptions occur; 
A limited right to strike with no such right in essential services and no access 
to mediation, conciliation or arbitration; and 
A restricted right to strike, particularly in essential services, with the provision 
for compulsory arbitration where the right to strike does not apply. 
(Nyembe, 1992:45) 
The above approaches can be categorised into those approaches proscribing the right to 
strike and those sanctioning the right to strike in the public sector. Both will be briefly 
described. 
6.2.3.3.1 Approaches prohibiting the right to strike: 
A number of countries prohibit the right to strike in the public sector. According to the 
International Labour Organisation (1989a:120), these include roughly 30 developing 
countries. Factors contributing to this approach include, the ideological charter of the 
State (for example marxist or authoritarian States)41and a broad-based notion of 
essential services. Furthermore, in some countries such prohibitions are not necessarily 
legal. For example in Australia, industrial action is banned de facto but not de jure 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:121). Where this approach is adopted, a 




Qualifying the trade union membership; 
Limiting the scope of statutory immunities against civil liabilities; 





Placing restrictions on picketing; 
Securing protection against union discipline; and 
Supporting restrictions by professional organisations. 
(Morris, 1986:10; International Labour Organisation, 1989a:121). 
A key feature of those States opposing the right to strike for public sector employees is 
the application of cooling-off periods during negotiations or consultation in order to allow 
parties to reconsider proposals without the disruptive influence of "heat-of-the-moment" 
decisions". (Ben-Israel, 1988:23; Bendix, 1989:214; Hernandez, 1983:6; Lieberman, 
1980:4-30) 
6.2.33.2 Approaches sanctioning the right to strike: 
~ notable trend has been the growth of the recognition of the right to strike for public 
sector employees internationally (Benjamin, 1989:45, Ben-Israel, 1988:114, Christie, 
1992:18, International Labour Organisation, 1989a:121, Morris, 1986:191-192). Examples 
where strikes are sanctioned include, Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and a 
number of States in the United States of America (International Labour Organisation, 





The acceptance by some States of their inability to prevent strikes;42 
The cost of annulling employment contracts in the event of strikes; 
The growing def acto acknowledgement of this right for public sector 
workers; 
The variety of interpretations of essential services and the subsequent lack 





Growing dissatisfaction with the maxim of "government sovereignty" by 
workers, on the premise of changing social realities (notably declining work 
conditions); 
The recognition of the dispensability of previously "indispensable" services; 
and 
The realisation of the limited rather than "awesome" powers of trade 
unions in the public sector enjoying this right.43 
(Aaron, Najita & Stern, 1988:205; Lewin, D. et al, 1988:327) 
Most these States however, include a number of requisite conditions before a strike can 
be sanctioned. Examples of some of these approaches follows. 
6.2.3.3.2.1 Conditions for allowing a right to strike: 
Some international examples of conditions applied before a strike can be sanctioned in 





In France strikes can only be undertaken once a variety of administrative 
procedures have been satisfactorily completed; 
In the former West Germany, the right to strike (with the exception of 
beamte )44is condoned during the negotiation phase on two conditions: that 
they do not "destroy the employers activities" and that they remain short 
( time-length);45 
In Mexico a key condition involves the use of a strike ballot where a two-
thirds majority is required before a strike can be adopted; 
In Italy and Sweden a "social contract" between the State and trade unions 
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* 
requires a degree of self-regulation by the trade unions which includes the 
provision for minimum essential services and the protection of basic public 
interests" in the event of a strike;46 and 
In Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America 
certain forms of industrial action such as the use of "rotating strikes, 
secondary strikes and political strikes" or "spontaneous strikes" are 
specifically prohibited. 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:120-122; Kahn-Freund, 1977:234; Morris, 
1986: 150; Pillay & Bendix, 1993:46) 
6.2.3.4 Current trends: 
The right to strike for trade unions in the public sector has become "less of a straight yes 
or no issue" in recent years (Freeman, 1986:66; Treu, T. et aL, 1987:36). However, a 





The preference for a limited right to strike; 
The adoption of a peace obligation; 
The restrictions imposed on skilled personnel; and 
The issue of ambiguous legislation. 
6.2.3.4.1 The preference for a limited strike: 
A key trend has been the adoption of a limited right to strike in the public sector. This 
approach is usually applied to a specific class of public sector employees and on the 
condition that the health, safety or welfare of the public is not compromised, or limited 
(Boshoff & Bendix, 1993:36). 
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6.2.3.4.2 The adoption of a peace obligation: 
Another trend is the inclusion of a peace obligation. This obligation is characterised by a 
number of requisite steps which must be completed before a strike can be recognised. In 
addition, provision is usually made for a skeleton crew which ensures the continuation of 
essential seTVices. (Morris, 1986:7; Weiler, 1980:187,236). 
6.2.3.4.3 The restrictions imposed on skilled personnel: 
An associated trend is the relationship between skill levels and the complexity of 
conditions applied. Subsequently, occupations requiring high skill levels are usually 
required to fulfil more preconditions before undertaking industrial action. This is 
attributed to their scarcity and relative importance. On the other hand, services requiring 
limited job skills usually enjoy relatively fewer restrictions (Weiler, 1980:236). A further 
feature has been the concomitant right of employers to a lock-out, in the instance where 
public sector trade unions have been granted the right to strike (Christie, 1992:26). 
6.2.3.4.4 The issue of ambiguous legislation: 
In some States the right to strike is ambiguous. In Belgium, for instance, legislation 
specifically prohibits this right for public employees, while sanctioning the right to 
associate (which embraces the right to strike). Similarly, in Austria and Denmark public 
employees enjoy a de facto right to strike, while this right is banned by law. In Denmark 
the prohibition of this right also instructs striking public sector employees to return to 
work in case of industrial action. (International Labour Organisation, 1989a:122) 
As noted above, a key factor in the determination of labour rights is that of essential 
se1vtces. 
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6.2.4 The issue of essential services: 
The definition and qualification of essential services varies according to the specific 
conditions of each State (Thomas, 1989:143). Subsequently, the following aspects of 





The qualifications adopted; 
The use of a broad definition; 
The use of an enumerative method; and 
Key trends in the interpretation of essential services. 
6.2.4.1 Qualifying essential services: 
"Essential" commonly connotes a vision of "unacceptable harm" to the public (Weiler, 
1980:220). Therefore a key measure of essentiality is the potential cost of disrupted 
services as a result of "public violence and/ or very serious harm to public health and 
environment" (Christie, 1992:20). Consequently, the notion of public welfare is integral to 
the applied definitions of "essential services". However, as noted previously, the types of 
services which fulfil the above qualification can vary. This is illustrated by the following 
proposed lists: 





Public safety (Hospitals, police, firefighters); 
Human needs (Teachers, social assistance, legal); 
Economic activity (railways); and 
Amenities (Garbage, parks, libraries, post). 
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Services required on humanitarian grounds; and 
Services required on the basis of national economic interest. 
It can be said that a variety of factors contribute to the differences in the interpretation 





Conflicting group interests; 
Political agendas; 
Public opinion;47 and 
Biased media coverage. 
(Boshoff & Bendix, 1993:37; Lewin, D. et al, 1988:413-415; Morris, 1986:9) 
Generally, it can be concluded that the key criteria applied in defining essential services 
should consider the question: essential to whom? as well as the availability of substitute 
services (Morris, 1986:9,188; Pankert, 1980:727). In this context, two approaches for 
applying a definition will be described, namely:, 
* 
* 
The broad interpretive approach; and 
The enumerative approach. 
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6.2.4.2 The broad interpretive approach: 
States applying a broad definition of essential services generally ascribe the use of this 
approach to the unpredictability and instability of conditions within that State (Benjamin, 




The notion that by applying a broad definition, specific demands or 
changes within the public sector do not complicate the legal task of its 
regulation; 
The lack of a universal standard or criteria for specifying such services; and 
The potential for a subjective interpretation by enumerating specific 
services.49 
(Benjamin, 1989:730; Morris, 1986:189-190). 
Criticisms of this approach include: 
* 
* 
Its "restrictive character" in terms of limiting or prohibiting fundamental 
labour rights; and 
Its potential for including private sector services. 
(Aaron, Najita, & Stern, 1988:203; Bendix, 1989:73; Ben-Israel, 1988:107; 
Christie, 1992:21; International Labour Office, 1986:67; Pankert, 1980:726; 
Weiler, 1980:221). 
95 
6.2.4.3 The enumerative approach: 
The enumerative approach is characterised by the use of unique criterion for determining 
essentiality and therefore essential services (Morris, 1986:189; Pankert, 1980:729). 
Examples of commonly listed essential services include the police, firefighters and prison 
officials (Christie, 1992:19; International Labour Organisation, 1989a:l21)50• A brief 
outline describing the advantages and disadvantages of the enumerative approach follow. 





The promotion of concern with the health and safety of the population; 
The capacity to add or delete services not complying with the requisite 
qualifications by means of "expeditious legislature"; 
The provision of a clear distinction of services thereby avoiding the 
problem of repressive measures to services which are not considered "truly 
essential"; and 
The opportunity for allowing "workable alternatives" to services deemed 
"essential", thereby alleviating potential strife or dissatisfaction for such 
workers.51 
(Morris, 1986:8,189; Pankert, 1980:727-728) 
Disadvantages of the enumerative approach include: 
* The inability to differentiate between relative "danger" of disputes in these 




"health, welfare and safety"); 
The potential for subjectivity thereby exposing the system to potential 
misuse or abuse; and 
The lack of discrimination involving time period whereby services 
experiencing disruption can after a period of time fall within the category 
of "essentiality". 
(Boshoff & Bendix, 1993:36; Morris, 1986:189). 
6.2.4.3.1 Trends in the use of the enumerative approach: 
The enumerative approach is commonly applied internationally.52 Factors contributing to 





The endemic conditions of each State: namely the geographical, 
environmental, technological, social, economic, political and industrial 
concerns, and broadly, the mores and values of a State;53 
Uncertainty over the impact of fundamental labour rights, especially the 
right to strike in "essential services"; 
The preferred methodology for determining "essential services"; and 
The diversity of public service functions and various pragmatic concerns 
such as the issue of service replacement. 
(Benjamin, 1989:44, 107; Benjamin, Jacobus & Albertyn, 1988:724; Centre 
for Applied Legal Studies, 1990:78; Christie, 1992: 13-19; Morris, 1986:8-9; 
97 
Hodges-Aeberhard & Odero de Dios in Boshoff & Bendix, 1993:36; 
Pankert, 1980:726-727,735-736) 
6.2.4.4 A definition of essential services: 
As noted above, a wide variety of interpretations of essential services are applied (Morris, 
1986:191; Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:214; Sing & Bendix, 1993:69). Examples include, 
specific "services necessary for public health and safety" and "all activities which the 
government may consider appropriate" (Morris, 1986:7). 
For the purposes of this thesis, the following definition of "essential services" applies: 
"One whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health 
of the whole or part of the population" 
(The Freedom of Association Committee of the International Labour 
Organisation in Ben-Israel, .1988:109). 
6.2.5 Conditions where labour rights can be proscribed: 
The International Labour Organisation submits that "under certain circumstances [where] 
governments might feel that the economic position of their countries [demand] at certain 
times stabilisation measures" a temporary curtailment of labour rights is condoned 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989b:20). However, the organisation stipulates that 
such restrictions must be "accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers' living 
standards" (International Labour Organisation, .1989b:20). 
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7. Overview: 







The concepts and definition of Public Administration and Public 
Management; 
The composition, purpose, characteristics and environment of the public 
sector, and in this context, the Public Personnel Management function; 
The characteristics of labour relations in the public sector and key models; 
The characteristics and role of parties to the labour relationship; and 
The issue of rights in the labour relationship. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LABOUR DISPUTES AND THEIR 
SEITLEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR. 
1. Introduction: 
This chapter outlines a background to labour disputes and their settlement in the public 





The causes of labour conflict in the public sector; 
The categories of labour disputes; 
The Processes of labour dispute resolution and settlement; and 
The Approaches to labour dispute settlement. 
2. Causes of labour conflict in the public sector: 






Behavioural factors; and 
Structural factors. 
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2.1 Environmental factors: 






The political environment; 
The social environment; 
The economic environment; 
The legislative environment; and 
The organisational environment. 
2.1.1 The political environment: 
Politics can be described as a form of conflict (Miewald in Shafritz, 1975:38). 
Subsequently, political factors causing labour conflict can be broadly ascribed to the 
inherent tensions between the administrative and political organs of the State and the 
party-political pressures applied on the labour relationship. (Treu et al, 1987:11, Weiler, 
1980:244) 
2.1.2 The social environment: 
The emergence of group interests within public sector employment can cause labour 
conflict. Examples of such group characteristics include skills, grades and racial or ethnic 
criteria which demand specific consideration within the workplace. (~en-Israel, 1988:1-2; 
Eldridge in Wood, 1987:55) 
2.1.3 The economic environment: 
Two economically-related causes of labour conflict can be distinguished, namely: State 
intervention during an economic recession and poor relations between trade unions and 
the public. 
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During an economic recession, or as a result of excessive budgetary spending, the need 
for government intervention in the economy can arise. The nature and manner in which 
the State modifies existing labour policies can therefore cause labour conflict. Examples 
include the unilateral imposition of wage or salary "freezes", the proscription of key trade 
union rights (such as the right to strike), and a restriction on certain voluntary dispute 
settlement procedures1. 
Poor relations, between trade unions and the public can also lead to labour conflict. This 
factor can be ascribed to the taxpayer's unwillingness to finance public employee 
demands, thereby pressuring public officials to refuse to accept trade union demands, 
and in some instances, apply "strong-arm" tactics for resolving such disputes.2 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:105-117; Treu et a(, 1987:21,43; Wissink in 
Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:201) 
2.1.4 The legislative envi~onment: 
Severe, complex or ineffectual labour legislation3can trigger labour conflict. This is 
illustrated by a number of findings in the United States of America which concluded that 
a curvilinear relationship exists between the severity of labour law, complexity of applied 
labour relations machinery and the resulting level of industrial action. Similarly, such 
findings also concluded that "weak meet and confer laws" also led to a higher incidence. 
of labour conflict. A key explanation for this trend is the emergent "patina of legitimacy" 
which underscores the use of power processes for resolving conflict.4 (Aaron, Najita & 
Stern, 1988:155-163; Freeman, 1986:67; International Labour Organisation, 1989a:115; 
Lewin et al, 1988:325; Miewald in Shafritz, 1975:38)5 Other legal causes of labour 
conflict include: 





Sanction of the use of police or military in settling labour disputes; and 
Inequitable labour rights, notably excessive employers' rights and the right 
of the State to intervene unilaterally in matters pertaining to conditions of 
employment. 
(Morris, 1986:195). 
2.1.5 The organisational environment: 
The contest of interests between employers who determine workplace policies, inter alia, 
labour policies, and employees who need a "sense of control over [their] employment 
destiny" can cause labour conflict (Lewin et al, 1988:29). In particular, the curtailment of 
trade union rights in an organisation is a major feature in this regard. Furthermore, a 
"threat" of retrenchment because, for example of improved technology or budgetary 
constraints, can also cause labour conflict. (Aaron, Najita & Stern, 1988:207; Lewin et al, 
1988:29; Wissink in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:198) 
2.2 Behavioural factors: 
Labour conflict can be caused by a number of behavioural factors. These include, the 
recalcitrance of the State (as employer) to acknowledge or change the existing status quo 
in terms of labour policies, a strong-arm approach to "dealing" with labour disputes and 
the reciprocal antagonistic measures undertaken by trade unions in order to achieve their 
goals. (International Labour Office, 1986:34; International Labour Organisation, 
1989a:115; Lewin et al, 1988:90; Morris, 1986:198; Wissink in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 
1991:198)6 
Other behavioural factors contributing to labour conflict in the public sector include: 




The desire emulate private sector successes by means of a show of force; 7 
and 
A prevailing sense of mistrust between the parties. 
(Lieberman, 1980:26,34; Miewald in Shafritz, 1975:38; Treu et al, 1987:11) 
2.3 Structural factors: 
Labour conflict can be caused by a number of structural factors. In particular, these 
factors include poor dispute handling or negotiation skills by employers and trade unions, 
a general shortage of suitable actors for resolving disputes and a wide application of 
ineffective or inappropriate communi~ations structures within the organisation. 
(Lieberman, 1980:26-34; Miewald in Shafritz, 1975:38; Treu et al, 1987:11) 
2.4 Key trends: 
To sum up, the above causes of labour conflict in the public sector ·can be described in 
the following manner: 
Labour frustration and insecurity: It is suggested that a growing sense of general labour 
frustration and the "perception of a common external threat" has resulted in a "deep 
sense of collective grievance". (Hays & Kearney, 1983:196, International Labour 
Organisation, 1989a:124, Winchester in Treu et al, 1987:217) 
Disparaging workforce conditions: It is suggested that deteriorating workforce conditions 
have resulted in a poor employment image which has undermined the notion of the 
honour of working for the State. Factors contributing to employee dissatisfaction include 
·real-term decreases in pay levels, mercurial government intervention in labour policies 
and a broad sense of disenchantment with the lack of a work-effort appreciation.· 
(Hays & Kearney, 1983; Hyman, 1975:154; International Labour Organisation, 1989a; 
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Sing & Bendix, 1993:68) 
Proscriptive !egislation: It is suggested that the application of proscriptive legislation has 
limited the role of labour in determining and regulating policies applied for its own 
welfare. (Hays & Kearney, 1983; International Labour Organisation, 1989a:121-124) 
Bureaucratised labour relations frameworks: It is suggested that complex and time-
. consuming procedures have frustrated negotiations and dispute settlement. processes as 
well as heightening the levels of trade union distrust towards employers. (Hays & 
Kearney, 1983; International Labour Organisation, 1989a:120-122) 
State and ernployer recalcitrance: It is suggested that the continued refusal of the State to 
accept fundamental labour rights and related trade union demands has been 
characterised by the adoption of various strong-arm tactics by the State and employers in . 
order to safeguard the status quo. (Hays & Kearney, 1983:196; Hyman, 1975:183; 
International Labour Office, 1986:71) 
Trade union politicisation: Freeman (1986:52) and the International Labour Organisation 
( 1989a: 124-125) suggest, as previously noted, that the politicisation of public sector trade 
unions can be attributed to an inherent imbalance of powers of the labour relationship.8 
This trend is based on the trade union notion that an inextricable link exists between the 
socio-economic goals and the political interests of public sector trade union.9Specific 
goals include raising the "demand for public S.ervices"10and securing suitable 
compensation packages for fellow members.11 
3. Categories of labour disputes: 
As noted in Chapter TQree, labour disputes can be distinguished according to disputes of · 
right arid disputes of interest. In the public sector however, these definitions vary (Treu et 
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al, 1987:29). In general, disputes of right are referred to third party arbitration (with the 
right to strike usually prohibited), and disputes of interest settled by collective bargaining, 
conciliation or mediation. However, failing a settlement in the latter instance, arbitration 
or fact-finding can be applied. In the case of essential services, third party adjudication 
by means of arbitration is usually applied. (International Labour Organisation, 
1989a:123; International Labour Organisation in Boshoff & Bendix, 1993:40; Morris, 
1986:180; Pankert, 1980:723; Treu et al, 1987:30-33; Weiler, 1980:232) 
4. Processes of labour dispute resolution and settlement: 




Power driven processes; 
Processes of right; and 
Processes of interest. 
4.1 Power driven processes: 
A key power driven process in the public sector is industrial action. 
4.1.1 Industrial action in the public sector: 




Causes of industrial action; 
Characteristics of industrial action; and 
Measures applied for regulating industrial action. 
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4.1.2.1 Causes of industrial action: 
Strikes in the public sector have increased internationally since the 1960's. Factors 





The expansion of the public sector; 
The rapid development of trade uruons; 
The significant rise in trade union membership; and 
The institution of collective bargaining in many public sector organisations. 
(International Labour Office, 1986:69; Pillay & Bendix, 1993:46; Treu et al, 
1987:7-22; Wissink in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:199). 
Key strike triggers have predominantly involved the issues of wages and labour rights (an 
aspect which involves the issue of comparative legal systems)12 (Treu et al, 1987:21). 
4.1.2.2 Characteristics of industrial action: 
Industrial action in the public sector internationally, can be characterised by its political 
disposition, short duration and the large number of participants involved13• The latter 
feature includes the use of nationally coordinated and selective strike action. Industrial 
action has also been characterised by its frequent adoption by "minority members" of 
trade unions with strong workplace organisation. (Freeman, 198~:43; Treu et al, 
1987:211) 
Target constituencies against whom strikes are aimed~ vary between "first"14 and "third-
world"15 countries. In the former States, disputes are usually associated with direct 
disagreement between trade unions and individual employers. In the latter States, 
industrial action is often characterised as a show of force against an incumbent 
government. (Freeman, 1986:43-66; Weiler, 1980:220; Wood, 1987:54) 
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4.1.2.3 Measures applied for regulatini industrial action: 
As noted in the previous chapter, industrial action can be either sanctioned without 
restriction, sanctioned with certain limitations or proscribed completely (Morris, 
1986: 10). Subsequently, the occurrence of industrial action can be regulated by a variety 
of measures founded on one of the above approaches. In general, a common measure 
adopted by most States involves the narrowing down of factors to those being acceptable 
(i.e. a "legal" strike") and those unacceptable (i.e. an "illegal" strike) even in countries 
proscribing its incidence16• This approach adopted by States prohibiting the right to 
strike, can be ascribed to the notion that "an all-out strike causes less inconvenience to 
the public than more selective action" (Thomas, 1989:143). (International Labour 
Organisation, 1989a:121-122) 
However, in regulating industrial action in the public sector a number of mechanisms or 





The use of criminal or civil law; 
The application of penal restrictions; 
The negotiation of no strike ,agreements; and 
Self-restraint/Joint Regulation schemes. 
4.1.3.3.1 Criminal and civil law: 
The application of civil or criminal involves either the removal of statutory immunities 
which protect the right to strike or the creation of "statutory wrongs which the 
immunities do not protect" (Morris, 1986:195). Either system can be applied in the event 
of a breakdown in procedural matters or relations, between the parties. The choice 
between applying civil or criminal law however depends on the severity of expected 
punishment. For example, civil law procedure is usually applied in the case of fines, 
while criminal law procedures could be adopted in the instance of arrests having to be 
108 
made (Morris, 1986: 196). In terms of their comparative usage, Morris (in Boshoff & 
Bendix, 1993:34) proposes that civil law enjoys two relative advantages over criminal law: 
* 
* 
That it reduces the political and administrative problems raised in the mass 
prosecution of strikers; and 
That it allows government to remain outside the dispute, unless the law 
fails to resolve the issue. 
However, as in the case of the United Kingdom, the adoption of either civil or criminal 





Their conspicuous nature of making industrial action a punishable crime 
and the incapacity of the State to protect the public from strife despite 
such formal measures; 
In the case of criminal law: the potential political and administrative costs 
and the displacement of the role of government from regulator to that of 
disciplinarian; and 
In the case of civil law: The possibility of sympathy strikes, removal of the 
political accountability of the State, and the added complexity of 
constructing an equitable dispute resolution system. 
(Morris, 1986:196-205) 
4.1.3.3.2 Penal restrictions: 
The application of penal restrictions includes measures such as fines, imprisonment, 
dismissal, and mass prosecution in regulating strikes (Morris, 1986:191). However, this 
measure is a highly contentious issue. On the one hand, findings such as those made by 
Ichniowski during the mid-1980's on the United States police-force concluded that the 
use of strike penalties were effective in deterring strike occurrence (Aaron, Najita, & 
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Stern, 1988:166). On the other hand, it is proposed by others that penal sanctions lead to 
further labour instability , in particular, by jeopardising the principle of the freedom of 





That fines are often only a slight deterrent and usually ineffective in 
enforcing compliance; 
That imprisonment is a bureaucratic and political nightmare, while leaving 
services unattended; 
That dismissal can lead to skill and replacement problems compounded by 
the union blacklisting of vacant jobs; and 
That mass prosecution can be lengthy, expensive and induce bitter feelings 
in the workplace. 
(Morris, 1986:191) 
The application of such measures therefore usually depends on the gravity of the 
situation, such as for instance, industrial action directly threatening the lives and welfare 
of the community (Ben-Israel, 1988:126). However, in some States, such as Nigeria where 
strikes are banned outright, contraventions in terms of labour disputes are frequently are 
"met with stiff penalties, su.ch as indefinite imprisonment of union officials and 
proscription of the union for a minimum of period of six months"· (Pillay & Bendix, 
1993:53) .. 
4.1.3.3.3 The no-strike agreement: 
The no strike agreement between employers and trade unions is viewed as a key measure 
for preventing industrial action17 (Morris, 1986:227). In particular, the popularity of this 
approach is attributed to the responsibility it places on the State to secure "equitable 
arrangements for determining work conditions and wages" (Morris, 1986:199). However, 






An unexpected change in leadership; 
New or changing environmental circumstances; 
Unscrupulous employer behaviour; and 
The problematic nature of legally enforcing a non-binding agreement 
(Morris, 1986:200). 
Subsequently, it can be seen that the no strike agreement is vulnerable to exploitation by 
its lack of enforcement. According to Morris (1986:200) therefore, This makes such an 
approach "likely to remain in the realms of theoretical discussion". 
4.1.3.3.4 The Self-restraint or Joint Regulation approach: 
Both approaches involve a mutual restraint of confrontational. tactics by the State and 
trade unions, in order to provide a fair means for settling disputes (Morris, 1986:201). In 
the event of a strike, such agreements often include arrangements for the continued 
payment of striking workers on the basis that emergency services can be continued. This 
measure includes the recognition that certain services would not be provided during the 
dispute and that .scab labour would be forbidden (Morris, 1986:201). 
In addition, the Joint Regulation approach involves a clear "articulation of the scope of 
permissible action" allowed to both the trade unions and employers in the event of a 
·dispute (i.e. industrial action) (Morris, 1986:202). Subsequently, an arrangement is 
usually made, whereby both parties establish a joint forum for regulating such an 
agreement (Morris, .1986:204). 
Howev~r. a key problem is the possibility of trade unions striking without recourse to 
prior arrangements, thereby leaving employers vulnerable to the effects of such a strike. 
Consequently, a key element of the Joint Regulat_ion approach is the acceptance by both 
parties that a degree of flexibility and informality must exist as a buffer for potential 
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conflict (Morris, 1986:202-204). According to Morris (1986:206) therefore, the proposed 
advantage of this approach lies in its inexpensive and democratic manner. 
4.1.3.3.5 The Graduated Strike approach: 
The Graduated Strike or Non-stoppage Strike involves a step-by step approach where 
pressure is gradually applied on both parties in dispute to reach a settlement. This 
process is based on the withdrawal of a percentage of both parties incomes under the 
auspices of a neutral third party18• The purpose of this measure is to force parties to 
settle at the earliest (cheapest!) possible moment. In the case of collected funds, such 
moneys can be used to compensate the public for the disruption of services or other 
socially-beneficial projects. (Bernstein in Siegel & Myrtle, 1985:379; Lewin et al, 
1988:340,419; Weiler, 1980:242) 
4.2 Processes of right: 
A key process of right in the public sector is the application of arbitration. 
4.2.1 Arbitration: 
The following aspects of arbitration will be described: 
* 
* 
Its application in the public sector; and 
A critique of its usefulness in this regard. 
4.2.1.1 Application in the public sector: 
The arbitration mechanism is widely applied in the public sector. In many States, the 
adoption of compulsory arbitration usually displaces the right to strike by means of an 
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anti-strike clause19 (Freeman, 1986:67). This practice is founded on the notion that 
arbitration is a less costly alternative to the strike option and that this mechanism does 
not deter the voluntary process of negotiations. Findings in the United States of America 
have lent credence to this notion by proposing that a correlation exists between the 
application of arbitration and a decline in strike incidence during negotiations. (Aaron, 
Najita & Stern, 1988:188; Pillay & Bendix, 1993:54; Stern & Olson in Freeman, 
1986:67,70) 
Compulsory arbitration in the public sector is applied to disputes of right. However both 
compulsory arbitration and interest arbitration can be applied for settlirig disputes of 
interest. The arbitration process usually involves the adoption of either final-offer or 
pendulum arbitration. The latter form, or an issue-by-issue approach, is a more popular 
form of arbitration in the public sector. (International Labour Organisation, 1989a:123-
124; Lewin et al, 1988:340-413; Treu et al, 1987:233; Weiler, 1980:232-245) 
Interest arbitration is often applied as a voluntary. mechanism for dispute settlement in 
the public sector and is usually restricted to non-essential services.201n some States the 
interest arbitration option includes a conditional right to strike during negotiations. 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:123-124; Lewin et al, 1988:340,413; Weiler, 
1980:229-232) 
4.2.1.2 Critique: 





The States' concerns with arbitration; 
The employers' concerns with arbitration; 
The trade unions concerns with arbitration; 
Other concerns with arbitration; and 
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* Some counter arguments in support of arbitration. 
4.2.1.2.1 The States' concern with arbitration: 
For the State, arbitration can undermine State sovereignty thereby jeopardising the 
interests of the public (Lewin et al, 1988:414). In particular, this threat involves a 
potential demand for the redistribution of government resources, a change in managerial 
authority, an increase in taxes, a change in the types and quality of service provided, the 
removal of responsibility from relevant government executives and legislators and, in the 
most extreme circumstances, lead to a demand for a new representative government 
(Howlett in Aaron, Najita & Stern, 1988:209). Subsequently, these concerns have, in 
some instances, led to efforts by the State to prohibit the use of the arbitration 
mechanism for dispute settlement in the public sector (International Labour 
Organisation, 1989a: 123-124 ). 
4.2.1.2.2 The employers' concern with arbitration: 
At the organisational level, employers contend that the use of arbitration can undermine 
managerial control. This notion is founded on the perception that arbitration favours 
labour rather than employer interests due to the monopolistic nature of government 
services which provide trade unions with an opportunity to mount formidable pressure on 
employers.21 
(Lewin et al, 1988:414-416; Weiler,1980:231) 
4.2.1.2.3 The trade unions' concern with arbitration: 
However, arbitration can also lead to a loss of control in the dispute resolution process 
according to trade unions, as a result of displacing the right to strike. Subsequently, this 
factor raises concern over the possibility of undue governmental bias during the process. 
In particular, these concerns include the selection of arbitrators by the State and, in 
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some instances, the accusation that the State assists employers in adopting delaying 
tactics. (Aaron, Najita & Stern, 1988:206; Treu et al, 1987:234) 
4.2.1.2.4 Other concerns with arbitration: 
A key criticism of arbitration is the growing dependence of parties on this process. 
Coined the chilling effect or narcotic effect, this process results in an exaggeration of trade 





The predictability of award outcomes due to the parties exposure to ·a 
particular arbitrator or the practice of "splitting" award outcomes;22 
The opportunity to "save face" by blaming poor outcomes on the 
arbitrator·23 
' 
The relative inexpense of the process financially (despite the reverse claim 
by trade unions as noted above); and 
The potential for better award outcomes where parties have poor 
negotiating experience. 
(Aaron, Najita & Stern, 1988:206; Cameron, Cheadle & Thompson, 
1989:70; Freeman, 1986:74; Weiler, 1980:230-231) 
Subsequently, it is contended that arbitration undermines the integrative nature of the 
labour relationship (Farber & Bazerman, 1989:100-102; Kochan in Farber & Bazerman, 
1987:347; Flanagan, 1990:314; Freeman, 1986:71). However, researchers such as Chelius 
and Extejt (in Lewin et al, 1988:343), suggest that the chilling or narcotic effect is usually 
short-lived because of the variability of conditions over time.24 
To sum up, arbitration is also criticised for the following reasons: 





The general increase in the number of iJllpasses during negotiations, where 
arbitration follows;25 
The problem of inexperienced or biased arbitrators; and 
The similarity between fact-finding and arbitration. 
(Aaron, Najita & Stern, 1988:206; Benjamin, 1989:46; Flanagan, 1990:313; 
Freeman, 1986:70-3; Lewin et al, 1988:79,342; Nyembe, 1992:44; Treu et al, 
1987:31; Weiler, 1980:228) 
4.2.1.2.5 Some counter-arguments justifying arbitration: 
With regard to the justification for State sovereignty, it is contended that political 
systems invariably include a variety of other pressure groups, such as private sector trade 
unions, which influence the formulation of labour policy. Similarly, the notion that 
employers and trade unions loose control during such a process is c_ountered by the 
arguments that such parties rather than loose control over the bargaining process, retain 
their powers by means of the fair (or authoritative) and private manner in which 
arbitration is conducted. (Lewin et al, 1988:414-419) In particular, factors which support 
the above notions include: 
* 
* 
Findings in the public sector which indicate that a negligible level of 
arbitrator bias influences arbitration; and 
That differences between the negotiation process and arbitration were 
minimal, with a general preference for the former process on the basis that 
arbitration could be followed if disagreement continued. 
(Freeman, 1986:43; Lewin et al,1988:79) 
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4.3 Processes of interest: 
The following key processes of interest are applied in the public sector: 
* 
* 
Collective bargaining; and 
Conciliation and Mediation. 
4.3.1 Collective bargaining: 




Characteristics of public sector bargaining; 
Collective bargaining structure; and 
The alternative of Joint Consultation. 
4.3.1.1 Characteristics of public sector collective bargaining: 
Collective bargaining in the public sector is broadly characterised by "complexity, [a] lack 
of clarity, and change" (Heneman & Schwab, 1978:271). Therefore, unlike the private 
public sector collective bargaining often incorporates elaborate time-consuming measures 
and a variety of third party mechanisms to prevent a breakdown.26 Bargaining 
legislation in the public sector is usually unique and industry specific depending on the 
level it is applied (Lieberman, 1980:95-97; Stieber, 1986:5-6; Treu et al, 1987; Weiler, 
1980:214).27 Collective bargaining is usually banned in "essential services" and 
sometimes temporarily during periods of necessitated State intervention in the economy 
(Treu et al, 1987). 
Collective bargaining can be applied on a regular basis or intermittently as conditions 
dictate. In some States, such as Belgium, collective bargaining is applied specifically 
during periods of political transition in order to renegotiate standing arrangements with 
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the newly elected government (International Labour Organisation, 1989a:116). 
4.3.1.2 Collective bargaining structure: 






Bargaining scope; and 
Bargaining levels. 
4 .3 .1.2.1 Bargaining representation: 
Public sector trade union representation in the collective bargaining process can involve 
bilateral negotiations (i.e. one-on-one bargaining) or multi-lateral or end-run bargaining 
(i.e. where several parties participate). 
The recent growth of trade unionism in the public sector has led to growing trade union 
pressure for better (wider) representation in the bargaining process. These demands can 
be ascribed to a desire for improved fundamental labour rights and the protection of key 
interests, such as wages. (Freeman, 1986:51-52) 
4.3.1.2.2 Bargaining scope: 
Bargaining scope is contingent on the sovereign prerogative of the State, whereby activities 
or issues determined to be counterproductive to the public interest are prohibited from . 
the bargaining process. However, according to Hays & Kearney (1983:326), this 
prerogative is criticised on the grounds that it prevents "public knowledge of the issues" 
which can help to "hold public officials accountable for their bargaining decisions and -
solidify public opinion in impasse situations". (Freeman, 1986:52; Weiler, 1980:215-217) 
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4.3.1.2.3 Bargaining levels: 
Two broad approaches to collective bargaining have emerged in the public sector, 
namely: a decentralised or organisational bargaining and a mixed bargaining framework. 
It is suggested that the decentralised bargaining approach is the most popular framework 
in the public sector. With reference to local government, States adopting this approach 
include Canada, Japan and the United States of America. Key reasons for this 
framework include the need to address specific organisational issues (particularly those 
of a social and financial nature) and the desire to limit any undue political influences in 
the bargaining process.28 (International Labour Organisation, 1989a: 118-119; Lewin et 
al, 1988:123; Knowles, 1988:227-228) 
The mixed bargaining approach involves the use of both central and organisational level 
bargaining. Its chief characteristic is the division of bargaining topics according to the 
level at which they ought to be negotiated. In the United Kingdom for example, pay and 
salary structures are determined by means of national settlements and "conditions of 
work and other elements in the pay -productivity bargain" at the organisational level29 
(Winchester in Treu et al, 1987:229). However, a key issue in this approach is the 
legitimacy of conflicting agreements arising out of separate agreements at both levels. 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:118-119; Knowles, 1988:227-228) 
4.3.1.3 The use of Joint Consultation: 
Joint Consultation is a popular option to collective bargaining in the public sector. This 
approach involves a process of consultation rather than negotiation between employers 
and trade unions. The purpose of Joint Consultation is to accentuate "the co-operative 
rather than the adversary elements of labour-management relations" (Adams, 1992:80). 
Notably however, unlike collective bargaining, employers retain the ultimate right to 
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determine the outcome of issues. (Adams, l992:80) 
· Internationally, the practice of Joint Consultation varies. In the Netherlands for instance, 
public sector Joint Consultation is practised at the central level by means of a council 
representative of government and four employee federations. In Germany Joint 
Consultation is restricted to beamte (i.e. employees with a statutory _employment 
relationship) and government officials only. Similarly, these restrictions apply in Japan, 
but with the further proviso that all recommendations are submitted to an independent 
body3°in order to determine final pay and work conditions. (International Labour 
Organisation, 1989a: 118-119) 
In some States however, both Joint Consultation and collective bargaining are applied in 
tandem. In Spain for instance, macro economic issues are collectively bargained for while 
"recruitment plans, job classification and promotion systems; matters involving legislation 
or increased budgetary provision" are subject to Joint Consultation (International Labour 
Organisation, 1989a:119). Reasons for this approach are primarily attributed to the need 
to coordinate, both bargaining and budgeting requirements on the basis of a best possible 
outcome for all.31 (International Labour Organisation, 1989a:118-119; Knowles, 
1988:227; Treu et al, 1987) 
However, the above arrangement is also criticised for the lack of a clear distinction 
between both processes. For example, during Joint Consultation, trade unions which may 
oppose the employers' views can convince employers to compromise in order to avoid 
potential strife. This possibility, therefore begs the question: Does negotiation rather than 
consultation take place during the Joint Consultation process? (Adams, 1992:80) 
In some cases, Joint Consultation is also resented by trade unions on the basis that this 
process entrenches the sovereignty of the government by displacing other fundamental 
labour rights (Adams, 1992:80; International Labour Organisation, 1989a: 118-119). 
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4.3.2 Mediation and Conciliation: 
Both mechanisms are commonly applied together in the public sector. Therefore, the 
following aspects of both mechanisms will be described: 
* 
* 
Their application, and 
a critique of the above. 
4.3.2.1 Application: 
Conciliation and mediation are usually applied interchangeably for settling disputes in 
the public sector. A distinction can be made between developed countries, where these 
mechanisms are regularly used for settling disputes, and the cJeveloping countries, where 
they are hardly applied.32 (Ben-Israel, 1988:104; International Labour Office, 1986:72; 
International Labour Organisation, 1989a:120-123) 
4.3.2.2 Critique: 
No specific method for evaluating the usefulness of conciliation and mediation exists33• 







The personal integrity and "style or philosophy"34of the mediator or 
conciliator; 
The intensity of the conflict, and the extent to which inter-personal hostility 
is prevalent, in the process; 
The parties' commitment to this process; 
The acceptability of the mediator or conciliator; 
The strategic implications of a request for this mechanism; and 
The timing of entry by parties in dispute.35 
(Bendix, 1989:210-211; Lewin et al, 1988:335-336; Subbarao, 1988:122) 
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Both processes can be useful where parties are relatively inexperienced in negotiations 
(Bendix, 1989:208-210).36 
4.4 Other dispute resolution and settlement mechanisms: 
A commonly applied dispute settlement process in the public sector internationally is 
fact-finding. 
4.4.1 Fact finding: 
Fact-finding or advisory arbitration is usually applied after a failure of the conciliatory or 
mediatory mechanisms to settle disputes in the public sector. This mechanism is viewed 
as an alternative form of arbitration. In the public sector, fact-finding is seen as a useful 
mechanism for clarifying key "facts" and applying public pressure, in the form of "public 
opinion", on disputing parties for a settlement (Treu et al, 1987:31). As with arbitration, 
fact-finding usually replaces the right to strike although this depends on the prevailing 
circumstances of a dispute and statutory practice in this regard. An example of a fact-
finding approach .can be the use of indexation during wage disputes. This process 
provides a comparative perspective of pay levels in other industries or sectors where 
workers are not subject to strike limitations. Subsequently indexation could provide the 
basis for a settlement of this nature. (International Labour Organisation in Boshoff & 
Bendix, 1993:41; Morris, 1986:194) 
5. Approaches to labour dispute settlement: 
Approaches to dispute settlement in the public sector can be summed up in the following 
terms: 
* Whether or not a right to strike is sanctioned; 




The degree of State assistance to the process; and 
The preference for statutory or voluntary processes and the nature of 
disputes themselves. 
(International Labour Organisation in Boshoff & Bendix, 1993:40; Pankert, 
1980:723) 
In general however, two broad approaches to dispute settlement in the public sector 
commonly occur in practice. These approaches can be distinguished between countries 
whose dispute settlement objective it is to determine a satisfactory outcome to parties in 
dispute (i.e. participation) and those States who aim to protect community interest (i.e. 
unilateralism). (Pankert, 1980:733), 
The unilateralist approach is characterised by prohibitions against the right to strike and 
lock-out and the application of compulsory arbitration as the .key mechanism for dispute 
settlement. Examples of the unilateralist approach, include many developing countries 
where a key trend has been the adoption of restrictive dispute settlement systems for the 
public service. 
(Pankert, 1980:733-736; Treu et al, 1987:27-36) 
The participative approach involves the adoption of ad hoc or procedural approaches for 
settling disputes which sanction the use of voluntary procedures. These include collective 
bargaining and other forms of third party facilitation during the negotiation process. 
However, in most States, for example Massachusetts in the United States of 
America, 37 exception is made to essential services where stricter measures are 
applied.38(Heneman & Schwab, 1978:275; Pankert, 1980:725-733; Treu et al, 1987:27-36) 
Subsequently, a number of further characteristics distinguish the above approaches. 
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5.1 Characteristics of labour dispute settlement: 





The political sensitivities of the parties in dispute; 
The more detailed regulation of practices; 
The wider adoption of alternative dispute settlement methods; and 
The stricter regulation and sometimes prohibition of open conflict. 
(Treu et al, 1987:43) 
5.2 Dispute settlement trends in the public sector: 






The desire to settle labour disputes at their source of origi,n; 
The preference for a limited State role in labour disputes;39 
The growing usage of voluntary measures by allowing parties in dispute to 
determine their own mechanisms for dispute settlement;40 and 
. The preference for independent third party assistance41in the case of 
continued disagreement, rather than State-sponsored machinery. 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:123; Morris, 1986:180; Treu et 
al, 1987:30-33,230; Weiler, 1980:232) 
5.3 Key issues in public sector dispute settlement: 
Key dispute settlement issues in the public sector can be summed up as follows: 






The viability of codes of conduct where no formal measures are applied; 
Sophisticated dispute settlement procedures and the lack of relevant 
management and trade union expertise in this regard; 
Time constraints where, unlike the private sector, no opportunity is given 
to "personal and emotional differences" due to public pressure and time 
requisites; and 
Unfair tactics by parties to derail the dispute settlement process. For 
example, preferential government policies towards certain trade unions. 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:120; Morris, 1986:180; Treu et 
al, 1987:232-237; Weiler, 1980:242) 
6. Overview: 
This chapter outlined a background to key features and trends of labour disputes and 





The environmental, behavioural and structural causes of labour conflict; 
The interpretation of labour dispute categories, namely disputes of interest 
and disputes of right; 
The use of power driven processes (industrial action), processes of right 
(arbitration) and processes of interest (collective bargaining, mediation and 
conciliation) for resolving and settling labour disputes; and 
Finally, the characteristics, trends and a number of key labour issues 
concerning dispute settlement. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LABOUR RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
1. Introduction: 
This chapter outlines the nature of labour relations in South African local authorities. In 





A background to the concept and role of local authorities; 
A background to labour relations practices in local authorities; 
The parties to the labour relationship; and 
The manner in which labour relations are conducted. 
2. A background to Local Authorities in South Africa: 








The concept and a definition of Local Government; 
The characteristics of local government; 
The types of local government in South Africa; 
The purpose of local authorities in South Africa; 
The duties of local government; 
The environments shaping local government duties; and 
The location of local authorities in the public sector. 
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2.1 The concept and a definition of Local Government: 
Since ancient Greek times local government has broadly meant to steer or govern 
(Hammond-Tooke, 1977:3). However, this concept has been obscured by a variety of 
historical, political, cultural, educational, geographical and demographic forces 
(Hanekom in Heymans & Totemeyer, 1988:15). Subsequently, no universal definition of 
local government is applied (Conyers, 1984:187). In general however, local government 
can be described as "the government of cities, villages, boroughs, towns and other 
organised communities" or as a "particular tier of government" (Coetzee, 1985:26-27). 
Examples of both approaches will be briefly illustrated. 
In terms of the former description, Meyer (in Heymans & Tdtemeyer, 1988:13), depicts 
local government as comprising a number of local democratic .units which are "vested with 
forescribed, controlled governmental powers and sources of income to render specific 
local services and to develop, control and regulate the geographic, social and economic 
development of defined local areas" (Meyer in Heymans & T~temeyer, 1988:13). 
Similarly, Coetzee (1985:27) describes local government as "the action of governing the 
affairs of a town or city by directing, controlling and regulating people, business and 
industrial activities within its jurisdiction". 
On the other hand, in terms of the latter approach, Lockhard (1968:451) describes local 
government as "a public organisation authorised to decide and administer a limited range 
of public policies within a relatively small territory which is a subdivision (own italics) of 
a regional or national government". For the purposes of this thesis, the following 
definition of local government applies: 
"a decentralised representative institution with general and specific powers 
devolved on it in respect of an identified restricted geographical area within a 
state" (Heymans & Totemeyer, 1988:2). 
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2.2 Characteristics of local government: 
Local government is usually described by the terms municipality, council and local 
authority. Municipal government is a form of universitas. According to Donges & Van 
Winsen (in Craythorne, 1982:21), universitas is a group process in which a "new subject of 
rights and duties separate and distinct from the rights and duties of the individual 
persons who constitute the group" is determined. Subsequently, local government 
connotes a formal legislative body (Coetzee, 1985:26). · 
As noted previously, a key feature of focal government is its relative subordination to 
central government policy and second tier pressures (Lockhard, 1968:451). Subsequently, 
the nature of intergovernmental relations1 influences the capacity of local government to 
represent, and look after the interests of the community within its jurisdiction (Heymans 
& T~temeyer, 1988:2; Mawhood, 1983:n.p.)2. In particular, these relations are based on 
the concept of decentralisation3, where power is distributed "horizontally rather than 





Their corporate nature5; 
Their defined powers for a range of services; and 
Their representation, usually by elected members. 
(Craythorne, 1982:21; Heymans & T~temeyer, 1988:13)6 
South African local authorities can therefore be described as legally independent entities 
which operate within defined communities (depending on the communities size) or 
jurisdictions (Hanekom in Heymans & Tl1temeyer, 1988:13). Their status is usually 
determined by the size of the community they serve and the revenue they derive from 
their jurisdictional areas for services rendered7 (Craythome, 1982:21; Heymans & 
Tlltemeyer, 1988:13). 
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2.3 Types of local government in South Africa: 





City Councils: City Councils function in all the provinces of South Africa, 
are white-elected, and are nominally called boroughs in the province of 
Natal; 
Town Councils: Town Councils function in all the provinces of South Africa 
and are almost identical to City Councils; 
Town Boards: Town Boards function in the provinces of Natal and 
Transvaal, in townships outside the City Councils or Boroughs. Public 
functionaries are elected by "whites" or appointed by an administrator. 
Town Boards render selected basic services such as roads, waterworks and 
drainage; 
Village Councils/ Village Management Boards: Village Councils function in 
the Orange Free State and Cape Province and are granted limited 
municipal powers; 
* · Local Boards; Local Boards function in the Orange Free State and the 
Transvaal. Public functionaries are elected or appointed by the 
Administrator for the province and have almost the same functions as 
office-bearers of a municipality; 
* Health Committees: Health Committees function in the provinces of Natal 
and the Transvaal. In Natal, Health Committees render selected services 
such as the maintenance of streets, waterworks, drainage, control of 
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* 
nuisances and buildings; and 
Regi.onal Setvices Councils: Regional Services Councils function in all the 
provinces of South Africa. They render a number of specified municipal 
services on a regional basis as defined by the Re~onal Services Councils 
Act (Act 109 of 1985). 
(Cloete, 1988:19,243; Craythorne, 1982:20) 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term local authorities shall refer to all the above 
forms of local government. 
2.4 The purpose of local authorities in South Africa: 
Local government grants citizens within its jurisdiction "the opportunity to provide for 
matters that are of a ·1ocal nature and that affect their everyday lives" (Sing & Penceliah, 
1989:49). In order to ensure that its institution is beneficial to the community it serves, 
two broad objectives prevail, namely: 
* 
* 
Serving people within its jurisdiction as efficiently and effectively as 
possible; and 
Ensuring that the maximum number of inhabitants participate in the 
decision-making process (directly or indirectly) of the local authority. 
(Cloete, 1978:233; Hanekom in Heymans & Totemeyer, 1988:14). 
In fulfilling these goals, a number of duties can be undertaken. These will be described 
below. 
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2.5 The duties of local authorities: 
As noted above, the range of services provided is contingent upon the capacity or size of 
the relevant local authority, available resources and expertise and the perceived needs of 
the inhabitants (Hanekom in Heymans & Totemeyer, 1988:15). Examples of services 
provided at the municipal level include: 
* Streets, pavements and storm-water drainage 
* Cemeteries and crematoria 




* Rubbish and night-soil disposal 
* Health 
* Environmental protection 
* Community development, housing and slum clearance 
* Town and city planning 
* Licences 
* Passenger transport 
* Libraries and other amenities. 
(Cloete, 1986:55-65; Cloete 1988:254) 
In performing the above duties, local government must function within a number of 
unique environments. These environments will be briefly described. 
2.6 The environment's shaping local authority duties: 






The physical conditions; 
The social expectations; 
The economic demands; 
The political values; and 
* Administrative delegation and regulation. 
2.6.1 Physical conditions: 
All local authorities need to assess the physical infrastructure in their area. This is in 
order to plan and maintain new and existing structures for the development of such an 
area. (Coetzee, 1985:29) 
2.6.2 Social expectations: 
This involves accounting for and responding to the needs of the populace. In particular 
local authorities aim to improve upon and secure existing living standards. (Coetzee, 
1985:31) 
2.6.3 Economic demands: 
Local government is expected to respond effectively to the financial and resource 
constraints imposed upon it. This involves planning for such demands by means of 
establishing a clear budget of existing expenditures and projects. (Coetzee, 1985:32) 
2.6.4 Political values: 
Local government is a political institution (Craythorne, 1990:12; Sing & Penceliah, 
1989:49). Consequently, these organisations are expected to fulfil the function of the 
political system by apportioning spiritual and material values in society9 (Coetzee, 
1985:33; Heymans & Totemeyer, 1988:10). This is achieved by reflecting the values of 
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the community it serves in its decision-taking. As Coetzee (1985:33) comments: 
"Since politics at the local government level embraces all the activities 
which have an influence on the manner in which the nature of a 
community's authoritative policies are determined and executed [the] 
' 
municipal council has the authority of the whole community behind it to 
take decisions and to ensure that they are put into effect". 
2.6.5 Administrative delegation and regulation: 
The scope and delegation of authority at the local government level is embodied by the 
responsibility of the chief executive officer and departmental heads of each organisations 
(Coetzee, 1985:35). These responsibilities are accomplishment by means of the 
"organisational structure adopted, the training given to, and the values inculcated into the 
municipal staff' (Craythorne, 1990:15). As noted previously, according to Tdtemeyer (in 
Heymans & Tdtemeyer, 1988:1,10), decisions are "predominantly politically determined" 
thereby reflecting the quality and "credibility of government service". Therefore the scope 
and delegation of responsibility to local authorities is characterised by the kinship 
between administrative values and performance, and socio-political values. 
2.7 The location of local authorities in the public sector: 
The concept and composition of the public sector will be described. 
2. 7 .1 The concept of the public sector: 
The public sector broadly refers to "all those enterprises, departments or institutions 
which either produce goods or provide services and which are totally or partially owned 
or controlled by the state" (Golding, 1985:41). 
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However, it can be noted that a related mis-perception is the assumption that both the 
public sendce and public sector are readily interchangeable concepts (Boshoff & Bendix, 
1993:31). This notion is rejected by Kluever (in Levitz, 1990:9) who accuses the media, in 
particular, for making "sweeping statements about the Public Service [which] include 
under this definition many bodies such as local authorities". Subsequently, the public 
service is a distinct sector within the public sector which does not include local 
authorities within its composition. As Levitz (1990:8) concludes, the Public Service 
constitutes "departments, own affairs administrations and provincial administrations" 
(now disbanded). 
For the purposes of this thesis, unlike previous chapters, local authorities do not fall 
within the category of the public service. 
2.7.2 The composition of the public sector: 
Public sector organisations function within the financial constraints of an annual budget 
(Hilliard, 1994:8). The public sector is the largest employer in South Africa with an 
active workforce of around 1.7 million workers or 16% of overall employment in 1992 
(Boshoff & Bendix, 1993:32)10• The number of employees in local government during 








Public Service & Exchequer personnel (59.8% ); 
Local Authorities ( 16.1 % ) ; 
Transnet (10.8%); 
Public corporations (8.2% ); 
Posts & Telecommunications (5.9% ); and 
Agricultural Control Boards (0.2% ). 
(The South African Institute of Public Administration, 1992:27) 
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The above figures are illustrated in Annexure 6A. 
3. Characteristics of labour relations in South African local authorities: 




Frame of reference applied in South Africa; 
Growth of the labour relations function in local authorities; and 
Nature of labour relations in local authorities. 
3.1 Frame of reference applied in South Africa: 
Labour relations in South Africa can be described as an amalgam of European and 
North American traditions (Cameron, Cheadle & Thompson, 1989:9). Historically, 
employers have functioned in a Unitarist mode which was often characterised as a 
paternalistic approach to labour relations (Childs, 1987:74;). However, since the 1980's a 
pluralist approach has become prevalent in South Africa (Childs, 1987:74). Horwitz 
(1991b:61) describes this trend as a shift from a win-loose approach to "an emergent 
notion of pluralism in the political economy", i.e. a win-win approach in labour 
relations11• A number of factors contributed to this change, in particular: 
* 
* 
The rapid growth of trade unionism in South Africa; and 
The subsequent increase in labour representation in the workplace~ 
(Childs, 1987:74). 
However, despite the paradigmatic shift in the broader approach to labour relations, Van 
Holdt (in Botha, 1990:28) warns that at the organisational level labour relations often 
reflects an "authoritarian, oppressive and undemocratic" style. The growth and nature of 
labour relations in South African local authorities follows. 
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3.2 Growth of the labour relations function: 
Historically, personnel management and labour relations practices were hardly applied as 






The limited financial resources of local authorities; 
General government inexperience with the personnel function12; 
A prevailing management disregard for methodical investigation13; and 
The sparse attention given toward labour issues at the time. 
(Cloete, 1978:218)14• 
However, since the early 1980's the labour relations function jn local government 
generally became an integral aspect of personnel management in local authorities. Key 
factors contributing to this trend included: 
* 
* 
A growth in the. autonomy of local authorities in regulating labour relations 
practices; and 
A growth in the size of trade unionism within their organisations. 
(Sing & Penciliah, 1989:54) 
3.3 Nature of labour relations in South African local authorities: 
A multiplicity of labour relations arrangements have emerged in South African local 
authorities15 (Sing & Penciliah, 1989:54). These arrangements can be distinguished by 
their relatively independent nature by means of the specific arrangements decided within 
each local authority, in particular, the nature of relations between the relevant parties 
(Coetzee, 1985:119). The lack of uniformity in labour relations practices can be 









The number, level, schooling, diversity and morale of staff; 
The incidence of labour unrest; 
The essentiality and vulnerability of services; 
The geographical distribution of the offices and institutions; 
The intensity of union activity and negotiations; 
The incidence of grievances; and 
The skills and training of line managers and supervisors. 
(Sing & Bendix, 1993:73) 




Roodepoort: Where day-to-day grievances are handled by the Chief 
Personnel Officer and more "serious industrial relations matters" taken up 
by the Chief of Personnel Services; and 
Port Elizabeth: Where the duties of the Personnel Officers include: 
Ensuring the correct completion of properly identified grievances on forms, 
monitoring all the "facts" collected, prevention of bias, victimisation and 
unfair labour practices, and advising the rights and responsibilities of all 
the parties involved in such a dispute; and 
Pietermaritzburg, Johannesburg and Durban which have separate Labour 
Relations units to deal specifically with issues in more detail in this regard. 
(Sing & Penceliah, 1989:_?4) 
4. Parties to the labour relationship: 
The labour relationship in local authorities is made up of trade unions, professional 
associations, employers and employers organisations, and various advisory and regulatory 
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bodies provided by the State or independent organisations (Sing & Maharaj.1990:45). A 





The trade unions; and 
The State. 
4.1 Employers: 
The following aspects of the employers role in local authorities will be described: 
* A definition of employers; and 
* Employer representation in labour relations. 
4.1.1 A definition of emplovers: 
Local government employers represent the local authority and body corporate (Sing & 
Penceliah, 1989:51). In terms of labour relations, the responsibility of employers is 
largely undertaken by the personnel officials of each local authority. However, in some 
instances, elected and appointed public functionaries, including the Town Clerk, can 
participate directly in certain processes, notably negotiation during industrial action. In 
general, as noted previously, employers are defined by the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 
of 1956) [as amended] as: 
"Any person (a municipality is a person) whomsoever who employs or 
provides work for any person and remunerates or expressly or tacitly 
undertakes to remunerate him or who, subject to sub-section (3) permits 
any person whomsoever in any manner to assist him in carrying on or 
conducting of his business; and employ and employment have 
corresponding meanings." (Craythome, 1990:211) 
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A notable trend has been the emergence of employer organisations for, inter alia, 
resolving and regulating labour relations disputes in local government (Sing & Maharaj, 
1990:43). This feature will be described. 
4.1.2 Employer organisations in local authorities: 





A definition of employer organisations; 
A background to employer organisations; 
Current representation of employer organisations; and 
Objectives of employer organisations. 
4.1.2.1 A definition of employer organisations: 
The Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) [since amended] defines an employer 
organisation as: 
"Any number of .employers in any particular undertaking, industry, trade or 
occupation associated together for the purpose, whether by itself or with 
other purposes, of regulating relations in that undertaking, industry, trade 
or occupation between themselves or some of them and their employees or 
some of their employees." 
4.1.2.2 A background to employer organisations in South African local authorities: 
The first employers' organisation in South Africa can be traced back to 1890 when the 
Industrial Union ofEmployers was founded (Sing & Maharaj, 1990:46). In local 
government, such an undertaking was attempted in 1917 by the Transvaal Municipal 
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Association as a result of employee demands for improved salary. and service conditions. 
In 1959 the United Municipal Executive was also organised by employers specifically in 
order to negotiate with the all "white" South African Association of Municipal Employees 
(SAAME) (Sing & Maharaj, 1990:46). Both the above employer organisations failed to 
retain permanent status due to their limited powers and a lack of unity amongst 
employer members. 
However, the first permanent employer organisation was·founded in January 1969 and 
became known as the Transvaal Municipal Employers' Organisation (TMEO). 
Subsequently, labour relations in local authorities featured the establishment of an 
industrial council between the TMEO and SAAME, as well as the introduction of an 
Industrial Court for the Local Government Undertaking in the Province of Transvaal (as 
approved by the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) [as amended] during this period). 
In 1985 the TMEO became known as the Municipal Employers' Organisation (MEO) 
and extended its operation to the Orange Free State and Natal. During this time the 
MEO also became party to the Industrial Council for Municipal Undertaking which by 
1988 had resulted in eight Industrial Council divisions. (Sing & Maharaj, 1990:45-47) 
4.1.2.3 The current representation of employers' organisations: 
A number of local authority employer organisations function presently. In general these 
organisations can be distinguished by three branches of representation: 
* 
* 
In Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, local government 
undertakings represent the interests of the Association of Chief 
Administrative Officers for Local Authorities (ACAOLA) and SAAME; 
In the Cape Province, the Cape Province Local Authorities Employers' 
Organisation was established and registered in february 1981 under 
government Notice 51of1986; and 
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* More. recently, the Major Cities Employer's Organisation which was 
registered in 1988_which represents einployers from the Durban, 
Johannesb~g, Cape' Town, P6rt Eli7.abeth, .Pretoria and Bl0emfontein local 
authorities. 
' . . . . . .· { . 
- (Sing & Maharaj, 1~90:47) 





The Orange Free ·state' ·Gold FieldS Empiojers' Org~ation; 
The Major Cities Employers' Organisation; 
The Cape Pro~~ Local Autiwrities Employers' Association; and 
' ' ~ . 
The MunicipQJ Employers' Organisation. 
(Sing & Penceliah, i989:53; Sing & Maharaj, 1990:46) 
All the above organisations are members to the Federation of Municipal Employers' 
. ' 
Organisation, whose duties include,' inter iilfa, represeniliig the above member 
organisations interests on the Board of Remunerati<?n and Service Benefits of Town Clerks 
'" ' ' . . ' ~ : ·. . : ·t - ' 
and whose constitution provides for "structure~ ~llective bargaining roles, internal 
relationships and ext~rnafrelanonshlp~". (Sfug ·&Maharaj, 1990:47) 
4.1.2.4 Objectives of emploYers' orianisations in South African local authorities: 
To sum up, the objecti~es of.employers' o~gaDisatlons in loCat ·authorlrles involve: 
Regulating me111.1>Cr\employee relations while safeguar~ the interests of 
the ·employers; '· · · · '"'· 
* 








Ensuring that any proposed legislation related to labour relations is 
acceptable to member employers; 
Expanding the present membership; 
Retaining and developing any liaisons or links with other associations, 
organisations, business chambers, institutes or authorities, i.e. external 
relations; 
Providing legal assistance, where necessary, for members; and 
"Cooperating with organisations of employers and/or employees on any 
industrial council or conciliation board which may be established to deal 
with matters affecting members". 
(Sing & Maharaj, 1990:48) 
4.2 Trade unions: 
The following aspects of trade unions in local authorities will be described: 
* 
* 
A definition of trade unions in the South African context; and 
Trade union representation in labour relations. 
4.2.1 A definition of trade unions: 
As noted previously, trade unions are defined by the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 
1956) [ as amended] as: 
"Any number of employees in any particular undertaking, industry, trade or 
occupation associated together for the purpose, whether by itself or with 
other parties, of regulating relations in that undertaking, industry, trade or 
occupation between themselves (or some of them), and their employers (or 
some of their employers)." 
( Craythorne, 1990:211) 
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4.2.2 Trade union representation in labour relations: 
The following aspects of trade union representation in local authorities will be described: 
* The composition; 
* The membership; and 
* The growth of trade unionism in local authorities. 
4.2.2.1 Composition: 
Trade unions in local authorities, as elsewhere, act as guardians of the particular 
interests of their members (Pillay & Bendix, 1993:53). Historical forces have broadly 
shaped their nature and composition. In particular, until recently, trade unions were 
racially segregated and it is submitted currently represent these historical compositions. 
A description of this membership follows. 
4.2.2.2 Membership: 
Annexure 6B provides a list of all the active local authority trade unions in South Africa. 
Currently employees are represented by approximately 34 local government trade unions 
and professional associations. The two largest representative trade unions are the South 
African Association of Municipal Employees (SAAME) and the South African Municipal 
Workers Union (SAMWU). A number of trade unions belong to inter-industry 
federations or confederations. A brief description of these organisations follows. 
Major union groupings on the South African industrial relations scene comprise the 
Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the National Council of 
Trade Unions (NACTU), the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) and the 
South African Congress of Labour (SACOL) (King, 1990:27). Their individual policy 
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COSATU: Forming a "strategic alliance" with certain political parties, while 
retaining autonomy; 
NACTU: Adopting a "workerist" charter while retaining links with 
Africanist flags and black consciousness; 
UWUSA: Allied to the Inkatha Freedom Party and anti-socialist; and 
SACOL (the South African Congress of Labour): Allied with the National 
Party but steering toward Conservative Party style policies. 
(King, 1991 :27) 
Notably, a realignment of trade union federations in recent years has resulted in an 
alliance between the Federation of Salaried Staff (FEDSAL) .and the Confederation of 
Metal and Building Unions (CMBU), to which SAAME is affiliated (its second biggest 
affiliate). (Horwitz, 1991b:3). 
Local government trade unions can be furthermore distinguished by: 
* 
* 
Those trade unions whose members and interests are remain "localised", 
i.e. within local government, for example the South African Association of 
Municipal Employees (SAAME) and the South African Municipal Workers 
Union (SAMWU); and 
Those trade unions which are classified as general trade unions whose 
activities include other sectors besides that of the local government, for 
example, the Transport arid General Workers Union (TGWU), United 
Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) and the Black Allied Workers 
Union (BAWU). 
(Sing & Penceliah, 1989:53) 
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4.2.2.3 The growth of trade unionism in local authorities: 
A major feature of public sector trade unionism has been its rapid growth in the past 
decade (Horwitz, 1991b:14; Wiehahn, 1988:71). This can be illustrated, for example, by 
public sector trade unions generally being the largest growing membership of COSATU 
(Andrew Levy & Associates, 1991:4). Subsequently, the growth of trade unions in the 






Economics: Public sector employees seeing the trade union as a means of 
achieving a higher wage and better working conditions; 
Group strength: The growing realisation of the effectiveness of group 
pressure in terms of attaining labour interests; 
Social pressure: A social acceptance within a circle of friends that such a 
step was essentially promoting ones own prestige within the ranks of 
employment; and 
Socio-political realities: "In South Africa, where the black population has 
effectively been excluded from direct political representation, it is hardly 
surprising that as labour representatives become better trained and 
experienced, and as the working population in this country becomes better-
informed and more· aggressive in its demands for a greater voice in 
decision-making, that the trade union movement will continue to be a 
logical and powerful vehicle for maintaining pressure in the process of 
change." 
(Fick & Hugh High, 1987:55-56) 
4.3 The State: 
The nature of relations between the State and local government is a central one. The 
States role in the labour relationship can be distinguished by the principal control 
measures which it applies to local government personnel matters thereby making local 
authorities "subject to control by the provincial authorities and State departments" 
(Cloete, 1988:265-266). These measures include various provisions, such as the need for 
the Administrators or relevant ministers to approve all by-laws regarding personnel 
matters (Cloete, 1988:266). The States'-role in local government labour relations can, 




It acts as legislator by determining the collective rights and legal basis upon 
which collective bargaining and dispute settlement procedures are founded; 
It acts as a conciliator by specifying methods for dispute settlement, notably 
conciliation, arbitration and mediation; and 
It acts as a regulator by indicating, for instance, time limitations for 
particular dispute settlement processes, or acting in the capacity of advisor 
or mediator in certain instances. 
(Bendix, 1989:72) 
5. Conducting the labour relationship: 
Two specific aspects of conducting the labour relationship in South African local 
authorities are described: 
* 
* 
Applied legislation influencing labour relations; and 
The key issue of the right to strike. 
5.1 Applied legislation: 
Until recently, industry-specific legislation for regulating local government personnel 






The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 30of1941) for dealing with a loss 
of workers' earnings as a result of a death or disablement caused by 
accident at work or a disease contracted at work. 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (Act 3 of 1983) for regulating 
conditions of employment. 
The Wage Act (Act 5 of 1957) which is particularly applied where 
mechanisms for negotiation are necessary for setting minimum wages. 
The Machinery and Occupationa) Safety Act (Act 6 of 1983) for protecting 
the physical safety of employees and promotion of occupational hygiene. 
(Craythome, 1990:xxxiii-xxxiv; Sing & Maharaj, 1990:43; The Official SA 
Trade Unions Directory and Industrial Relations Handbook. 1989 /90) 
However, specific legislation which applies to local authority labour relations comprises: 
• The Remuneration of the Town Oerks Act (Act 115 of 1984) 
* The Local Government Trainin& Act (Act 41 of 1985) 
• The Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) 
• The Public Service Labour Relations Act (Act 102 of 1993) 
(Sing & Maharaj, 1990:43) 
Each of these Acts will be briefly described. 
1 
147 
5.1.1 Remuneration of the Town Clerks Act (Act 115 of 1984): 
This Act delineates specific wage ceilings for local government employees by according 
to the Town Clerk a maximum salary. This provides a benchmark from which salary 
scales for all personnel are pegged. (Sing & Maharaj, 1990:43) 
5.1.2 Local Government Training Act (Act 41of1985): 
This Act provides the groundwork for personnel training and development, such as 
courses for administration and/or other practice in local government. (Sing & Maharaj, 
1990:43) 
5.1.3 Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956): 
Formerly referred to as the Industrial Conciliation Act (Act 11 of 1924) and since 
amended, this legislation extensively regulates labour relations at the local government 
level (Sing & Penceliah, 1989:55). Subsequent amendments since 1956 have entrenched, 
for instance, the rights of trade unions whose members partially or wholly work for the 
state to register, and in this context, the right of existing trade unions or professional 
associations to object to such registration (Landman, 1991:18). Furthermore, this Act 
provides dispute handling machinery (conciliation, mediation and arbitration) and defines 
the concept of unfair labour practice (Fick & Hugh High, 1987:131). With specific 
reference to local government,· the purpose of the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) 
[since amended] is to: 
* Prevent and settle disputes between employers and employees; . 
* Regulate terms and conditions of employment by agreement and 
arbitration; 
* Provide for the establishment of an Industrial Court. 
(Craythorne, 1990:210) 
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Despite the above provisions, the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) [as amended] 
has been consistently challenged by public sector unions for their full incorporation into 
this Act (Horwitz in Business Day, 14/05/1989)17• This pressure has subsequently, led 
to the promulgation of the Public Services Labour Relations Act (Act 102 of 1993) in 
August 1993. 
5.1.4 Public Service Labour Relations Act (Act 102 of 1993): 
The need for this Act was established during a meeting between the Commission for 
Administration and a delegation of trade unions and staff associations representing some 
300 000 public sector workers (Andrew Levy & Associates, 1991:33) .. This Act 
entrenched a number of key labour demands , such as the right to strike for non-essential 
services. However, these provisions are currently disputed on the basis that few services 
fall within this category of non-essentiality (Hilliard, 1994:7). Presently, the application of 
the Public Services Labour Relations Act (Act 102 of 1993) for local authorities is vague. 
A key right, which can be described is the right to strike in South African local 
authorities. 
5.2 The issue of the right to strike: 
The right to strike in local government is prohibited by means of section 65 (1) of the 
Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) [as amended]. This prohibition is ascribed to the 
nature of local authorities as essential servicd8• (Bendix, 1992:545; Benjamin, 1989:45; 
Brassey et al, 1987:104; Cameron, Cheadle & Thompson, 1989:82; Christie, 1992:25; 
Cloete, 1988:259; Pillay & Bendix, 1993:49; Sing & Maharaj, 1990:44; Wiehahn, 1988:71) 
According to the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) [as amended] s46(1), essential 
sefVices are listed19 as follows: 
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(a) any local authority; or 
(b) any employer .. . who within the area of a local authority provides light, power, 
sanitation, passenger transportation or a fire extinguishing service; or 
( c) any employer to whom the provision of this section has been applied in terms 
of sub-section (7); 
Furthermore, sub-section (7) provides a blanket clause which allows the Minister of 
Manpower, at his discretion and on publication of a notice in the Government Gazette, 
to declare the following activities as essential services: 
(i) the supply, distribution, processing, canning or preserving .of any perishable 
foodstuffs; or 
(ii) the supply or distribution of petrol or other fuels for use by local authorities or 
other employers in connection with the provision of any service ref e"ed to in 
paragraph (b) of sub-section ( 1) 
(Bendix, 1992:454; Benjamin, 1989:45; Christie, 1992:15; Sing & Bendix, 1993:70) 
This prohibition has recently been contested by the Labour Courts. Their findings have 
challenged the notion that all services provided by local authorities are essential. This can 
be illustrated in the case of Town Council of Benoni v. Minister of Labour, cited in 
Cameron , Cheadle & Thompson in 1989. In this case the Benoni Town Council 
requested a prohibition of all forms of industrial action in the local authority based on 
s.46(i) of the Labour relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) [since amended]. However, this 
attempt was overturned by the Labour Court because of its "far-reaching restriction on 
the ordinary rights of employers and employees" in the local authority (Cameron, 
Cheadle & Thompson, 1989:80). 
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As noted above, the lack of judicial consensus concerning an appropriate 
strike definition;20 and 
The legitimate sanction of industrial action on some occasions in local 
authorities21 by the industrial court22• 
(Cameron, Cheadle & Thompson, 1989:73; Pillay & Bendix, 1993:54). 
6. Overview: 






Describing the concept and key features of local government, namely the 
characteristics, types, purpose,duties, environment and location of local 
authorities in the public sector; 
Describing labour relations practices in local authorities, namely the 
applied frame of reference, growth and nature of labour relations in local 
authorities; 
Describing the concept and key features of parties to the labour 
relationship; and 
Describing the manner in which labour relations are conducted, namely 




LABOUR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETILEMENT 
IN SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL AUTHORITIES. 
1. Introduction: 
This chapter outlines a background to labour disputes and their settlement in South 
African local authorities. In particular, the following aspects are described: 
* The causes of labour conflict in South African local authorities in the 




The categories of labour disputes; 
The processes of labour dispute resolution and settlement, with specific 
reference .to industrial action and collective bargaining structures; and 
The approaches to labour dispute settlement. 
2. Causes of labour conflict in South African local authorities: 
A number of factors causing labour conflict in South African local authorities can be 






Behavioural factors; and 
Structural factors. 
2.1 Environmental factors: 
The nature, source and types of conflict in local authorities have been illfluenced by a 
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The political environment; 
The social environment; 
The economic environment; 
The legislative environment; .. · 
The organisational environment. 
Each environment will be described in context of key labour dispute issues in local 
authorities. 
2.1.1 The political environment: 
The politicisation of the trade union movement has been a key issue of labour 
disputes in local authorities. This issue will be briefly described. 
2.1.1.1 The issue of trade union politicisation: 
The introduction of race-based policies in South Africa confronted traditionally 
· "black"1 trade unions (referred to as independent trade unions hereafter) with the 
dilemma of an "unjust political order" (Thompson in Benjamin, Jacobus & Albertyn, 
1988:74). Subsequently, industrial action became a key "weapon against undemocratic 
government" (Pillay & Bendix, 1993:47; Copelyn, 1991:29, Magwaza in Botha, 
1990:31)3• These developments were notable in local authorities where industrial 
disputes frequently went beyond the confines of "bread and butter issues" to include 
demands for political "freedom and justice'14 which the employers were powerless to 
address.5 (Horwitz, 1991a:68; Institute for Industrial Relations, 1988:43; Municipal 
and General Workers Union in MacShane et al., 1984:171; Negota, 1991:7; Pillay, 
1990:12). 







The perceptible shift in the South African political scenario towards 
transition which sparked political uncertainty6 and to which both the 
employer and employee had to "adapt almost daily to changing 
circumstances" (Andrew Levy and Associates, 1990/1991:3); 
The lack of a franchise for "non.;.whites"; 
The repression of extra-parliamentary opposition, especially in the 
townships 7; 
The application of prejudicial labour policies at both the State and 
organisational levels; 
The popular perception by the· disenfranchised of trade unions as a key 
mechanism for political expression8; and 
The lack of a clear distinction of "political demands"9• 
(Dlamini in Fick & Hugh High, 1987:102; Du Plessis, 1990:63; Heymans & 
Totemeyer, 1988:3; Horwitz, 1991a:68; Mullins, 1988:4; Institute for Industrial 
Relations, 1988:40; Wood, 1987:64-65,158-199). 
2.1.2 The social environment: 
A variety of discriminatory labour practices and the growing acceptance of violence as 
a method for resolving workplace issues have been key issues of labour disputes in 
local authorities. These will be briefly described. 
2.1.2.1 The issue of workplace discrimination: 
South African labour relations have been "infinitely aggravated" by racial prejudice 
and tensions at all levels of society. In the workplace, the imposition of race-based 
policies and the long-term effects of such discriminatory practices on "non-white" 
employees has been a key source of tension between employers and the independent 
trade unions. The complexity of the social environment is shown in the case of local 
authorities, as elsewhere, where despite the formal annulment of all race~based or 
discriminatory practices10, racial friction is still contended to undermine labour 
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The disproportionate racial composition of the workforce in terms of 
work grades and leadership; 
The continuation of informal discriminatory practices or measures, for 
example in terms of recruitment and selection; 
The lack of desire to implement affirmative action policies but rather 
provide for equal opportunities; 
(Bendix & Graham, 1988:39; Bredenkamp in Botha, 1990:29; Ernstzen, 1991:32; 
Nyembe, 1992:39; Pillay & Bendix, 1993:50; Poppleton, 1985:13; Swilling in Heymans 
& T~temeyer, 1988:199; Trollip, 1990b:22) 
· 2.1.2.2 The issue of "violence" in the workplace: 
The growing indifference to, and nominal acceptance of, industrial action by 
independent trade unions has been cited as a key source of conflict. The acceptability 
of violent measures for seeking workforce demands is broadly ascribed to a variety of 
behavioural dynamics which, according to Von Holdt (in Botha, 1990:28), are 
mirrored by the wider society: 
"Violence is integral to the way people experience social life in this 
country. Then, when a strike occurs and violence erupts, everyone jumps 
up and says: There's violence. But it has happened a long time before 
that." 
2.1.3 The economic environment: 
Economic disparities among the workforce and the pressure of growing 
·unemployment have been key economic concerns in local authorities. These will be 
briefly described. 
1.5.5 
2.1.3.1 The issue of economic disparities in the workplace: 
Economic factors, such as wage and salary issues, have traditionally been a key source 
of labour relations conflict. Particular concerns for independent trade unions in local 
authorities have included the issues of the living standard wage11 and~ until recently, 
the inequitable distribution of salaries according to racial classification._ In loc~l 
_auth?_rities,. !~~se issues included comparative wage disparities among similarly _graded 
_w_ork~rs i11.~1he sarious local authorities, especially between rural and urban local 
L.!1ll.!h.()rities12 .• (Nyembe, 1992:39; Roux, 1989:21) 
2.1.3.2 The issue of unemployment in the workplace: 
With approximately 3.6 million new job seekers expected to enter the South African 
labour market between 1985 and 2000, and estimates ranging up to 9 million 
unemployed by the turn of the century, growing concern over job security has become 
a key source of concern in the workplace. Local authority employees most 
"threatened" by these developments have been those of the semi-and unskilled 
category, the majority of whom are ~ember to the independent trade unions.13 
(Bredenkamp in Botha, 1990:29; South African Chamber of Business in Andrew Levy 
& Associates, 1990/1991:28; Van der Merwe, 1989:117). 
2.1.4 The legislative environment: 
The application of discriminatory legislation, complex legalistic procedures and a 
dualistic labour relations system have been key legal causes of conflict. These will be 
briefly described. 
2.1.4.1 The issue of discriminatory legislation: 
As noted above, the entrenchment of apartheid-related legislation in the workplace 
over the past decades, notably job reservation policies, has been a major source of 
conflict for independent trade unions14• Examples include, the Bantu Labour 
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Relations Regulations Amendment Act (Act 70 of 1973) [since repealed], which 
separated the rights of the bantu15 and whites, and the Industrial Conciliation Act 
(Act 11 of 1924) which, inter alia, forbade racially mixed trade unions (Du Toit, 
1976:45). (Douwes Dekker, n.d.:56; Maller, 1989:6) 
2.1.4.2 The issue of complex legislation: 
The application of long and bureaucratic dispute settlement procedures have 
increased labour relations tensions in the local authorities. In particular, factors 




The financial and psychological burden on trade unions in undertaking 
complicated and time-consuming legal procedures; 
The inconsistency of the court with regard to various labour rights 
interpretations16; and 
The overly prescriptive approach of the industrial courts in regulating 
conflict. 
(Employment Law, 1991:85-86; Horwitz, 1989:8; Pillay, 1990:12; Pillay & Bendix, 
1993:49) 
2.1.4.3 The issue of dualistic legislation: 
Unlike the relative liberalisation of private sector labour rights since the early 1980's, 
public sector labour rights remained relatively unchanged since the Wiehahn 
Commission of 197917• Subsequently, the provision of unequal labour rights in both 
sectors has been a source of conflict notably in the public sector where more 
restrictive labour rights have been applied18• In local authorities, the demand for 
extended labour rights has, in particular, included the issue of trade union 
recognition19, which for the majority of independent trade unions has been justified 
on the premise that since employees pay taxes they ought to have the right to 
participate in organisational matters20 (Bendix, 1989:73; Sing & Penceliah, 1989:55). 
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(Business Day, 9/06/1987 and 14/05/1989; Ernstzen, 1991:32; Horwitz, 1989:6; 
Horwitz, 1991b:9; Labour Research Service, 1990:(i); South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 1987 /1988:663; Rand Daily Mail, 9/11/1980; The Argus, 26/11/1988). 
2.1.5 The organisational environment: 
The lack of organisational autonomy has been a source of labour conflict in the 
public sector. This factor will be briefly described. 
2.1.5.1 The issue of the lack of organisational autonomy: 
Excessive State intervention in labour relations matters in the public sector has been 
a key .source of concern for many public sector trade unions. Notably, this includes 
independent trade unions in local authorities, which have accrued workplace tensions 
partly to: 
* The ineffective and limited powers of employers in acquiescing to 
labour demands; and 
* The concomitant negative image of such public functionaries21• 
(Barnes in Coetzee, 1985:140-141; Craythorne, 1982:374). 
2.2 Behavioural factors: 
Labour disputes in local authorities can be ascribed to a number of behavioural 
factors. Labour relations can be characterised by a variety of confrontational 
dynamics which often exacerbate or trigger labour disputes. In South African local 
authorities these dynamics can be described in the context of each party within the 




The trade unions; 
The employers; and 
The State. 
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2.2.1 Employer confrontational dynamics: 
Employer confrontational dynamics can be attributed to a recalcitrance for change 
regarding the status quo22 and the adoption of delaying tactics in the dispute 






The "ideology of personnel management" which saw conflict as evidence 
of mismanagement and workers leaders as "agitators". This view led 
many employers to believe in their unilateral right to decide on the 
conditions of employment (Coetzee, 1985:143; Douwes Dekker, n.d.:56; 
Poppleton, 1985:10); 
The close ties between employers and the State (based on the notion of 
mutual benefit24) (Albertyn, 1989:83); 
The high level of in-built distrust between parties (Douwes Dekker, 
n.d.:62)25 ; 
The lack of management sensitivity to the changing labour relations 
environment (Sing & Bendix, 1993:71); and 
The lack of experience of both employers and trade unions "in coping 
with the power expression of unionism in the workplace" (Douwes 
Dekker, n.d.:36)26• 
2.2.2 Trade union confrontational dynamics: 
Trade union confrontational dynamics have been characterised by an escalation in 




Growing political instability and economic pressure; 
The prescriptive and recalcitrant attitude of employers and the State 







The rise in worker expectations as a result of the wider experience of 
local authorities employees with mass action campaigns which deepened 
the "workers awareness of being a class in and for themselves" 
(Ernstzen, 1991:33); 
The growing participation of external trade unions in local authority 
matters (having ostensibly unionised their own sectors )27 and the 
concomitant increase in intra-union conflict28; 
The advent of a "new type" of trade unionism subsequent to the 
annulment of closed shop agreements or compulsory membership; and 
The evolvement of a culture of trade union loyalty and generalised 
sense of dissatisfaction among its members within the organisation29• 
(Andrew Levy & Associates, 1990/1991:12; Bendix, 1992:552;.Bredenkamp in Botha, 
1990:29; Ernstzen, 1991:33; Horwitz, 1991b:12; King, 1990:22; Pillay & Bendix, 
1993:50) 
2.2.3 State confrontational dynamics: 
It is proposed that high levels of State intervention in labour relations by the use of 
strong-arm tactics30 and an adoption of confrontational strategies31 have caused 
labour conflict. This behaviour by the State has been broadly ascribed to a perception 
of the need to "contain" trade unionism (Thompson, 1990:n.p.). Examples of these 




Negotiating with "tame staff associations" while excluding "militant 
democratic unions" from this process (Community Resource and 
Information Centre, 1989:12); 
Co-opting trade union officials whose views are similar to that of the 
States (Golding, 1985:49); and 
Providing material incentives and developing an ethic of loyalty "in the 
face of enormous opposition by the oppressed classes" (Golding, 
1985:49). 
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In summation, the extent and nature of State intervention in local authorities in this 
context has been contentious. As noted previously, prior to the Wiehahn Commission 
report of 1979, extensive central and provincial government control was exerted in the 
form of directives and enactments with regard to local authorities personnel issues 
(Cloete, 1978:215; Craythorne, 1982:373). However, since the early 1980's, State 
interventionism has been characterised by a use of prescriptive legislation and the 
appointment of officials sympathetic to the State.32 
2.3 Structural factors: 
Labour disputes in South African local authorities can also be attributed to a number 
of structural factors. In particular, these include inadequate labour relations policies 
and procedures and ineffective communications structures. Both will be briefly 
described. 
2.3.1 The issue of inadequate labour relations policies and procedures: 
Conflict in the public sector, notably local authorities, has been ascribed to "bad 
industrial relations practices or poor personnel administration" (Mcfarlane in Douwes 
Dekker, n.d.:48). Specific causes of concern include.· the lack of clear, and therefore 
effective, dispute regulation policies and the application of ad hoc solutions to labour 
dispute issues. (CQmmunity Resource and Information Centre, 1989:12; Financial 
Times, 8/11/1980; Nyembe, 1992:41; Poppleton, 1985:3). 
2.3.2 The issue of ineffective communications: 
Labour conflict in local authorities has also been ascribed to poor communications 
between employers and their respective trade unions33• According to Magwaza (in 
Botha, 1990:29) a "failure by both sides to engage in real and meaningful 
communication at a very early stage" underscores the potential for conflict. The lack 





The historical polarisation of the workforce (notably of the independent 
trade union movement) and the employers; 
Management misunderstanding and a rnisperception of worker 
demands34; and 
The vast size of the workforce in some local authorities35• 
(Bredenkamp in Botha, 1990:29; Coetzee, 1985:140; Magwaza in Botha, 1990:29; Van 
der Merwe, 1989:116) 
3. The categories of labour disputes: 
/ 
A key element of disputes has· been the extension of their definition in 1979 from "a 
change in the conditions of employment pertaining to a dismissal or suspension to 
include Unfair Labour Practices" (Wood, 1987:45). Unfair Labour Practices can be 
defined as: 
"Any labour practice which has the effect that the business of any 
employer or class of employer is or may unfairly be affected or 
disrupted thereby." 
"The incitement too, support of, participation in or furtherance of any 
boycott of any product or service by any trade union, federation, office-
bearer or official of such trade union or federation." 
(Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:221) 
As well as,. 
"A failure or refusal to discuss, negotiate and introduce a disciplinary 
and grievance procedure, in circumstances where a trade union has 
approached the employer with such a request." 
(Sing & Penceliah, 1989:52) 
Furthermore, an Unfair Labour Practice can be brought by trade unions or employees 
against employers on the grounds of racial, sexual or any other form of arbitrary 
discrimination (Landman, 1991:22). In terms of jurisprudence, an Unfair Labour 
Practice is distinguished between essential services and the rest. In local authorities 
Unfair Labour Practices fall within the category of disputes of right. However, the 
precise interpretation of what constitutes an Unfair Labour Practice is blurred more 
recently by the development of a "body precedent" in the Appellate Division where 
the interpretation of the term can be adjusted to the unique circumstances of each 
case36. (Thompson, 1992:504). (Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:221; Sing & Penceliah, 
1989:52; Thompson, 1992:502-504) 
As noted previously, disputes can be classified as disputes of right or disputes of 
interest. 
3.1 Disputes of right: 
As noted previously, disputes of right involve issues which directly violate or challenge 
existing "rights". Rights broadly reflect agreed or legislated standards of practice which 
are non-negotiable. Consequently, disputes in this category must be interpreted 
according to existing legal provisions or clauses which regulate employment. However, 
rights may also be interpreted according to customary workplace practices. In local 
authorities, disputes of right have varied_ but have included the legal contract of 
employment, actual working conditions, and related to this, working rules such as hours 
of work (Bendix, 1989:202; Cape Town City Council, 1990/1991:np). Subsequently, 
disputes of right can be settled by means of legal adjudication or compulsory 
arbitration (Bendix,1989:202; Cape Town City Council,1990/l:n.p.; Douwes Dekker, 
1990:294; Pankert, 1980:723) 
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3.2 Disputes of interest: 
As noted previously, disputes of interest concern issues where no definitive standards 
or legal mea_sures are applied. They normally arise during the course of collective 
bargaining or negotiations. The outcome, however, may result in the adoption of new 
rights or standards whereby following disputes on similar matters may be regarded as 
disputes of right. In local authorities, disputes of interests have included a new right 
being sought by employees to which they are not entitled such as new hours of work. 
(Bendix, 1989:202; Cape Town City Council, 1990/1991:n.p.) Subsequently, disputes of 
interest are usually settled by means of negotiation or third party participation or 
decree. (Bendix, 1989:203; Cape Town City Council, 1990/1991:n.p; Douwes Dekker, 
1990:294; Pankert, 1980:723) 
4. Processes of labour dispute resolution and settlement: 
The following aspects of labour dispute resolution and settlement in local authorities 
will be described: 
* 
* 
Power driven processes and processes of right, notably the trends in 
. industrial action and their regulation; and 
Processes of interest, notably collective bargaining structures. 
4.1 Power driven processes and processes of right: 
A major source of concern in South African local authorities has been the use of 
industrial action by trade unions as a process for resolving labour disputes. Industrial 




A definition of strikes in South Africa; 
The key characteristics of industrial action, including their causes in 
South Africa generally and in South African local authorities; and 
A some measures applied for their resolution in South African local 
authorities. 
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4.1.1 Definition of strikes: 
A strike is defined by the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) [as amended] in 





The refusal or failure of employees to: 
continue work (irrespective of whether the discontinuance is partial or 
complete); 
resume work or to accept re-employment; 
comply with the terms and conditions of employment applicable to them; 
Their retardation by slowing down the progress of work;· or 
Obstruction of work; or 
Breach or termination of the contract of employment; provided that: 
Such refusal, retardation, obstruction, etc. is the result of "combination, 
understanding or agreement" between the employees concerned, 
whether expressed or not, and that its purpose is to force the employer: 
to comply with demands or proposals regarding conditions of employment 
or any other matter; 
not to institute intended changes; 
to employ or dismiss any person. 
(Bendix, 1992:555) 





Work stoppages which are proscribed in terms of s65 (lA) of the Labour 
Relations Act (act 28 of 1956) [as amended], if their purpose in 
following the contracts of employment to the letter can be proved to be 
an "obstruction" to the employment relationship (Cameron, Cheadle & 
Thompson, 1989:75); 
Work-to-rules which are defined in context of a strike as an "obstruction 
to work which is carried out by a group of employees in furtherance of 
an industrial demand"; 
Go-slows which, in terms of a strike, constitute "a retar.dation of the 
progress of work which is carried out by a group of employees in 
furtherance of an industrial demand"; and 
Sit-ins which can only be defined as a strike on similar grounds as 
provided for go-slows.37 
(Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:218-220) 
4.1.2 Features of industrial action: 
The following aspects of industrial action will be described: 
* 
* 
A background to South African industrial action trends; and 
Industrial action in South African local authorities. 
4.1.2.1 A background to South African industrial action trends: 
This section provides a brief summation of key industrial action trends in South 
Africa. For the purposes of this dissertation, the following description of the major 
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features of industrial action is limited to the period 1988 to 1992, unless otherwise 
specified. 
4.1.2.1.1 Industrial action trends (1972-1992): 
An average of 497 strikes38 occurred between 1972 and 199239• The number of 
strikes ranged from a low of 71 in 1972 to a high of 1148 in 1992. A decline in strike 
activity during the late 1970's was attributed to ineffective trade union representation 
and the imposition of prohibitive legislation with regard to fundamental employee 
rights. A similar event during the period 1983 until 1985 was ascribed to recessionary 
conditions and subsequent trade union fears with regard to retrenchments40• 
The level of strike activity during 1972-1992 is shown in Anne.xure 7A ·Table 1. 





An increase in the number of man-days lost;41 
An increase in the level of trade union militancy, a notable factor being 
the growth in "black"trade union organisation; 
An escalation in workplace disputes; and 
An increase in the level and proportion of industrial action taking place 
in the public sector. 
(Andrew Levy & Associates, 1990/1991:15; Bendix, 1992:549-556; Central Statistical 
Services, 1993; King, 1990:17) 
4.1.2.1.2 Indust~ial trends (1988-1992): 




Industrial action triggers; 
Forms of industrial action; and 
Characteristics of industrial action between 1988 and 1992. 
4.1.2.1.2.1 Industrial action triggers: 
Industrial action triggers can be classified into the following categories: wages, wages 
and other, trade union matters, work conditions, disciplinary and other. A description of 
each cause follows. 
4.1.2.1.2.1.1 Wages: 
Wages were the dominant cause of industrial action between 1988 and 1991 but were 
succeeded in 1992 as the primary trigger by wages and other issues42 (see Annexure 
7A - Table 3). Average wage settlements between 1985 and 1990 were estimated at 
around 0%-3% above the inflation rate (Horwitz, 1991b:ll). Between 1988 and 1992 
percentile wage settlement gains ranged from a low of 12.6%.in 1992 to 17.4% in 
1989 and 1990 (see Annexure 7A - table 2). In the public sector, average wage 
settlements between 1988 and 1992 were broadly consistent with the above-mentioned 
figures43• However, relative wage increases below the inflation rate were noted in 
the second half of 1988, the first quarter of 1990, the second quarter of 1991 and the 
second quarter of 1992 (the lowest since 1986)44• On the other hand, in the second 
half of 1992 public sector wage in~reases were the highest of any sector45• (See 
Annexure 7G: Average wage settlement for public sector employees relative to the 
inflation rate between 1985 and 1992). (Central Statistical Services, 1993; Labour 
Research Service, 1990:5) 
Average wage settlements in South Africa between 1988 and 1992 are shown in 
Annexure 7 A - Table 2. 
4.1.2.1.2.1.2 Wages and "other'' issues: 
Wages and other issues declined in frequency between 1988 and 1991 but in 1992 
became the primary cause of industrial action (see Annexure 7A - Table 3). Examples 
of this trigger include the issues of fringe benefits and paid leave. A notable feature 
was the close association between the frequency of wages and other and disciplinary 
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issues (Horwitz, 1991b:12). (Central Statistical Services, 1993) 
4.1.2.1.2.1.3 Conditions of employment: 
Conditions of employment issues followed a similar pattern to that of the above trigger 
in terms of its relative decline in frequency between 1988 and 1991 and notable 
escalation as a cause of industrial action in 1992 (see Annexure 7A -
Table 3). An example of a condition of employment issue is working hours. (Central 
Statistical Services, 1993) 
4.1.2.1.2.1.4 Disciplinary issues: 
Disciplinary issues broadly declined as a cause of industrial action between 1988 and 
1992 (see Annexure 7A - Table 3). Examples of this trigger include issues of possible 
retrenchment and employee dismissals, fines or other forms of punishment. (Central 
Statistical Services, 1993) 
4.1.2.1.2.1.5 Trade Union Matters: 
Trade union matters were relatively infrequent triggers of industrial action from 1988 
to 1991 and did not feature as a cause of strikes in 1992 (see Annexure 7A - Table 3) .. 
A notable example of trade union matters involved the issue of recognition 
agreements, especially by unregistered trade unions, which sought mutual or "good 
faith" recognition agreements with their employers. (Central Statistical Services, 1993; 
Christie, 1992:23) 
4.1.2.1.2.1.6 "Other" issues: 
Other issues ranged in frequency as a cause of industrial action, with an increase 
between 1988 and 1990 and a decline after 1990 (see Annexure 7A - Table 3). 
Notably, often interrelated triggers included the issue of privatisation in the case of 
public sector organisations, allegations of discriminatory practices, political sympathies 
and calls for affirmative action. (Andrew Levy & Associates, 1990/1991:2; Central 
Statistical Services, 1993) 
The relative frequency of the above strike triggers for the period 1988-1992 is shown 
in Annexure 7 A - Table 4. 
4.1.2.1.2.2 Features of industrial action: 
Industrial action can be classified into the following categories: strikes, workstoppages, 
overtime bans, go-slows, lockouts and other. For the five year period (1988-1992), the 
comparative usage of these forms of industrial action averaged: overtime bans (33% ), 
strikes (31%), go-slows (19%), workstoppages (13%), other (4%) and lockouts (0.5%). 
These figures are shown in Annexure 7 A - Table 5. 
Over the five year period (1988-1992) the usage of overtime bans, strikes and go-
slows broadly increased while workstoppages, lockouts and other forms of industrial 
action decreased (see Annexure 7A - Table 4). 
4.1.2.1.2.3 Characteristics of industrial action (1988-1992): 
The above trends will be described in the context of the characteristics of industrial 
action for each year between 1988 and 1992. 
4.1.2.1.2.3.1 Industrial action during 1988: 
The number of strikes46 in South Africa marginally decreased from 1148 in 1987 to 
1025 in 1988 (refer to Annexure 7A - Table 1). Causes of industrial action, in order of 
descending frequency, involved: wages (320 strikes), wages and other (231 strikes), 
conditions of employment (189 strikes), disciplinary (176 strikes), other (64 strikes) and 
trade union matters (45 strikes) (refer to Annexure 7A - Table 3). Overtime bans were 
the primary form of industrial action (refer to Annexure 7A - Table 4). The public 
sector accounted for 41.5% of the total industrial action during 1988. (Andrew Levy 
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& Associates, 1988/1989; Central Statistical Services, 1993) 
4.1.2.1.2.3.2 Industrial action during 1989: 
The number of strikes in South Africa decreased from 1025 in 1988 to 942 in 1989 
(refer to Annexure 7A - Table 1). Causes of industrial action, in order of descending 
frequency, involved: wages (306 strikes), conditions of employment (184 strikes), other 
issues (183 strikes), wages and other (123 strikes) and disciplinary (118 strikes) (refer 
to Annexure 7A - Table 3). Overtime bans continued to be the primary form of 
industrial action (refer to Annexure 7A - Table 4). The public sector accounted for 
just 1 % of the total industrial action during 1989. (Andrew Levy & Associates, 
1989/1990; Bendix, 1992:549-556; Central Statistical Services, 1993) 
4.1.2.1.2.3.3 Industrial action during 1990: 
The number of strikes in South Africa marginally decreased from 942 in 1989 to 885 
in 1990 (refer to Annexure 7A - Table 1). Causes of industrial action, in order of 
decreasing frequency, involved: wages (317 strikes), other issues (219 strikes), 
conditions of employment (118 strikes), disciplinary (109 strikes), wages and other (100 
strikes) and trade union matters (22 strikes) (refer to Annexure 7A - Table 3). Overtime 
bans continued to be the primary form of industrial action (refer to Annexure 7A -
Table 4). The public sector accounted for 24% of the total industrial action during 
1990. (Andrew Levy & Associates, 1990/1991; Bendix, 1992:549-556; Central 
Statistical Services, 1993)3 
4.1.2.1.2.3.4 Industrial action during 1991: 
The number of strikes in South Africa decreased from 885 in 1990 to 600 in 1991 
(refer to Annexure 7A - Table 1). Causes of industrial action, in order of decreasing 
frequency, involved: wages (201 strikes, other issues (181 strikes), wages and other (89 
strikes), disciplinary (62 strikes), conditions of employment (51 strikes) and trade 
union matters (16 strikes) (refer to Annexure 7A - Table 3). Strikes became the 
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primary form of industrial action during 1991 (refer to Annexure 7A ·Table 4). The 
public sector accounted for 8% of total industrial action during 1991. (Andrew Levy 
& Associates, 1990/1991; Bendix,1992:549-556; Central Statistical Services,1993) 
4.1.2.1.2.3.5 Industrial action during 1992: 
The number of strikes in South Africa increased from 600 in 1991 to 789 in 1992 
(refer to Annexure 7A - Table 1). Causes of industrial action, in order of decreasing 
frequency, involved: wages and other (508 strikes)47, other issues (82 strikes), wages 
(76 strikes), conditions of employment (74 strikes), disciplinary (49 strikes) and trade 
union matters (no strikes) (refer to Annexure 7A - Table 3). Strikes continued to be 
the primary form of industrial action during 1991 (refer to Annexure 7A. Table 4). 
The public sector accounted for 12.7% of total industrial actfon during 1992. (Andrew 
Levy & Associates, 1990/1991; Bendix, 1992:549-556; Central Statistical Services, 
1993) 
4.1.2.2 Industrial action trends in South African local authorities (1988-1992): 





A background to the broad pattern of industrial action in local 
authorities; 
The key triggers of industrial action in local authorities; 
The key characteristics of industrial action in local authorities; and 
The costs of industrial action in local authorities. 
These above features of industrial action will be described for the period 1988-1992. 
In some instances; a comparative analysis with broader South African trends is also 
provided. 
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4.1.2.2.1 A background to the broad pattern of industrial action: 
The incidence of industrial action generally increased between 1988 and 1992. A key 
feature was the increase in the percentage of local authorities industrial action taking 
within the public sector, for example reaching 23% or 46.2% of total strike days in 
the first half of 1990 (Labour Research Service, 1990:5). The majority of strikes48 in 
local authorities were caused by the South African Municipal Workers Union 
(SAMWU) which in 1990, for example, claimed over 50 out of an estimated 79 strikes 
(Central Statistical Services, 1991; Ernstzen, 1991:34). The number of local authority 
employees involved in industrial action ranged from 5 335 in 1988 to 48 898 in 1992. 
Industrial action in loc_al authorities was also characterised by the high percentage of 
"non-white" strikers involved (Boshoff & Bendix, 1993:32). (Andrew Levy & 
Associates, 1988/1989-1992/1993; Central Statistical Services,.1991; Municipal 
Employers Organisation, 1988-1992) 
Annexure 7B - Table 1 illustrates the number of striking workers in local authorities 
between 1988 and 1992. 
4.1.2.2.2. Key industrial action triggers: 
As noted above, the major triggers of industrial action in local authorities can be · 
categorised by the following: wages, wages and other, work conditions, trade union 
matters, disciplinary and other. A description of each trigger follows. 
4.1.2.2.2.1 Wages: 
Wages, as a cause of industrial action, ranged from a high of 25% of total manhours 
lost in 1991 to a low of 3% of total manhours lost in 1992. Key issues in local 
authorities included the "Living Wage Campaign'149 and the determination of equal 
wage scales for all local authorities. In comparison to the total manhours lost in South 
Africa, the level of wages as a trigger of industrial action in local authorities was 
broadly below the national average. (Central Statistical Services, 1993; Municipal 
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Employers Organisation, 1988-1992) 
The above figures are shown in Annexure 7C - Table 1. 
4.1.2.2.2.2 Wages and "other" issues: · 
Wages & other, as a cause of industrial action, ranged from a high of 86% of total 
manhours lost during 1990 to a low of 3% of total manhours lost in 1992. A key 
reason for the high levels of wages and other triggers in local authorities generally was 
the impact of fixed annual budgets which gave "rise to compensatory demands in 
other fields" (Barnes in Coetzee, 1985:139). In comparison to total manhours lost in 
South Africa, the level of wages and other as a trigger of industrial action in local 
authorities was broadly above the national average during 1990 and 1991 but below 
the national average during 1988, 1989 and 1992. (Central Statistical Services, 1993; 
Municipal Employers Organisation, 1988-1992) 
The above figures are shown in Annexure 7C - Table 2. 
4.1.2.2.2.3 Work conditions: 
Work conditions, as a cause of industrial action, ranged from a high of 25% of total 
manhours lost during 1992 to a low of 
0% of total manhours lost in 1989 and 1990. Key issues in local authorities included 
paid leave and a shorter working week. In comparison to total manhours lost in South 
Africa, the level of work conditions as a trigger of industrial action in local authorities 
was similar in 1988 but ranged from below average in 1989, 1990 and 1991 to above 
the national average in 1992. 
The above figures are shown in Annexure 7C - Table 3. 
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4.1.2.2.2.4 Trade union matters: 
Trade union matters, as a cause of industrial action, ranged from a high of 16% of 
total manhours lost during 1989 to a low of 0% of total manhours lost in 1990. Key 
issues in local authorities involved trade union recognition agreements and the use of 
stop-order facilities. In comparison to total manhours lost in South Africa, the level of 
trade union matters as a trigger of industrial action in local authorities was broadly 
above the national average except during 1990. (Central Statistical Services, 1993; 
Municipal Employers Organisation, 1988-1992) 
The above figures are shown in Annexure 7C · Table 4. 
4.1.2.2.2.5 Disciplinary issues: 
Disciplinary issues, as a cause of industrial action, ranged from a high of 2% of total 
manhours lost during 1991 and 1992 to a low of 0% of total manhours lost in 1990. 
Key issues in local authorities involved employee grievances against alleged 
supervisory prejudice, dismissal and other unfair labour practices. In comparison to 
total manhours lost in South Africa, the level of disciplinary issues as a trigger of 
industrial action in local authorities during 1988-1992 was below the national average. 
(Central Statistical Services, 1993; Municipal Employers Organisation, 1988-1992) 
The above figures are shown in Annexure 7C · Table 5. 
4.1.2.2.2.6 "Other" issues: 
Other issues, as a cause of industrial action, ranged from a high of 62% of total 
manhours lost during 1992 to a low of 3% of total manhours lost in 1990. Key issues 
in local authorities involved privatisation concerns50, affirmative action51, the 
legitimacy of local authority institutions52 and political campaigns and mass 
action53• In comparison to total manhours lost in South Africa, the level of other as a 
trigger of industrial action in local authorities was above the national average during 
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1988, 1989 and 1992 but below the national average in 1990 and 1991. (Central 
Statistical Services, 1993; Municipal Employers Organisation, 1988-1992) 
The above figures are shown in Annexure 7C • Table 6. 
4.1.2.2.3 Characteristics of industrial action (1988-1992): 
The characteristics of industrial action triggers in local authorities are briefly 
examined between 1988 and 1992. 
4.1.2.2.3.1 Industrial action triggers in 1988: 
Industrial action in local authorities during 1988 was caused, in order of descending 
frequency, by other (61%), work conditions (18%), wages (10%), wages and other (6%), 
trade union matters ( 4%) and disciplinary issues ( 1 % ). (Municipal Employers 
Organisation, 1988) 
These figures are shown in Annexure 7D • Table 1. 
4.1.2.2.3.2 Industrial action triggers in 1989: 
Industrial action in local authorities during 1989 was caused, in order of descending · 
frequency, by 'other (58%), wages (21%), trade union matters (17%), wages and other 
(4%), disciplinary issues (1%) and work conditions (0%). (Municipal Employers 
Organisation, 1989) 
These figures are shown in Annexure 7D • Table 2. 
4.1.2.2.3.3 Industrial action triggers in 1990: 
Industrial action in local authorities during 1990 was caused, in order of descending 
frequency, by wages and other (86%), wages (11%), other (3%), trade union matters 
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(0%), disciplinary issues (0%) and work conditions (0%). (Municipal Employers 
Organisation, 1989) 
These figures are shown in Annexure 7D • Table 3. 
4.1.2.2.3.4 Industrial action triggers in 1991: 
Industrial action in local authorities during 1991 was caused, in order of descending 
frequency, by wages and other (59%), wages (25%), other (7%), trade union matters 
( 6% ), disciplinary (l % ) and work conditions (l % ). (Municipal Employers 
Organisation, 1989) 
These figures are shown in Annexure 7D • Table 4. 
4.1.2.2.3.5 Industrial action triggers in 1992: 
Industrial action in local authorities during 1992 was caused, in order of descending 
frequency, by other (62%), work conditions (25%), trade union matters (5%), wages 
(3% ), wages and other (3%) and disciplinary issues (2% ). (Municipal Employers 
Organisation, 1989) 
These figures are shown in Annexure 7D • Table 5. 
4.1.2.2.4 Overview of industrial action triggers (1988-1992): 
Annexure 7E - Table 1 illustrates the relative frequency of industrial action trends 
during 1988-1992 as an overall average for this period. 
4.1.2.2.5 Costs of industrial action ( 1988-1992): 
The costs of industrial action in local authorities during the period 1988-1992 ranged 
from a low of 1 784 man-days or 6 728 value-days in 1988 to a high of 250 767 man-
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days or 1 001 257 value-days during 1990. These figures reflected an overall increase 
in the cost of industrial action in local authorities54• (Municipal Employers 
Organisation, 1988-1992) 
These trends are shown in Annexure 7F · Table 1. 
4.1.3 Measures applied for regulating industrial action: 
In summation, a variety of measures can be applied by local authorities for regulating 






Seeking a court interdict; 
Dismissing striking employees; 
Instituting a "lockout"; 
Applying a "no work - no pay" policy; 
Allowing police or military intervention; and/ or 
Negotiating with the strikers to return to work. 
A selection of one or more of the above measures can be applied by a number of 
approaches. These will be briefly described. 
4.1.4 Approaches for regulating industrial action: 




In-house agreements between employers and trade unions in terms of 
procedures to be followed; 
Strategic or proactive plans, which inclu~e measures for the continuation 
of services; or 
The assumption that industrial action warranted little attention or 
required coercive measures. 
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Two examples of such approaches, include: 
* 
* 
Kimberley City Council: Activates a "strategic plan" in the case of service 
disruption. This includes provisions made for the continuation of four 
specific services (electricity, water, sanitation and refuse removal) by 
means of a pre-arranged skeleton crew. (Interview - Kimberley City 
Council, 5th July 1991) 
Johannesburg City Council: A principle step is the resumption of 
immediate negotiations within the framework of reasonable ultimatums 
whereby workers are persuaded to return to work and render services 
which have been disrupted. (Interview - Johannesburg City Council, 13 
July 1990) 
With regard to the above measures, the use of the Industrial Court, the dismissal of 
employees, and the use of an employer lockout will be briefly examined. 
4.1.4.1 The Industrial Court: 
Court interdicts involve the application of a legal injunction by employers against 
striking workers to proscribe industrial action in a local authority. This process 
involves a representation by employers and striking workers in such a court where a 
final judgement is reached. The Industrial Court can adopt one of two approaches to 
the issue of industrial action, namely: 
* 
* 
A functional approach where issues of procedure are raised; or 
A substantive approach where the nature of the dispute is brought into 
question. 





The causes of industrial action, in terms of their classification as disputes 
of interest or disputes of right, essentially determines the legitimacy of a 
strike (with disputes of interest being more favourably looked on than 
disputes of right); 
The circumstances of the parties, i.e. the nature of the employers' 
business. This aspect includes consideration of the loyalty of previous 
service by striking employees and the claimed loss of their important 
benefits resulting in industrial action; and 
The type of industrial action undertaken. Notably, the adoption of 
wildcat strikes, go-slows and sit-ins are less acceptable to Industrial 
Courts than other forms. 
(Olivier, 1993:595) 
4.1.4.2 Dismissal of employees: 
A dismissal of striking employees is highly contentious. According to the Industrial 




That industrial action threatened to destroy the livelihood of the 
employer. In local authorities this condition is usually justified by 
employers on the premise that services disrupted are essential for public 
welfare; Arid 
That procedurally this measure is sound, i.e. that negotiations have been 
attempted in good faith and that local and/ or statutory procedures have 
been followed beforehand. 
(Olivier, 1993:595) 
In addition to these conditions, the conduct of both parties is also taken into 
consideration. In particular, the Industrial Court notes that employers should not be 
overhasty to implement a dismissal but rather that they provide an ultimatum warning 
of an intent to dismiss workers beforehand. In conclusion though, the Court finds that 
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"dismissal may be justified where employees have been guilty of aggression, violence 
or intimidation". (Olivier, 1993:595) 
4.1.4.3 Employer lockouts: 
A lockout can be described as the withdrawal of work opportunities for employees. 






The exclusion by the employer of a number of employees from his 
premises; 
An employer's partial or total discontinuance of business or work; 
A breach or termination of the contracts of employment of a body or a 
number of employees, 
provided that the pumose of his action was to oblige the employees: 
to agree or to comply with any demands or proposals, 
to accept any change in the conditions of employment, 
to agree to the employment or dismissal of any person. 
(Bendix, 1992:555) 
Those employers applying a lockout in their local authorities where industrial action 
occurs, justify this approach on two broad premises: 
* 
* 
That industrial action is illegal and therefore its occurrence can be 
countered by similar measures; and 
That the consequences of allowing employees into the workplace could 
further damage or hinder services to the community. 
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Therefore, it is suggested that a key objective of an employer lockout is to force 
striking employees "to take responsibility for their industrial action" (Christie, 
1992:26). In certain instances, some local authorities may institute a selective lockout 
by closing down departments in which the striking workers are employed. (Douwes 
Dekker, n.d.:70; Rycroft & Jordaan, 1990:221) 
4.2 Processes of interest: 
The main form of resolving labour disputes is the application of collective bargaining. 
A brief description of the collective bargaining structure in local authorities follows. 
4.2.1 The collective bargaining process and structure: 
Collective bargaining can take place through an Industrial Council or by other 
prearranged mechanisms within a local authority. In examining this process, the 





Bargaining scope; and 
Bargaining levels. 
4.2.1.1 Bargaining representation: 
The representation of parties on an Industrial Council varies55• Nominally these 
arrangements involve an equal representation by the trade unions and their respective 
employers. The Referee or third party facilitator can be elected by both parties, 
nominated by the employers, or in some instances, selected by the State. 
A key issue involves the concern with· the fairness of representation during this 
process. Specifically, it is contended that the practice of equal representation by all 
recognised trade unions of a local authority, undermines the notion of democratic 
consensus by allowing smaller trade unions to have an equal say to larger trade 
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·, 
unions in labour matters. 
Another issue is the lack of recognition by employers of some trade unions and 
therefore a denial of their right to bargain. This matter can be illustrated by the 
recent nation-wide SAMWU campaigns in local authorities for, inter alia, national 
recognition. 
(Bendix & Swart, 1982:1; Craythome, 1992; Ernstzen, 1991) 
4.2.1.2 Bar~ainini scQpe: 
The bargaining scope is broadly restricted to disputes of interest. Examples of labour 
matters which can be bargained for include, wages;, disciplinary procedures or 
employee benefits. Some issues, such as wages, are nominally bargaining for annually, 
while other issues, such as disciplinary procedures, can be bargained for on an ad hoc 
basis. 
4.2.1.3 Bariainini levels: 
Collective bargaining takes place at two levels, namely the: 
• 
• 
Organisational level: Which can involve an Industrial Council or other 
structure in a local authority. This level is frequently adopted by larger 
municipalities or local authorities, for example the Industrial Council of 
Kimberley City Council or Cape Town City Council; and 
Regional level: Which nominally takes place in an Industrial Council 
(usually permanent) representing the interests of employers and trade 
unions of a number of local authorities. This level is usually adopted by 
smaller or rural local authorities. 
(Bendix & Swart, 1982: 1; Craythome, 1992) . 
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5. Approaches to dispute settlement in local authorities: 
In .summation, labour disputes can be settled by a number of alternative or inter-





Negotiating issues by means of internal organisational mechanisms or 
an Industrial Council (by mediation or voluntary arbitration); 
The use of an independent advisory organisation, such as the 
.Independent Mediation Society of South Africa (Independent Mediation 
Society of South Africa) (by means of mediation or voluntary 
arbitration); 
The use of a Conciliation Board by applying to the Minister of 
Manpower for this structure; or 
Failing any of the above, the use of an Industrial Court (by means of 
litigation, voluntary or compulsory arbitration)56• 
(Brassey et al.., 1987:18-19; Christie, 1992:28; Craythorne, 1990:278; Wiehahn, 
1988:71; Wissink in Fox, Schwella & Wissink, 1991:200) 
Annexure 7H illustrates the statutory framework for dispute settlement in South 
African local authorities. 
6. Overview: 
This chapter outlined the nature of labour disputes and their settlement in South 
African local authorities, namely: 






The categories of labour dispute, namely disputes of right and disputf!S of 
interest; 
The processes of dispute resolution and settlement, with specific focus 
on industrial action trends and the structure of collective bargaining; 
and 
In conclusion an outline of the dispute settlement process in South 
African local authorities. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
LOCAL AUTHORITY LABOUR ·RELATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Introduction: 
This Chapter outlines the perceptions and opinions of key personnel involved in the 
regulation of labour relations practices in South African local authorities. The 





A background to the target group; 
A background to the themes of this survey; 
A background to the layout of each theme; and 
A comment on the reference to the target group and methodology of 
the delphi questionnaire. 
2. A background to the target group: 
The following personnel participated in the de/phi questionnaire: 
Employers: These involved Personnel officials who managed labour relations within a 
local authority. 
Trade unions: These involved the leadership and executive members of trade unions 
and professional associations in local authorities. 
The State: These involved key individuals in State institutions which regulated or 
advised on local authority labour relations matters. 
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3. A background to the themes of this survey: 
The following six questionnaire themes are applied: 
Theme One: A background to labour relations in South African local authorities. 
Theme Two: Parties to the labour relationship. 
Theme Three: Conducting the labour relationship. 
Theme Four: Causes of labour conflict. 
Theme Five: Processes of labour dispute resolution and settlement. 
Theme Six: Approaches to dispute settlement. 
4. A background to the layout of each theme: 
The findings of these themes is presented in the following manner: 
Theme: The theme is a title of one of the above themes. Most 
themes comprise a number of topics; 
Topic: The topic describes an issue raised in the questionnaire. In the event of more 
than one issue, each issue follows the layout described below. 
Background: The background describes initial findings made during preliminary 
surveys (i.e. interviews with some of the above participants before the delphi 
questionnaire survey was performed). 
Purpose: The purpose motivates the style of the question and defines the target group. 
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Question: The question describes the focus and options of the subject presented to the 
target group. 
Response: The response presents a statistical description of the findings. In some 
issues this analysis is illusJrated in tabular format. Due to the uneven response rate of 
the aforementioned parties, any applied comparative analysis has been weighted in 
order to reflect commensurate views; 
Additional commentary: The commentary lists additional notes or views described by 
the respondents in relation to a specific issue. 
Overview: The overview summarises the findings of each topic. 
4.1 Comment: 
For the purposes of this chapter, respondents are referred to by their party or target 
group. For example; trade union respondents are referred to as trade unions, unless 
otherwise specified. 
Finally, a more detailed explanation of the methodology and background to this 
survey is provided in Chapter One: 3.3 Delphi questionnaire. 
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5. Theme One: A background to labour relations in South African local authorities. 
The following topic was addressed: 
* The labour relations environment. 
5.1 Topic One: The labour relations environment. 
The perceptions of the target group with regard to the existing labour relations 
climate in local authorities was sought. 
5.1.1 A background to preliminary findings: 
Preliminary surveys indicated that employers and trade unions viewed labour relations 
within their local authority's in a positive light. (Interviews, 1990-1992) 
5.1.2 Purpose: 
The purpose of this topic was to establish the validity of this view. 
5.1.3 Question: 
Employers and trade unions were asked to rate the labour relations climate within 
their respective local authority. The State was asked to rate the labour relations 
climate ·in local authorities generally. Respondents were asked to choose one of the 













Co-operative/Good ( 68% ); and 
Grudging/Accepting (32%). 
No participants rated the labour relations environment as hostile/Bad. 
The majority view of each party was as follows: 
* Employers: Co-operative good (80% ); 
* Trade unions: Co-operative/Good (52% ); and 
* The State: Grudging/Accepting (70%). 
These findings are illustrated in Table 1 below: 
Table 1 
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5.1.5 Additional commentary: 
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No additional comments were listed. 
5.1.6 Overview: 
Both the employers and trade unions viewed the labour relations environment in local 
authorities as cooperative. On the other hand, the majority of State respondents felt 
that the labour relations environment was grudging or accepting. 
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6. Theme Two: Parties to the labour relationship. 
0 
The following topics were addressed: 
* The role of trade unions in local authorities; and 
* The role of the State in regulating labour relations in local authorities. 
6.1 Topic One: The role of trade unions in local authorities. 
The .extent to ~hich trade unions should participate in determining employee policies in 
their workplace was examined. 
· 6.1.1 A background to preliminary findings: 
a. 
Preliminary surveys indicated that all three parties were concerned with the role of trade 
unions in determining employee policies within their local authority's. The State · 
expressed a need for more effective trade union participation in such matters but at a 
central level, in an advisory capacity. Employers and trade unions both agreed that the 
latter party played a role in determining employee policies but differed with regard to 
the extent of participation taking place. 
6.1.2 Purpose: 
The purpose of this question was to clarify the above perceptions. 
6.1.3 Question: 
The topic was addressed to all three parties. 
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The State was asked to rate the extent to which trade unions ought to be participate in 
determining employee policies in local authorities. Respondents were asked to choose 




To be allowed to participate fully in all issues 
To participate in some issues only; and 
Not to be allowed to participate at all . 
Employers and trade unions were asked the extent to which the fatter party participated 
(or were consulted) within their local authority in terms of the above process. 
Respondents were given the choice of a yes or no answer. 
6.1.4 Response: 
The majority of State respondents (80%) indicated that trade unions should be allowed to 
participate fully in all issues regarding employee policies in local authorities. 
Most employers (93%) and the trade unions (83%) indicated that trade unions did 
participate in this process. 
These findings are illustrated in Table 2 below. 
6.1.5 Additional commentary: . 
The State respondents generally justified their choice on the premise that full 
participation by trade unions in such processes improved the possibility for greater 
labour peace and stability in local authorities. In some instances, reference was also 
made to the International Labour Organisations' Convention in this regard. A State 
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"To consider and regulate in accordance with the provisions of the Labour 
Relations Act (sic), matters of mutual interest to the parties and to prevent 
and settle disputes"; 
"To promote good relations between the employer and its employees"; and 
"To use its endeavours generally in the direction of maintaining labour 
peace within the undertaking". 
Those employers who indicated that trade unions participated 
in such matters within their local authority, described a system of "working groups" which 
. comprised employer and trade union representatives. These groups were either cons~lted 
or negotiated on matters pertaining to employee policies within that organisation. The 
permanent structures usually had an "on-going" programme in this regard, while 
provisional structures were established on a "needs-only" basis. It was nott'.d that local 
authorities which adopted permanent "working groups" favoured a process of negotiation. 
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An employer respondent added that the working group arrangement in their local 
authority was restricted to "white" trade unions only. 





Stand-by allowances; and 
Salaries. 
Employers who negotiated with their trade unions justified tliis approach on the need for 
a cooperative labour relations environment where standing arrangements were seen to 
be "legitimate". 
Other employers described an "open door policy" approach which allowed trade unions to 
present workplace concerns to management. Another employer respondent noted that 
trade unions -did not participate in the policy process but were notified of planned 
changes in this regard which could be contested by their Industrial Council. 
Finally, some trade unions commented that their participation was largely restricted to 
salary issues. 
6. L6 Overview: 
The State supported the notion that trade unions should participate fully in determining 
employee policies within their local authorities. Findings by employers and trade unions 
generally concurred with this assertion. The method of participation varied amongst local 
authorities. Two specific arrangements were described, these being the "working group" 
structures and the "open door" policy approach. The former structure usually involved a 
process of negotiation while the latter approach involved a consultative or bargaining 
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process. Finally, it was noted that in many instances the ,topics for participation were 
largely limited to salary issues. 
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6.2 Topic Two: The role of the State in regulating labour relations in local authorities: 
The issue of State intervention in regulating labour disputes in local authorities was 
examined from the perspective of the State. 
6.2.1 A background to preliminary findings: 
Findings during the preliminary survey indicated that the State considered an advisory 
role in this regard as suitable. Both employers and trade unions expressed little concern in 
this matter. 
6.2.2 Purpose: 
The purpose of this question was to assess the extent to which the State sought to 
intervene in regulating labour disputes in local authorities. 
6.2.3 Question: 
State participants were asked to select one· of the following ,roles of the State for 




An inte1Ventionary role, 
An advisory role; and 
no role. 
6.2.4 Response: 
All State respondents indicated that the State ought to apply an advisory role for· 
regulating labour disputes in local authorities. 
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6.2.5 Additional commentazy: 
No additional comments were provided. 
6.2.6 Overview: 
The State preferred an advisory role in regulating labour disputes in local authorities. 
198 
7. Theme Three: Conducting the labour relationship. 
The following topics were addressed: 
* The right to strike; and 
* The definition of local authorities as "essential services". 
7.1 Topic One: The right to strike. 
The issue of the right to strike for local authority employees was explored. 
7.1.1 A background to preliminary findings: 
Preliminary surveys indicated that the issue of the right to strike was highly contentious. 
A clear division of views between employers and trade unions was noted. The former 
party supported a limited right to strike for local authority employees, while the latter 
party preferred an unrestricted right to strike. 
7.1.2 Purpose: 
The purpose of this topic was to establish the views of both the above parties and the 
State on this issue. 
7.1.3 Question: 
The question was addressed to all three parties. 
. 
The parties were asked to choose between three possible options with regard to a right 





An unlimited right to strike; 
A limited right to strike; or 
Prohibiting the right to strike. 
7.1.4 Response: 
The State was divided between a prohibition of the right to strike ( 40%) and a limited right 
to strike ( 40% ), and to a lesser extent an unlimited right to strike (20% ). 
Employers generally favoured the option of a limited right to strike (84%) and to a lesser 
degree a prohibition of the right to strike ( 16% ). 
Trade unions similarly preferred a limited right to strike (64%) and, to a lesser extent, 
selected an unlimited right to stn'ke (27%) and a prohibition of the right to strike (9% ). 
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7.1.5 Additional commentary: 





That local government services were "essential services" by law; 
That a right to strike could harm the public; and 
That effective alternative dispute settlement mechanisms existed. 
A trade union respondent added that if dispute settlement alternatives were "ineffective", 
then a strike ought to be embarked on. 






The threat of grievances and tensions would eventually "explode into 
uncontrolled industrial action" which was a real cause for concern; 
Strikes were a reality in local authorities, especially the more "elusive forms 
of industrial action" such as "work-to-hours"; 
There was a potential for employers to take trade unions for granted if the 
right to strike was proscribed; and 
there was a need to follow international standards by entrenching all 
fundamental labour rights. 
A trade union respondent noted that the possibility of privatising some local authority 
services undermined the notion of this "essential service" sector. 
-
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That the right to strike should be sanctioned in circumstances where all 
alternatives had failed. Examples included: a failure of compulsory 
arbitration, a deadlock in negotiations or that industrial action was "fawful" 
according to the courts; 
That a limited right to strike be permitted on the proviso that services were 
continued; 
That specific numbers or categories of workers be allowed to strike; 
That the definition of "essential services" be decided by each local authority 
rather than the State; and 
That negotiations be applied as a preliminary step before a strike can be 
initiated. 
Finally, those respondents selecting an unlimited right to strike contended that a strike 
was "the most meaningful tool at the disposal of the trade union". This choice was 
justified on the grounds: 
* 
* 
That major substantive issues were prejudiced by excessive employer 
authority; 
That the adoption of industrial action by the more militant trade unions 
was at the expense of other trade unions which followed the course of the 
law or existing policy process; and 
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* That a limited right to strike further complicated the dispute settlement 
process by means of applying a host of additional conditions. 
7.1.6 Overview: 
The State was divided between prohibiting the right to strike and allowing a limited right 
to strike for local authority employees. On the other hand, both employers and trade 





Those supporting the prohibition of the right to strike generally contended 
that such a right would threatened the welfare of the public; 
Those supporting a limited right to strike suggested that pragmatic 
considerations undermined its prohibition; and 
Those supporting an unlimited right to strike stressing the moral obligation 
of employers to entrench all fundamental labour rights. 
7.2 Topic Two: The definition of local authorities as "essential services": 
The issue of whether local authorities were justifiably defined as "essential services" was 
examined. 
7.2.1 A back~ to preliminary fi.ndin~: 
All parties expressed mixed reactions to this issue. 
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7.2.2 Pur_pose: 
The purpose of this topic was establish the views of the parties with regard to this issue. 
7.2.3 Question: 
The question was addressed to all three parties. Participants were presented with a 
statement which explained that local government was defined by the Labour Relations 
Act (Act 28 of 1956) [since amended] as an "essential service" sector. Respondents were 
asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the above statement. 
7.2.4 Response: 
The majority· of respondents of all three parties agreed that local government should be 





The State (80%) 
Employers (70% ); and 
Trade unions (67%). 
These findings are illustrated in Table 4 below. 
7.2.5 Additional commentary: 
Additional commentary can be distinguished by those parties contending that local 
government was "an essential service sector" and those rejecting this notion. 
Many respondents who agreed with the definition of local government as an "essential 
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A disruption of local government services, such as fire and ambulance 
personnel or as a result of burst water mains, electricity failures and traffic 
congestion, would threaten the community; 
The provision of, inter alia, water, electricity and public transport are basic 
public rights; 
The local authority has a contractual obligation to render its services to its 
residents; and 
The services provided are monopolised by the local authority and "do not 
derive profits which can attract private companies". 
In some cases, respondents qualified their choice on the basis that certain jobs were not 
"essential" in the true meaning of the term but that these jobs still broadly fell within the 
category of an "essential service" (or department). 
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On the other hand, those respondents who disagreed with this notion justified their 





According to the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) [since amended] 
and the proposed Public Service Labour Relations Bill (since passed as Act 
102 of 1993), only "certain local government functions could be classified as 
essential setvices"; 
A number of services provided by local authorities, such as Parks and 
Recreation, Roads and Library services, could not detrimentally affect the 
public as suggested by the definition; 
The determination of "essentiality" was far too subjective bearing on the 
side of caution rather than fundamental labour rights; 
A degree of "essentiality" should rather apply; 
A trade union respondent added the question: "How can grass-cutting be termed 
essential?". 
7.2.6 Overview: 
All the parties generally accepted the definition that local government was an "essential 
service" sector. Those respondents who agreed with this notion qualified their choice on 
the grounds that a disruption of local authority services would threaten the welfare of the 
com1J1unity, undermine public rights and breach the contractual obligation to provide 
such services. On the other hand, those respondents who disagreed with this definition 
contended that only certain services could truly be defined as "essential". Rather, these 
participants suggested that a "degree" of essentiality was preferable to such a definition. 
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8. Theme Four: Causes of labour conflict. 
The following topic was addressed: 
* The causes of industrial action in local authorities. 
' 
8.1 Topic One: The causes of industrial action in local authorities. 
The causes of industrial action in local authorities was examined. 
8.1.1 A background to preliminary findings: 
A primary concern to all three parties was the incidence of industrial action in local 
authorities. In this regard, a variety of strike causes were suggested by various 
interviewees. 
8.1.2 Purpose: 
The purpose of this topic was to establish the causes of industrial action in local 
authorities as submitted by each party. 
8.1.3 Question: 
This question was addressed to all three parties. Each party was asked to list the causes 
of industrial action. The State was asked to list these factors in local authorities 
















The growth in trade union organisation in local government; 
An ideological/political shift in worker attitudes with regard to labour 
rights; 
The greater "willingness" of local government structures to recognise and 
bargain with trade unions;-
Economic and political uncertainty; 
Compliant or flexible legislation; 
Excessive trade union intervention at the central level; 
Bad communications structures within local authority's; 
A shortage of labour relations knowledge and experience; 
Unsatisfactory management styles; and 












Bonuses (date disputes); 
Working conditions; 
Disciplinary issues; 
Trade union matters; 
Grievances against supervisors; 
Insufficient communication and understanding of all parties; 
Restructuring plans including rationalisati~n of the workforce; 





categories of workers such as traffic police and fire fighters); 
Transfers of certain individuals; 
Mass action, intimidation and stayaway calls by the African National 
Congress/ Pan Africanist Congress/ Congress of South African Trade 
Unions; and 











Poor conditions of service; 
Telephone tapping by security (and employers); 
Racial discrimination; 
Inappropriate job evaluation schemes; 
Unfair labour practices; 
Dismissal of officials involved in fraud; and 
Non-payment of salary adjustments; 
8.1.5 Additional commentary: 
No additional comments were provided. 
8.1.6 Overview: 
All three parties listed a range of causes. In summation, these triggers can be 
contextualised according to: 
Environmental factors: The growth and politicisation of trade unions in local authorities; 
Political and economic uncertainty; Ineffective legislation and unfair labour practices; 
Conditions of work issues such as wages, trade union matters, dismissals, transfers and 
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disciplinary issues; Racial friction and intimidation; And, the threat of rationalisation and 
retrenchment. 
Behavioural factors: Inexperience by both parties in handling labour disputes; High 
-
worker expectations; employer fraud and non-payment; And, covert operations by 
employers such as telephone tapping. 
Structural factors: A more lenient employer attitude with regarp to industrial action; The 
adoption of collective bargaining practices; Poor communications; And, inappropriate job 
evaluation schemes. 
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9. Theme Five: Processes of labour resolution and settlement. 
The following topics were addressed: 
* 
* 
Power driven processes and processes of right; and 
Processes of interest. 
9.1 Topic One: Power driven processes and processes of right. 
The measures and approaches applied by local authorities in regulating industrial action 
were examined. 
9.1.1 A background to preliminary findings: 
During the preliminary survey a variety of measures for regulating industrial action were. 
described by employers and trade unions. Initial findings indicated that employers 
preferred to negotiate with trade unions rather than to apply coercive measures in the 
event of the above. 
9.1.2 Purpose: 
The purpose of this topic was to identify the variety of approaches applied by employers 
in the event of industrial action. 
9.1.3 Question: 
The question was addressed to employers and trade unions. Both parties were asked to 
describe th.e steps taken within their local authority in the event of a strike. Furthermore, 








Call for military /police intervention; 
Seek a Court interdict; 
Attempt to negotiate; 
Do nothing; or 
N/A. 
9.1.4 Response: 
In general, the response to this question ranged from the provision of detailed steps and 
measures the lack of a procedure or plan in this regard. In the case of the former 







Persuading striking employees to return to work; 
Negotiating with striking employees to return to work; 
Applying for a Court interdict; 
Dismissing striking employees; 
Seeking police intervention in the labour dispute; and 
Setting an ultimatum for striking workers to return to work. 
Some of these measures are illustrated in Table 5 below. 
9.1.5 Additional commentacy: 
Those employers who responded that no procedures or plans were applied in the event of 
industrial action, attributed this to a lack of strike experience. 
Those employers which applied the above steps added the following commentary: 








Local authority reaction to strike declarations 
Perceptions of the Trade Unions 
74 
0 10 20 30 40 50 80 70 80 90 1 
% 
~ Pollce/Mllltary 
• Court Interdict 
!JJJI Negotiate 
• Donothlng 
• No exper1ence 
The provision to inform the South African Police not to interfere in the 
strike; 
The· application of a "no work, no pay" policy; 
The process of negotiating or persuading trade union leadership rather 
than attempting to deal with the masses of strikers; 
The application of a pre-negotiated strike procedure for handling industrial 
action; and 
The constant monitoring of the labour relations "system" in order to avoid 
such an event. 
9.1.6 Overview: 
A variety of approaches were applied by local authorities in the event of industrial 
action. In terms of the list provided, the most frequent measure applied, in descending 
order, was to negotiate followed by police/military intervention and Court interdict. 
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Other measures which were added to this list included persuading striking employees to 
return to work, negotiating with striking employees to return to work, applying for a 
Court interdict, dismissing striking employees; seeking police intervention in the labour 
dispute and/or giving striking workers an ultimatum to return to work. Some local 
authorities however, did not have any measures for dealing with industrial action due to 
a lack of experience in this regard. 
' 
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9.2 Topic Two: Processes of interest. 




The negotiation process; 
Collective bargaining level; and 
Collective bargaining scope. 
9.2.1 Issue One: The negotiation process. 
The usefulness of the negotiation process was examined. 
9.2.1.1 A background to preliminaiy findings: 
Findings during the preliminary survey indicated a difference of opinion between 
employers and trade unions with regard to the usefulness of negotiations within local 
authorities. Employers suggested that negotiations were highly successful and that 
potential problems could be ascribed to "irresponsible" elements within the trade unions. 
On the other hand, a number of trade unions proposed that negotiations were highly 
restrictive and that employers often manipulated the situation by negotiating with certain 
trade unions only. 
9.2.1.2 Purpose: 
The purpose of this issue was to establish the perceptions of the parties with regard to 
the usefulness of the negotiation process in local authorities. 
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9 .2.1.3 Question: 
The question was addressed to employers and trade unions. Both parties were asked to 
rate the relative success of negotiations within their local authority. Respondents were 





Very /Usually successful; 
Normally/ Sometimes successful; 
Hardly ever successful; and 
Not applicable. 
9.2.1.4 Response: 
Overall, negotiations were viewed to be: 
* 
* 
Nonnally/ Sometimes successful (58%); and 
Very/Usually successful (42%). 
Neither party rated negotiations as Hardly successful. 
Employers r'ated negotiations as Normally/Sometimes successful (58%) and Very/Usually 
successful ( 42% ), while both the above views were evenly split (50%) according to trade 
unwns. 
These findings are illustrated in Table 6 below. 
9.2.1.5 Additional commentacy: 
An employer commented that the negotiations were performed by means of an Industrial 
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Table 6. 
Success of negotiations between Employers and Trade Unions 
Perceptlona al the Employers and Trade Unlcnl 
~ Very/ UIU8lly 
Employers 58 
Ill Normally/ aometmes 
fil] Hardly successful! 
Unions 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 60 90 1 
% 
Council. Another employer respondent added that negotiations were successful with the 
"white" trade unions only as "black" trade union were not recognised by that local 
authority. 
9 .2.1.6 Overview: 
Both employers and trade unions indicated that the negotiation process was usually 
successful. Neither party viewed this process as hardly successful. 
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9.2.2 Issue Two: Collective bargaining level: 
The issue of the levels of collective bargaining available to parties was examined. 
9 .2.2.1 A background to preliminary findings: 
Representatives of all three parties indicated' during preliminary surveys that the level of 
collective bargaining was a key issue. All parties tended to favour a "mixed bargaining" 
approach. 
9.2.2.2 Purpose: 
The purpose of this issue was establish which level of bargaining was preferred by the 
parties. 
9.2.2.3 Question: 
This question was addressed to all three parties. Parties were asked to choose the level 
of collective bargaining they considered most suitable for settling labour disputes in local 




The central level; 
The local\ organisational level; or 
A mixture of both the above levels. 
9 .2.2.4 Response: 





A mixture of both levels (50%); 
The local\ organisational level (30% ); and 
The central level (20% ). 
Trade union respondents selected in descending order: 
A mixture of both levels (50%); and 
The local\ organisational level ( 42% ). 
None supported a central level of collective bargaining. 
State respondents selected in descending order: 
The local\ organisational level (80% ); and 
The central level (20% ). 
These findings are illustrated in Table 7 below. 
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Table 7. 
Level of collective bargaining suitable for resolving labour disputes 




9 .2.2.5 Additional commentary: . 
80 
90· 1 
~ Central level 
IB Plant level 
hFI=I Mix of both 
Employer and trade union respondents who favoured a mixed level approach to collective 
bargaining suggested that bargaining topics could be categorised into "national issues" 
and "local issues". The central level was contended to be useful for determining national 
standards for particular topics, while the local level was useful for negotiating these 
standards within the context of the financial constraints of each local authority. A variety 
of bargaining topics at both levels were suggested, namely: Wages and conditions of 
service at the central level, and "dispute resolution", trade union matters, allowances and 
safety conditions at the local level. An employer respondent, added that in the case of 
wages, a further distinction could be made between minimum wages which were of 
central concern, and actual wages, which were of local concern. 
Parties selecting the plant or organisational level for collective bargaining contended that 
each local authority enjoyed a variety of unique procedures, policies and circumstances. 
Examples included, disparate salaries, wages and fringe benefits such as housing bonds. 
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A number of employer and trade union respondents further expressed concern with the 
viability of a central level for collective bargaining. In particular, employer respondents 
stressed the loss of organisational autonomy, while trade union respondents noted the 
potential for larger trade unions and federations to unfairly influence the bargaining 
process. 
A trade union respondent who selected the central level for collective bargaining 
concluded that this level ensured, in the final analysis, a more representative and 
"structured" forum for agreement. 
9.2.2.6 Overview: 
In general, both employers and trade unions favoured a mixed level bargaining approach, 
while the State preferred a central level of collective bargaining. The former trend was . 
qualified further by the categorisation of labour dispute issues according to national and 
local issues. Respondents favouring a local level approach to collective bargaining 
suggested that labour disputes in local authorities were generally "domestic" issues. 
However, respondents favouring the central level approach suggested that there was a 
need to establish national standards. 
-
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9.2.3 Issue Three: Collective bargaining scope: 
The scope of topics allowed for bargaining in local authorities was examined. 
9.2.3.1 A background to preliminary findings: 
Both employers and trade unions listed a variety of topics which were bargained for within 
their local authorities. 
9.2.3.2 Purpose: 
The purpose of this issue was to establish the frequency and scope of topics bargained 
for in local authorities. 
9.2.3.3 Question: 
The question was addressed to employer and trade union participants. A list of bargaining 
topics, as suggested during the preliminary survey was presented to participants to rate in 







Conditions of service; 
Trade union rights; 
Disciplinary issues; and 
Dispute settlement procedures. 
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9.2.3.4 Response: 
The overall response was as follows: 
Dispute settlement (25%); 
Trade union rights (23% ); 
Conditions of service (18%); 
Disciplinary ( 18% ); and 
Wages (16%). 
These findings are illustrated in Table 8 below. 
Table 8. 
W Wages 
Condition of service 
Union rights 
• Disciplinary issues 




Relative frequency - Employers and Trade Unions 
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9.2.3.5 Additional Commentary: 
Other issues raised by the respondents included procedural agreements, administrative 
procedures, redundancies (retrenchment), grievances, recognition agreements and the 
union/ management relationship. 
Some participants commented that certain topics were bargained for annually, such as 
wages and conditions of service. An employer respondent also distinguished between the 
relative bargaining frequency of "whites" and "blacks" in terms of wages within their local 
authority, with "whites" bargaining more often that "blacks". 
9.2.3.6 Overview: 
Overall the most frequent topics bargained for were, in descending order: dispute 
settlement issues, trade union rights, conditions of service, disciplinary issues and wages. 
A notable feature was the distinction between topics bargained for on an annual basis, 
such as wages and conditions of service, and on a "needs" basis, such as disciplinary 
issues. 
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10. Theme Six: Approaches to labour dispute settlement: 
The following topic was addressed: 
* Dispute settlement structures and mechanisms. 
10.1 Topic One: Dispute settlement structures and mechanisms. 
The usefulness or effectiveness of the available dispute settlement structures and 
mechanisms was examined. 
10.1.1 A background to preliminary findings: 
Preliminary findings indicated that parties were divided with regard to the relative 
usefulness of the available dispute settlement mechanisms and structures. 
10.1.2 Purpose: 
The purpose of this topic was to establish the relative usefulness or effectiveness of 
applied labour dispute settlement mechanisms and structures. 
10.1.3 Question: 
This question was addressed to all three parties. All the parties were asked to rate each 
of the available dispute settlement mechanisms and structures according to the following 
scale: 
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* Very effective; 
* Effective; 
* Average; 
* Not so effective; and 
* Ineffective /useless. 
This list comprised: Arbitration, Conciliation, Mediation; Works Councils, Industrial 
Councils, Conciliation Boards and the Judiciary. 
The State was furthermore asked to opiniate on the usefulness of existing dispute 
settlement mechanisms and structures available to local authorities in terms of securing a 
healthy labour relations environment. 
10.1.4 Response: 





Arbitration: Very effective; 







Industrial Councils: Very effective; 
Judiciary: Effective; 
Conciliation Boards: Average; and 
Works Councils: Average. 
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All the parties indicated similar individual scales in terms of dispute settlement 
mechanisms. However, differences of opinion were expressed with regard to the 





Industrial Councils: Very effective (The State and trade unions); Effective 
(employers); 
Judiciary: Very effective (trade unions); Effective (The State and employers); 
Conciliation Boards : Effective (the State); Average (employers and trade 
unions); and 
Works Councils: Average (the State and employers); Not so effective (trade 
unions). 
These findings are illustrated in Table 9 below. 
Table 9. 
Effectiveness of dispute settlement structures and procedures 
Perceptions of the State, Employers and Trade Unions 
4--- ------------------





Ar. - Arbitration 
Co. - Conciliation 
Me. - Mediation 
W.C. - Works Councils 
I .C. - Industrial Councils 
C.B. - Conciliation Board 
Ju. - Judiciary 
4-very effective; 3-effectlve; 2-average; 1-not so effective; 0-useless 
The opinions of the State with regard to the issue of improving dispute settlement 
practices in local authorities can be summed up as follows: 
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The adequacy of existing procedures: 
* 
* 
In some instances adequate procedures were in place while in others, this 
was not the case; and 
The dispute settlement structures and procedures as adopted by local 
government were still rapidly evolving to "fit the needs of the major labour 
, relations players". 
A key problem with existing procedures: 
* A major problem with some mechanisms and structures was the occurrence 
of excessive time delays for settlement. 
Suggestions for improving existing procedures: 
* The introduction of smaller Industrial Councils; 
* Easier access to Conciliation Boards; and 
* The application of specific time periods for dispute settlement: 
10.1.5 Additional commentary: 
A trade union respondent noted that the dispute settlement process was effective when 
parties were given the opportunity to select their own mechanisms for settling a dispute. 
10.1.6 Overview: 
All parties rated arbitration as the most effective mechanism for settling labour disputes 
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in local authorities. Conciliation and mediation were rated equally also as effective 
mechanisms in this regard. All the parties rated Industrial Councils and the Judiciary as 
the most effective structures, while a mixed response was given to Conciliation Boards 
and Works Councils. Both these latter structures were less favourably perceived by 
employers and trade uni01zs than the State. 
According to the State, the existing dispute settlement process was disadvantaged by a 
lack of stringent "time" discipline, 
the relative inexperience of both employers and trade unions and piecemeal approaches to 
dispute settlement. Measures suggested for improving the dispute settlement process 
included introducing shorter time requisites for the process, rationalising the size of 
Industrial Councils and simplifying legal procedures in order to gain easier assess to 
structures such as Conciliation Boards. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
REVIEW AND CONCLUSION. 
1. Introduction: 
This thesis has described and examined the general nature of labour relations, with 
particular reference to labour disputes and their settlement in the public sector both 
internationally and in South African local authorities. This review and conclusion looks 





An overview of key labour relations features and trends in the public sector 
internationally; 
An overview of labour relations and dispute settlement features and trends 
in South African local authorities; 
Key findings of labour relations and dispute settlement in South African 
local authorities; and 
Some recommendations for improving the labour relations process in South 
African local authorities. 
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2. An overview of key labour relations features and trends in the public sector 
internationally: · 
Labour relations approaches can be distinguished by a number of frames of reference, 
namely the Unitarist, Radicalist and Pluralist perspectives.8 In terms of the pluralist 
frame of reference, labour relations can be described as an interactive framework in 
which the State, employers and trade unions regulate matters of mutual interest. The 
capacity of employers and trade unions to promote and safeguard such interests is 
however broadly contingent on the flexibility of the rules of conduct, the degree of trust 
established between both parties, the distribution of powers and the protection of group 
interests through civil liberties.b Labour relations are therefore characterised by the 
nature of these premises.c 
According to the pluralist frame of reference, conflict is inherent to the labour 
relationship. Labour disputes can therefore be either fu.nctional or dysfu.nctional. 
Functional conflict is characterised as a positive dynamic in the organisation because its 
occurrence engenders new ideas and methods which can improve organisational 
productivity. On the other hand, dysfunctional conflict undermines the organisational 
process, resulting in a breakdown in services. 
Causes of labour conflict can be categorised into environmental, behaviourial and 
structural causes. Environmental causes comprise a range of political, social, economic, 
legal and organisational factors. Behavioural causes usually involve a range of 
confrontational dynamics and strategies as applied by the parties in dispute. Structural 
causes can be distinguished by poor regulatory policies and procedures. 
a 
b 
Refer to Chapter Two: 3. Frames of reference. 
Refer to Chapter Two: s:z Key premises for conducting the labour 
relationship. 
Refer to Chapter Two: 4. Parties to the labour relationship. 
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Power driven processes: Notably industrial action, lock-outs and litigation; 
Processes of right: Notably arbitration; and, 
Processes of interest: Notably collective bargaining, mediation and 
conciliation. 
Other processes include a mixture of the above and fact-finding. For the purposes of 
statutory dispute settlement procedures, labour disputes are distinguished according to 
disputes of interest or disputes of right. The former category is usually settled by means of 
bargaining or third party facilitation while the latter category is usually settled by third 
party adjudication. 
li1 the public sector, labour relations are influenced by a number of unique 
environments.d Subsequently, these pressures have resulted in a variety of dynamic and 
independent approaches internationally.e These systems are generally characterised by 






The representation of employers by means of elected and non-elected 
public functionaries and the emergence of employer organisations in the 
public sector internationally; 
The rapid growth in public sector trade unionism internationally since the 
1960's and 1970's and the wide scope of member interests that are 
represented;r and 
Refer to Chapter Four: 3.4 The public sector environment. 
Refer to Chapter Four: 4.1 Labour relations models in the public sector. 
Refer to Chapter Four: 5.2.2.1 Growth in public sector trade unionism. 
2)2 
* The interventionary role of the State in regulating labour relations in the 
public sector.g 
In the above context, a key feature of labour relations in the public sector internationally 
has been the prohibition of certain fundamental labour rights. In particular, these include 
the right to associate, the right to bargain and the right to strike. In general, their 
prohibition is grounded on the notion that such rights would inevitably harm the public 
interest and welfare, which the State was duty-bound to protect. However, this belief has 
been challenged by a variety of developments internationally, notably a changing 
management attitude to labour in the organisation, a growing shortage of skills, the need 
for improved organisational productivity and a need for a pragmatic approach to labour 
relations.h These pressures have influenced a number of States to sanction some or all 
the above rights in the public sector, but usually on a conditi0nal or limited basis. 
The manner in which these rights are formally adopted depends on a States 
conceptualisation of essentiality. Subsequently, a variety of definitions regarding essential 
setvices are applied internationally. These definitions are characterised by their broad 
interpretation of the above services or by enumeration, which distinguishes between such 
services. The latter approach is more popular in the public sector internationally. 






Growing labour frustration and job insecurity; 
Disparaging workforce conditions; 
.Refer to Chapter Two: 4.2.2 Role of trade unions in the labour 
relationship. 
Refer to Chapter Four: 6.2.2.1 Justifying the right to bargain for an 
explanation of each feature. 
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* Proscriptive legislation; 
* Bureaucratised labour relations frameworks; 
* State and employer recalcitrance to a change in the existing status quo; and 
* Increased trade union politicisation. 
A key feature of the above conflicts in the public sector internationally has been the 
growing usage of power driven processes, notably industrial action.i Subsequently, a 
number of measures have been applied by the State to regulate. the incidence of 





Criminal or civil law procedures; 
Penal restrictions; 
No strike agreements with trade unions; and 
Self-restraint or Joint regulation schemes. 
The above procedures have had varying degrees of success.· A relatively recent 
development in this regard has been the adoption of a Graduated Strike approach. This 
process involves the incremental application of financial pressure in order to force 
parties to settle their disputes in the shortest possible time. These "fines" can be used to 
compensate the public in case of public costs being incurred. 
Dispute resolution in the public sector usually involves processes of right in the case of 
disputes of right, notably compulsory arbitration with an anti-strike clause. Arbitration can 
be applied by means of final-offer and issue-by-issue adjudication. However, where the 
right to bargain is allowed, processes of interest such as collecti.ve bargaining can be 
applied to such disputes. Collective bargaining is often applied in conjunction with or 
replaced by Joint Consultation in the public sector internationally. Other commonly 
Refer to Chapter Five: 4.1.2.1 Causes of industrial action. 
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applied forms of dispute resolution include mediation and conciliation. 






Detailed and strict regulation of practices; 
A wide choice of alternative methods; and 
The prohibition of various fundamental labour rights. 




The growing usage of voluntary measures for dispute settlement; 
A demand for limited State intervention in such processes; and 
The concomitant demand for independent third party assistance or 
facilitation. 
In the context of this background, an overview of labour relations and dispute settlement 
in South African.local authorities follows. 
3. An overview of labour relations and dispute settlement features and trends in South 
African local authorities: 
S~mth African local authorities can be described as decentralised representative 
institutions or a form of universitas, in which group rights and duties are determined. 
These organisations function by means of vested powers within a specific jurisdiction. 
Local authorities are also characterised by their relative subordination to the higher tiers 
of government. To sum up, their purpose is to serve the community within their 
jurisdiction as efficiently and effectively as possible and to provide for the participation 
of its inhabitants in the decision-making process. As with other public sector 
235 
organisations,j the services provided by local authorities are influenced by numerous 
public needs and wants. k 
Labour relations has become an integral function of personnel management in South 
African local authorities. The recent advent of labour relations as a management 
function in local authorities during the 1980's is attributed to, inter alia, the growth of 
trade unionism within this sector.1 
Formally, such practices are characterised by their Pluralist construct, but informally, it 
can be suggested that a Unitarist approach is applied. Within these systems, "employer" 
interests are looked after by personnel officials while other public functionaries 
participate in labour relations matters on an irregular basis. A key trend has been the 
growth !n employer organisations whose mission is to safeguard employer interests within 
the labour relationship.m The emergence of such organisations can be attributed to the 
rapid growth of trade unionism in local authoritiesn and therefore the need to deal with · 
labour demands in a uniform fashion. However, not all local authorities are member to 
employer organisations. 
On the other hand, despite the formal repealment of race-based trade union 
membership, local authority trade unions can be characterised as de facto racially 
distinctive organisations. In particular, independent trade unions or "non-white" trade 




Refer to Chapter Six: 2.7.2 The composition of the public sector. 
Refer to Chapter Six: 2.6 The environments shaping local authorities. 
Refer to Chapter Six: 3.3 Nature of labour relations in local authorities. 
Refer to Chapter Six: 4.1.2.4. Objectives of employers' organisations. 
Refer to Chapter Six: 4.1.1.2.3 The growth of trade unionism in local 
authorities. 
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repression and their subsequent lack of recognition in many local authorities. Currently, 
trade unions can be grouped into those organisations which are endemic to local 
government and those which belong to external labour structures, such as trade union 
federations. 
The States role in regulating labour relations in local authorities has generally been 
characterised by a variety of principal control measures which determine labour rights 
and dispute settlement procedures.0 
Labour relations in focal authorities are regulated by piecemeal legislation. A key Act is 
the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) [since amended] which broadly defines local 
authorities as essential seTVices. Subsequently, the right to strike is prohibited in these 
organisations. On the other hand, the right to associate and the right to bargain are 
sanctioned in the case of recognised trade unions. These rights have led to the adoption 
of Industrial Councils where bargaining can take pl~ce at either the organisational or 
regional level. However, the bargaining scope can vary and usually includes dispute 
settlement issues, trade union rights, conditions of service, disciplinary issues and 
wages.P Other measures applied for facilitating the dispute settlement process include 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration. In terms of their usage, arbitration is generally 
the most commonly applied mechanism.q 
The causes of labour conflict in South African local authorities during the period 1988 to 





Refer to Chapter Eight: 6.2 Theme Two: Topic Two. 
Refer to Chapter Eight: 9.2 Theme Five - Topic Two. 
Refer to Chapter Eight: 10. Theme Six - Topic One. 
Refer to Chapter Seven: 2. Causes of labour conflict in South African local 
authorities. 
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include the issue of workplace discrimination and racial friction, growing fears of 
retrenchment in the face of possible service privatisation or rationalisation and the threat 
of growing unemployment.5 In addition, a lack of management experience with labour 
relations, the adoption of various confrontational dynamics,t unviable policy processes 
and poor communications0 have also undermined this process. 
However, despite the availability of the above-noted processes, labour relations in South 
African local authorities have been characterised by the growing incidence of industrial 
action. This trend can be shown by the increased costs incurred as a result of industrial 
action during the period 1988 to 1992v and the nature of conflict triggers such as wages, 
wbrk conditions, discipline, trade union matters and other related issuesw. In this 
context, labour disputes leading to industrial action are usually resolved by a negotiated 
settlement, and failing this, the application of Court Interdicts, employee dismissals, lock-
outs, police intervention, ultimatums and "persuasion". 
', 4. Key findings of labour relations and dispute settlement in South African local 
authorities: 
In conclusion it is submitted that the labour relations approach applied by South African 
local authorities has failed to institutionalise labour conflict effectively. A critical look at 





Refer to Chapter Seven: 2.1 Environmental factors. 
Refer to Chapter Seven: 2.2 Behavioural factors. 
Refer to Chapter Seven: 2. Causes of labour conflict in South African local 
authorities and_Chapter Eight: Theme Four: Topic One. 
Refer to Chapter Seven: 4.1.2.2.5 Costs of industrial action (1988-1992). 
Refer to Chapter Seven: 4.1.2.2.4 Overview of industrial action triggers. 
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As noted previously, conflict is inherent to labour relations. Therefore, the purpose of 
labour relations is to institutionalise conflict in a manner which makes it least costly to 
the organisation. International trends in the public sector show that an increase in the 
incidence of industrial action is usually attributed to the application of coercive labour 
relations practices. Such practices are characterised by the lack of effective trade union 
participation in the labour relations process. Subsequently, it is submitted that an 
adversarial or power-driven approach to labour relations undermines its sense of 
purpose. Therefore, it is concluded that a consensus-driven approach, founded on the 
notion of justice, is integral to the labour relationship. 
The application of an adversarial labour relations approach in South African local 
authorities has failed to institutionalise labour conflict effectively. The key aspects of this 





The lack of flexible or consistent legislation; 
The lack of commitment by the parties to the labour relationship; 
The inequitable distribution of powers; and 
The inadequate safeguards for protecting group interests. 
The lack of flexible or consistent legislation: 
The application of complex and inconsistent labour legislation has undermined the 
purpose of labour relations processes in South African local authorities. 
Piecemeal legislation has often confused parties to the labour relationship about their 
actual rights. In particular, this legislation has complicated the dispute settlement system 
by entrenching elaborate and time-consuming procedures which, in addition to a lack of 
management or trade union expertise, obscures rather than streamlines the labour 
relations process. 
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Labour Court findings are also often inconsistent with the applied legislation. A notable 
example of the above is the issue of the right to strike for local authority trade unions. 
As noted previously, this right is prohibited for such parties on the grounds that local 
authorities are essential selVices. However, recent Labour Court findings have challenged 
' 
this notion which has resulted in further dissension by the parties with regard to due 
process. 
Lack of commitment to the labour relationship by both parties: 
A key aspect of labour relations is the degree to which both parties are committed to the 
labour relationship. A lack of commitment by such parties undermines the viability of the 
labour relations process. In South African local authorities, the lack of commitment by 
both parties can be characterised by mutual suspicion and distrust. This attitude has led 
to the adoption of confrontational strategies during labour relations interactions. 
From the trade union perspective, the lack of trust can be attributed to Government 
illegitimacy. Local authorities were seen to reflect the values and policies of an 
"illegitimate" State. In addition, labour relations policies were characterised by their 
adversarial nature, especially towards "non-white" or "independent" trade unionism. 
Subsequently, a key feature of these tra-de unions in local authorities has been their 
politicisation of labour demands and the adoption of industrial action as a vanguard for 
such expression. 
On the other hand, employers are suspicious of trade union motives, notably by the 
increased incidence of industrial action and the often "irresponsible" nature of labour 
demands. Although the majority of employers try to negotiate in order to settle disputes, 
their subsequent refusal to recognise certain trade unions and adoption of 
confrontational or "persuasive" tactics, continues to engender distrust. 
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Inequitable distribution of powers: 
From the employers perspective, local authorities have the duty to serve and protect the 
communities welfare. This purpose requires control over the processes which ultimately 
serve these objectives. A key labour relations concern is therefore the "threat" of trade 
unionism to the status quo of the State, as employer, and its capacity to serve the public 
effectively. This fear has been precipitated by the rapid emergence of trade unionism 
within this sector and the nature of labour demands placed before employers. 
Trends which have led to a growth in public sector trade unionism are attributed to a 
change in the perception that it is an "honour" to work for the State. This view was 
undermined by the stark realities of public sector employment where, in comparison, 
private sector employees enjoyed relatively better benefits and the recognition of some 
or all fundamental labour rights. 
Subsequently, local authority trade unions have demanded equitable powers in order to 
redress grievances in a fair manner. In particular, this trend involves a demand for 
fundamental labour rights. However, although the right to associate and bargain are 
recognised in these organisations both rights are encumbered by a variety of restrictions. 
For example, the right to associate includes a converse right for employers to deny trade 
union recognition. This restriction therefore limits the capacity of "unrecognised" trade 
unions to represent member interests within an institutional labour relations framework. 
Similarly, the right to bargain is circumscribed by the narrow scope of bargaining topics 
allowed. 
As noted above, the right to strike is prohibited in South African local authorities. This 
right is viewed as a keystone of trade union power therefore its prohibition is contentious 
and, it can be argued, undermines the principle notion of equity within the labour 
relationship. 
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The lack of protection of group interests: 
The lack of group interest protection by the largely consultative, or limited, negotiating 
role which trade unions play during the conciliatory process has undermined the labour 
relationship. Subsequently, the adoption of independent dispute settlement mechanisms is 
a feature of labour relations in South African local authorities. This approach can be 
seen in the popularity of voluntary arbitration procedures which are performed by an 
independently chosen third party. Notably, the selection of the arbitrator is accomplished 
by means of mutual consensus which the disputants apply in order to ensure that the 
process of protecting member interests is done in the fairest manner possible. 
Subsequently, labour dispute settlement procedures which involve the intervention or 
participation of the State are less effective due to the questionable legitimacy of such 
outcomes. 
5: Recommendations for improving the labour relations process in South African local 
authorities: 
As can be seen by the above issues, labour relations in South African local authorities 
are encumbered by various limitations. In this context, a number of recommendations 
can be made for improving the labour relations process in this sector, namely: 
* Accommodating trade union interests: 
Trade union interests have to be accommodated in order to ensure a viable labour 
relations system. This involves the fundamental recognition of key labour rights which in 
the context of South African local authorities includes the right to strike. However, in 
conjunction with these rights a need to balance such powers is crucial. Subsequently, it is 
submitted that a limited right to strike ought to be sanctioned. The nature of restrictions 
or constraints of this right should account for a procedural balance which ensures that a 







That services affected do not harm the public. This can be done by drafting 
a code of conduct and establishing a fact-finding body to check the effects 
of a strike on the community; 
That the right to strike provides for a manageable timetable of procedures 
for settling such a dispute; 
That the right to strike is restricted to certain employees as determined by 
the mutual consent of trade unions and employers beforehand; and finally, 
That in the event of industrial action, a Graduated Strike approach be 
adoptedx. 
* Simplifying existing legislation: 
As noted above, complex legislation has undermined the labour relationship by confusing 
the parties in the process about their rights. Subsequently, there is a need to simplify 
labour relations procedures and, at the local level, policies which regulate such 
procedures. 
* Reorganising structures: 
The need to establish streamlined structures for resolving disputes is crucial for effective 
labour relations. Current disadvantages or hindrances include poor communications and 
limited processes for mutual consensus. Suggestions for improving these inadequacies 
involve: 
x Refer to Chapter Five: 4.1.3.3.5 The Graduated Strike approach. 
* 
* 
More frequent communications between both parties, preferably through 
permanent "working group" structures;Y and 
Ensuring that outlets exist for complaints. 
* Developing trust: 
Finally, the key element which underscores the process of mutual consensus and a viable 
labour relations system is the development of trust. However, trust is contingent on the 
attitudes and willingness of parties to submit their differences. Trust therefore depends 
on a recognition by parties that mutual suspicions must be forgone and confrontational 
dynamics stopped in order to ensure a viable labour relations system based on the notion 
of consensus. As Bendix & Swart (1982:8) conclude: 
"As always, the only alternative to the 'rule of war is the rule of law, and 
where law cannot be imposed by tyranny, it must be sustained by consent." 




1. The term labour relations is applied rather than industrial relations, 
unless otherwise specified, on the grounds that local government is not 
an industry (Poppleton, 1985:3). 
2. An organisation can be described as "a structured interrelationship 
among individuals and groups as they cooperate to fulfil a 
predetermined objective" (Morrow, 1980:4). Furthermore, in terms of 
interest groups, Schattschneider (in Morrow, 1980:4) describes 
organisations as the "mobilisation of bias". 
3. 15 Grades of local authority's were listed by the Classification of Local 
Authority's According to Grades in the Government Gazette, No. 9462 
of 19 October 1984. Grades are established according to a statistical 
formula which is based on 13 individually-weighted factors. Examples 
include local authority income (25%), Erven (15%), Electricity meters 
(12%), water meters (10%) and sewerage points (10%). 
4. The delphi questionnaire themes are described in Chapter Eight. 
5. Fixed-alternative items ask for "yes-no" or "agree-disagree" answers, and 
are closed or poll questions. Scale items require a degree of response 
according to a pre-determined scale, and in conjunction with other 
related data or open-ended questions, measure the attitude of 
participants to key issues. (Kerlinger, 1975:484-485) 
6. This period was selected because of the extensive statistical literature 
available for this period, as similarly applied in some parts of the delphi 
questionnaire. 




1. The Industrial Relations Systems theory was pioneered by John Dunlop in 
the early part of this century. For a further insight into the historical 
evolution of this management function see Bendix (1989:13). 
2. The advisory role can be facilitated by means of Liaison Committees for 
employer-union interaction (Childs, 1987:74). 
3. Consensus can be defined as "a tacit agreement on the procedures as well 
as a broad agreement on basic values, norms and standards" to be applied. 
(Presidents Council Report, 1990/1:2) 
4. Childs· ( 1987:74) also describes the State Unitarist perspective which 
acknowledges the right of employees to associate on an advisory basis. 
5. Foucault (in Wood, 1987:252) asserts that modern strategies of domination 
by the State are characterised by token "illusive" freedoms granted to trade 
unions within the labour relations process. 
6. According to Coetzee (1985:143) this function is the dominant source of 
power for employers in the labour relationship. 
7. The division of loyalties or "management fragmentation" can undermine 
employer rights and duties through poor representation or divided interests 
(Windmuller & Gladstone, 1984, Lewin, D. et al., 1988). Factors 
contributing to this matter include "personal prejudice, poor 
communication practice [or] diverse individual management style" 
(Poppleton, 1985:7). 
8. The role of trade unions in the labour relationship can also be 
characterised by the collective, individual, economic, social and 
psychological needs of their members (Alfred, 1984:26; Du Toit, 1976:6). 
9. On a satirical note, Adam Smith in his publication, An enqui:ry into the 
nature and causes of the wealth of nations (1937) described trade unions as 
surreptitious organisations seeking to foment some plot against the 
populace: 
"People of the same trade union seldom meet even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or 
some contrivance to raise prices." (Fick & Hugh High, 1987:27) 
10. Other key factors iiifluencing the capacity of trade unions to address 
employee needs include, their structure, the degree of centralisation or 
decentralisation of processes within the labour relationship and the source 
of trade union power (Bendix & Swart, 1982:9). 
11. A critical issue in this regard is the degree to which "voluntarism" is· 
allowed, where parties enjoy the freedom to select their own methods for 
settling disputes. 
12. The recognition agreement is a "formal procedural structure" which governs 
the conduct of parties in a bargaining relationship (Bendix & Swart, 
1982:3). Douwes Dekker (n.d.:40) makes the observation that· a recognition 
agreement lends an air of legitimacy to the labour relationship .. 
13. Bendix (1989:73) cautions that police should be called 'in "only in extreme 
circumstances and ... only for the purpose of public protection or to prevent 
individuals from harming one another". 
14. "If the inherency of conflict between capital and labour is acknowledged, 
then a degree of institutionalisation, through agreed rules of the game to 
facilitate interaction and effect temporary reconciliation is required." 
(Douwes Dekker, 1990:294) 
15. The lack of rigour in labour legislation can also be shown by the 
jurisprudential dilemma of having to choose between the legitimacy of a 
former employment contract (pacta suni servanda) and a new_ly negotiated 
collective arrangement (Kahn-Freund, 1977:48). 
16: For example, a trade union representing highly skilled professionals can 
have a greater impact on the organisation than a larger trade union 
representing the interests of mostly unskilled workers. 
17. Kahn-Freund (1977:22) further distinguishes between "traditional" 
(employer) and "reactive" (trade union) powers where the "individual . 
worker is subordinated to the power of management but that power of 
management is coordinated with that of organised labour (own emphasis)". 
18. A more· detailed explanation of rights can be found in B~n-Israel. (1988:4-
30) and Kahn-Freund (1977). 
CHAPTER THREE 
ENDNOTES 
1. However, both the Unitarist and Radicalist frames of reference provide 
different explanations for conflict. 
Unitarists contend that conflict and industrial action can be largely 
attributed ·ro "agitators" or "intimidators" opposing consential or 
consultative processes on an "anti-establishment" basis. Conflict is therefore 
regarded as an aberration, and strike action as a manifestation of 
organisational disloyalty, even seditiousness: to the State. (Bendix, 1989: 14; 
Wood, 1989:49). 
On the other hand, Radicalists. propose that conflict is· ~he outcome of fixed 
and irreconcilable differences between employers and employees within·any 
capitalistic system. This is ascribed to "the appeal of new world views" 
(Hyman, 1975:177). Strike.s are subsequently viewed as a struggle by 
workers in "non-Marxist States" against the "broader relationships of 
control". (Aaron, Najita & Stern.1988:227;.Bendix, 1989:16; Childs, 1987:74; 
Du Toit, 1976:33; Savchenko, 1987:147; Wood, 1989:52). In Marxist States,· 
conflict is viewed as a manifestation of "individual misbehaviour" or 
"violations of the law or socialist morality" (Hethy, 1989:115). 
2. On this note, Douwes Dekker (n.d.:41) jibes: "Industrial peace is more 
surprising than industrial action". 
' 
3. In this context, Hernandez (1983:10) lists four factors which can be applied 
for determining wage levels: · 
* Wage rate comparisons; 
* Employers ability to pay; 
* Existing productivity levels; and . 
* Cost of living and changes. 
4. Ironically, Freeman (1986:51-2) suggests that the occurrence of strikes 
during poor. economic conditions may not necessarily meet with the 
disapproval of the employers. He notes: 
_ "Because public sector as well as private sector employers "save" labour 
-· 
co·sts when struck, public employees (sic: "employers") may be more willing 
to take strikes because they 'make money' duiing a strike. This further . 
reduces the economic power of unions in dispute." 
5. For a description of environmental turbulence and its impact on policy 
application, see Terreberry (in Baker, 1973:178-195) and Warwick 
( 1974: 100-118). 
6. According to Farber & Bazerman (1987:349-351), the divergence of 




The Asymmetric information learning model: shows that 
disagreement is caused by parties as a tactical measure for 
learning as much as possible about each other during the 
course of the bargaining process; r 
The model of Commitment: shows that disagreement is the 
outcome of formal commitments made by parti~s to a 
particular bargaining position beforehand; and 
The strategic third party behaviour or salience of possible 
rewards model shows that disagreement is caused by the high 
expectations of one or both parties to a possible third-party 
settlement. 
7. The level at which collective bargaining takes place can cause conflict. For 
example, it is suggested that :centralised bargaining .can lead to high worker 
expectations due to a perceived increase irt power. Subsequently, a failure 
to fulfil these workers expectations could trigger conflict in the workplace . 
(Hyman,' 1975:166). On the other hand, decentralised bargaining could 
suffer the same fate due to wide discord, a lack of uniformity and · 
piecemeal trade union representation in the bargaining process 
(Hernandez, 1983:7). 
8. Poor communications within the organisation can foster misunderstanding 
and distrust within the labour relationship (Wood, 1989:57). Conflict can 
therefore be manifested by competition for limited resources, dependence 
in cooperation, desire for autonomy, change in the relative status of parties 
and role conflict (Van den Bos, 1989:n.p.) 
9. See International Labour Office (1986:71) for examples. 












On the other hand, where such strikes are sanctioned as part of a 
legitimate process then they are classified as legal, constitutional or 
procedural forms of industrial action (Bendix, 1989:218). 
However, Rycroft & Jordaan (1990:216) query whether voluntary overtime-
bans can be defined as a form of industrial action. 
Hernandez (1983:1) notes that a clear distinction ought to be made 
between perceived triggers and other possible underlying causes. 
However, Bendix (1989:225) warns that in reality the lock-out may prove 
disadvantageous in the case of large-scale strikes to employers due to the 
enormous expense encumbered by closing down operations as well as its 
reciprocal effect on costs of production or service. 
The italicised quote is adapted from a definition of negotiation as submitted 
by Horwitz (1991a:76). 
For other useful definitions of collective bargaining see Shafritz (1975:43), 
Trollip (1990a:22) and Kahn-Freund (1977:17). 
For example, Feigenbaum describes collective bargaining in the context of 
one-on-one negotiation as "a system of bilateral determination of important 
personnel and working conditions" (in Shafritz, 1975:42). Jowell (1989:77) 
on the other hand, simply refers to collective bargaining as a "voice 
mechanism". 
He thy ( 1989: 117) describes collective bargaining in this context as "a major 
instrument to prevent labour disputes and conflicts". 
Nominally determined by in-house bargaining procedures (Horwitz, 
1991a:66). 
Adversarial tactics are used to give a party the best possible opportunity to 
realise their goals. Examples of such tactics include: · 
* 
Delimiting an opponents goal setting process by means of 
manipulation, persuasion or conditional sanction; and 
Modifying an adversaries environment through "public 
opinion, legislation, contracts, cooperation, readiness on 
behalf of the adversaries opponents, organisational structures, 
and physical factors (i.e. mobility, and access and availability 
constraints)". 
(Dlugos, Dorow & Weiermair, 1988:113) 
21. A related concern, for trade unions in particular, is the possibility of a 
dissipation of powers due to an excessively large number of representative 
units within the bargaining forum. This complicates the purpose of 
bargaining, i.e. that of finding a common ground between disputing parties. 
(Klinger, 1980:341; Stone, 1989) 
22. According· to Lewin, D. et al. {1988:355) the desire for mediatory 
intervention is a tacit acknowledgement by parties that they are willing to 
compromise. 
23. The mediator may also be referred to as a "facilitator" (Independent 
Mediation Society of South Africa, 1985:1). 
24. If disputing parties cannot agree on a mutually acceptable mediator or 
agency, each party may then appoint their own representative to mediate 
on their behalf (Bendix, 1989:208). 
25.. This can be achieved by correctly diagnosing and not disclosing the 
underiying issues or concerns of the parties, thereby assisting in the process 
of gaining their trust (Bendix, 1989:207-8). 
26. A key attribute is the mediators ability to refrain from imposing ideas or 
solutions on the parties, except in the situation where directive strategies 
may become necessary (Bendix, 1989:207-8). 
27. See Bendix (1989:368-70) and Gerber, Nel & van Dyk (1992:420-1) for 
some useful descriptions of Industrial Council structures and functions. 
28. Of all these approaches, Treu, T. et al. (1987:29) conclude that those 












"A group effort designed to attain group goals at the least cost of time, 
money, material or discomfort" (Koontz & O'Donnell, 1968:6) 
"The pursuit of mutually desired goals by, with and through people, acting 
together." (Van den Bos, 1989: n.p.) 
"All those processes that contribute to the efficient implementation of.a 
predetermined goal or policy." (Morrow, 1980:1) 
A background of the paradigmatic development and status of public 
administration is provided by Gildenhuys (1988:135-143). With regard to 
South African developments specifically, refer to Gildenhuys (1988:145-
150). 
Public policy is described by Dye (1987:3) as "whatever governments 
choose to do or not to do". 
A number of other definitions of Public Administration· are frequently 
applied. These include: 
"The formulation, implementation, evaluation and 
modification of public policy." 
(Cutchin, 1981:79) 
"[A] conscious directing of the activities undertaken by 
members of governmental institutions in pursuit of an agreed 
objective, which will contribute to the satisfaction of specific 
community needs and the betterment of the general welfare 
of the citizenry." 
(Rabie in De Wet, 1987:13) 





"A continuous struggle to achieve a precarious balance 
amongst a bewildering variety of pressures exerted on a 
society, in order to provide an acceptable way of life for the 
majority of the members of that society." 
(Van den Bos, 1989:n.p.) 
"The application of organisational, decision-making, and 
staffing theory and procedures to public problems." 
(Vocino & Rabin, 1981:4) 
"The composite of all the laws, regulations, practices, codes 
and customs that prevail at any time in any jurisdiction." 
(White, 1955:2) 
5. Countries favouring a "public management" approach include Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States (Brynard, 
1992; Treu et al, 1987:220). In part, this may have prompted the adage that 
"the field of administration is a field of business" (Denhart, 1984:43). 
6. For a more detailed description of key elements of public management see 
The Mushkin Report in Golembiewski & Gibson (1983:2). 
7. According to Treu et al (1987:4), the public service is characterised by "the 
nature of the employer organisation, service or institution". 
8. In this context, Gildenhuys (1983:31-32) contends that a quid pro quo does 
not necessarily follow for taxpayers. This is based on a non-exclusivity 
principle which simply suggests that services made available to the public 
must also benefit those who are not taxed. 
9. Otherwise coined the equity principle where services are provided at cost. 
10. The debate over the relative role and impact of the political environment 
upon the efficiency of the administrative process has been dogged by 
debate since Woodrow Wilsons' "The Study of Administration" published in 
1887 (Nigro & Nigro, 1980:7-8). Some useful readings on this matter 
include: 
* Dunsire, A., Administration: The Word and the Science. 
* 
* 
United Kingdom: Martin Robertson, 1973. (See Chapter Six: 
The American Science of Administration - Wilson and the 
politics/administration dichotomy and Chapter Ten: Public 
Administration and "Private Administration") 
Morrow, W.L., Public Administration: Politics. Policy. and the 
Political System. New York: Random House, 1980. 
Nigro, F.A., & Nigro,L.G., Modern Public Administration. 
New York: Harper & Row, 1980. 
11. This is underscored by the public pressure on the State to demonstrate its' 
commitment to the community. Subsequently "the difficulty of government 
work is that it not only has to be well done, but the public has to be 
convinced that it is being well done". (Forrestal in Corson, 1952:124) 
12. In the United Kingdom for example, the introduction of a centralised 
labour policy framework for public employees by the State, was the 
outcome of strongly divided union loyalties regarding employment issues 
(Treu, T. et al., 1987). · 
13. However, in the United Kingdom for instance, elected local government 
officials deny any undue "party political" influence with regard to labour 
relations (Winchester in Treu, T. et al., 1987:232). 
14. Commonly coined the responsibility ethic, this "duty" by the State is often 
contested by public sector trade unions (Rhodes, 1985:303). 
15. Imposing a wage freeze is one of the many options available to a 
government for curbing public employee expenditure. Other methods 
include, a denial of merit increases or cost-of-living adjustments, restricting 
step increases in promotion, and restructuring fringe benefits. (Hays & 
Kearney, 1983:193) 
16. Heneman & Schwab ( 1978:275) submit that the underlying theoretical 
difference "between labour laws governing the public sector versus labour 
laws governing the private sector" is the "character of public employment". 
17. This trend is echoed by Garret (1972:234): 
"No management function in industry has undergone greater changes in 
recent years than personnel management 
18. De Wet (1987:14) describes the process of establishing personnel policy as 
follows: 
"A personnel policy has to be formulated and implemented in any 
institution, funds have to be made available for salaries and staff expenses, 
staff structures have to be established within which staff can work, staff 
have to be appointed to carry out the personnel function and work 
procedures are necessary for staff to work in an orderly manner, and all 
these functions and activities of staff have to be controlled to ensure that 
predetermined goals are achieved."· 
19. According to Feigenbaum merit based processes in the public sector are 
crucial for ensuring the best possible staff for the job, whereby "the 
conditions and rewards of performance contribute to the competency and 
continuity of the service" (in Shafritz, 1975:42). 
20. As Weiler (1980:239) explains: 
"From the point of view of the union, the general public is not an innocent, 
uninvolved bystander in the dispute between the government employer and 
its union. The public is the employer. It is the interests of the public that 
are being advanced at the other side of the table, either as consumers of 
the services who want to maximise employee production, or as taxpayers. 
who want to minimise labour costs". 
21. Employer associations have also been characterised by a more proactive 
approach to labour relations (Shaw & Clarke in Lewin et al, 1988:148). 
Examples of these trends in local government can be found in Australia, 
Denmark, Germany, Sweden & the United Kingdom. (International Labour 
Organisation, 1989a:109-110) 
22. This declaration was ratified by several countries, such as Poland and the 
United Kingdom (International Labour Office, 1986:71). 
23. A change in government (through elections or otherwise) often led to a 
new governments inheritance of "disagreeable" public labour policy which 
led to its reformation often to the disadvantage of trade unions. 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:lll) 
24. In Venezuela, representation is further distinguished according to skill 
levels; Trade unions (nominally unskilled and semi-skilled labour), 
associations (skilled labour) and professional colleges (specific professions) 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:112). 
25. The Federacion de Sbuiicatos de Trabajadores al SeTVicio del Estado. 
" 
26. The Statute applied in Mexico is the Statute of Public Service Employees or 
Estatuto do los Trabajadores al Servico del Estado. 
27. In Malaysia local government unions specifically represent the employees 
of each local authority, prohibiting any other form of membership. 
28. . See Winchester (in Treu, T. et al, 1987:220) - government desire for 
greater efficiency and resulting centralisation over the labour relations 
process and Treu, T. et al (1987:13) in the case of local government. 
29. In this context it is contended that in the event of industrial action, 
employers would essentially benefit through savings on wages and salary 
costs, while the associated expense of such a strike would be more than 
likely financially prohibitive for trade unions (Freeman, 1986:49-52). 
30. "The fact that government may be elected ... does not normally entitle it to 
conscript the assets or services of individuals or firms which the public 
would find useful. Instead, it has to negotiate a voluntary agreement on 
terms which ultimately depend upon its relative bargaining position." 
(Weiler, 1980:216) 
31. This trait is based on a variety of international findings, such as those of 
Lieberman (1980:160) who came to this conclusion with regard to the 
Canadian public sector. 
32. See Methe & Perry in Freeman (1986:62) and Lewin et al, (1988:516) on 
public sector productivity findings in the United States of America. 
33. See Treu et al (1987:15) for examples of the frequency of informal 
bargaining practices in the public sector of International Market Economy 
Countries. 
34. Consequently, the use of "some kind of co-ordination between negotiations 
in the private sector and public service" has been suggested by some trade 
unionists (International Labour Office, 1986:35). 
35. Treu, T. et al. (1987) contend that in some countries collective bargaining 
remains a mere formality, largely seen as a measure for co-opting labour 
by means of the complex and time-consuming procedures applied and 
limited bargaining scope. 
36. It is submitted by Lieberman (1980:24) that public apathy to broader public 
issues has been largely ameliorated by collective bargaining practices 
because of the potential impact bargaining arrangements may have on the 
affairs of the public. 
37. In this regard, Morris (1986:190) counters the suggestion of judicial 
neutrality by asserting that even in the process of resolving disputes, 
government departments who decide on labour matters can influence court 
decisions, thereby making such institutions a "rubber stamp" of the 
government. 
38. In this context a further benefit of this right is the "psychological threat" it 
poses on parties to find agreement and refrain from continued 
intransigence (Lewin et al, 1988:330; Lieberman, 1980:27; Linder in 
Douwes Dekker, n.d.:73; Weiler, 1980:218). 
39. According to Heneman & Schwab (1978:276) the real damage of 
prohibiting a right to strike in this context is a disrespect for the law. 
Subsequently, Morris (1986:186-234) argues that in practice the notion of 
the legal status of industrial action in the public sector is often contingent 
on judicial discretion. In conclusion, Thomas (1989:143) submi~s that "no 
ban on official action would be able to guarantee that there would not be a 
corresponding increase in unofficial action or guerrilla warfare". 
40. It can be noted that public officials, more so political office bearers, 
"represent the public rather than special groups" (Wissink in Fox, Schwella 
& Wissink, 1991:199). 
41. An example is the former Soviet Union which espoused the lack of a 
divergence of interests between management and labour and therefore 
improbability of strikes (see International Labour Organisation, 1989a:121 -
former Soviet Union). 
42. For example, in Australia public sector strikes continue to arise as a form 
of custom de.spite their proscription (Pillay & Bendix, 1993:46). 
43. As Pillay & Bendix (1993:45) explain: 
· "The right to strike is not a delegation of authority to workers to fix their 
own wages. Political, economic and social costs impact on both the State 
and its workers during collective bargaining." 
44. Senior officials. 
45. The specific time-length was not specified. 
46. In Sweden this arrangement is entrenched by the Special Basic Agreement 
for the Public Sector Act (International Labour Organisation, 1989a:122). 
47. Public opinion may not necessarily be "commensurate with the essentiality 
of the service or services concerned but rather with the degree of 
inconvenience caused by the strikes" (Boshoff & Bendix, 1993:37). 
48. This trend is reflected by Benjamin Arnold (in Morris, 1986:9) who noted: 
"The concept of essentiality is not an absolute, capable of being defined by 
purely objective criteria; rather its meaning varies according to subjective 
group interests and political expediency." (Benjamin Arnold in Morris, 
1986:9). 
49. Observations made by the Green Paper on Trade Union Immunities 
(1981), issued by the Department of Employment in the United Kingdom 
concluded: 
"The interdependent nature of industry means that a case can now be 
made for regarding a strike by most groups of workers as threatening 
essential services or supplies." (Morris, 1986: 190) 
50. For example, in New Zealand and the United Kingdom the police and 
armed forces are proscribed from striking. (International Labour 
Organisation, 1989a:121). 
51. Morris ( 1986: 189) also suggests that this alternative has a far more 
beneficial effect than "subjecting disputes to compulsory arbitration in an 
ad hoc basis" by causing less resentment. 
52. This is the view of the Committee of Experts (Christie, 1992:21) and the 
Commission for the Freedom of Association (Ben-Israel, 1988:112), both 
bodies of the International Labour Organisation. 
53. For example, in Italy the conditions referred to in defining "essential 
services" include "environmental, economic, technological, political, cultural 




1. In South American countries, for instance, the imposition of unilateral 
government policy in the 1980's triggered general industrial strife. These 
measures were applied to curtail inflationary spirals as a result of the 
worldwide recession. However, a return to the "normal operation of labour 
relations machinery and the loosening of pay restraint programmes" led to 
-a decline in labour disputes. (International Labour Organisation, 
1989a:105,116-1l7) 
· 2. Public will can be described as the fear that a change in policy may 
undermine public well-being (Morris, 1986:198). 
3. It can be noted that public sector legislation is distinguished by 
administrative or public law (Treu et al, 1987:35). 
4. AS. Heneman & Schwab (1978:276) explain: 
"Permitting public employees to strike, or more accurately not placing a · 
prohibition on work stoppages, would seem to imply that legisl~tors were 
condoning the disruption of governmental services." 
5. For related discussion on legal factors contributing to labour conflict refer 
to Balfour & Holmes, Fallon, Klauser, Stern & Olson in Freeman (1986): 
Affect of legal penalties and labour rights on the dispute incidence; 
Ichniowski in Aaron, Najita' & Stern (1988): Study on Police strikes; and 
Aaron, Najita & Stern (1988): Comparison of legal and illegal strike 
incidence in the public sector. 
· 6. Treu et al (1987:7) note that international strike trends in the public sector 
during the period 1984-1987 were mostly attributed to restrictive 
government policies which undermined the labour rights. 
7. . Wi~h regard to similar findings within the public sector, Lieberman 
(1980:34) observes: 
"When public employees strike, other public employees in the same area 
are interested observers. If they see that a strike is successful - or that it 
does not result in any dire coI_tSequences to the strikers - they have an 
incentive to strike also." 
8. The politicisation of labour issues is justified as a natural recourse to unfair 
political pressure, prejudice or societal discrimination (Institute for 
Industrial Relations, 1988:40). 
9. This is based on the growing acceptance of the right of employees to 
associate and subsequently enjoy "all the instruments of political 
democracy" (Weiler, 1980:215). 
10. Thereby increasing employment levels and potential membership. 
11. Factors influencing the nature and scope of trade union politicisation in the 





The relative size (nominal strength) of a trade union; 
The degree to which management is reliant on its electorate 
to make "politically correct decisions" (i.e. public 
accountability); 
The nature of prevailing political, socio-economic and legal 
environments; and 
Prevailing union mores. 
(International Labour Organisation, 1989a:107-122; Lewin et al, 1988:23) 
12. The issue of amalgamating public and private sector labour relations systems 
is contentious. Some broad reasons both for and against this approach are 
briefly illustrated. 
Those opposing the merger contend that the monopolistic nature of the public 
sector underscores the potential for disruption as a result of extended labour 
rights. This would place "extraordinary pressure" on the State to acquiesce to 
workforce demands at the cost of the public. 
However, those favouring this possibility contend that the States' role ought 
to be distinct from that of its role as sovereign power. Furthermore, it is 
proposed that since public services are paid for partly by public employees 
(taxation), they ought to enjoy the right to determine the value of their own 
employ. 
(Heneman & Schwab, 1978:275; International Labour Organisation, 
1989a: 124-125). 
13. With particular reference to the United States of America (Freeman, 
1986:43). 
14. This term broadly refers to developed countries. 
15. This term broadly refers to developing countries. 
16. For example, in spite a the prohibition of the right to strike for public 
sector employees in the United Kingdom, the largest civil service strike in 
1981 approximately 300 000 employees (Winchester in Treu et al, 1987). 
17. This notion was supported by the Green Paper on Trade Union Immunities 
(1981) which investigated, inter alia, the usefulness of a no strike agreement 
between employers and trade unions (Morris, 1985:227). 
18. In this instance, it is suggested that neutrality removes the potential 
problem of "pride and popularity" which can hamper a settlement (Weiler, 
1980:242). 
19. Examples of countries where compulsory arbitration is applied with an 
anti-strike clause include: Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom 
(International Labour Organisation, l 989a: 123-124 ). 
20. In this context, Weiler (1980:229) comments: 
"All in all, one can maintain that interest arbitration is tolerable, although 
perhaps an undesirable ingredient of the labour relations system in an 
essential public service." 
21. This view is echoed by Lewin et al (1988:414) who suggests that there is 
"no systematic support for the belief that arbitration should or will serve as 
a check on public union monopoly power". 
22. A splitting of awards may often be practised where arbiters want to avoid 
swinging decisions in matters that they may have little insight into, as 
Weiler (1980:227) concedes: · 
"The arbitration fraternity is frank to recognise that it does not have the 
wisdom of Solomon. Normally it is content to split the baby down the 
middle!" 
23. This trend is notable in the case of Final-offer arbitration, with both 
demands being most likely exaggerated (Lieberman, 1980:94 ). 
24. For a specific list of suggested benefits of arbitration, see Lewin et al 
(1988:413-6). 
25. Lewin et al (1988:422) observe: 
" ... there is no doubt that arbitration has also increased union and 
management dependency on third parties to resolve their disputes and, in 
doing so, has frequently sapped the vitality of the bargaining process."· 
Although agreeing with this assertion, Freeman (1986:73) still cautions that 
the cause and effect of arbitration on the bargaining process must be 
proved. 
26. See Heneman & Schwab (1978:270-271) and Lieberman (1980:96) for the 
differences between public and private sector bargaining scope. 
27. Weiler (1980:214) mentions, for example, that municipal employees in the 
Canadian public sector enjoy distinct bargaining rights. 
· 28. See Corby (1991:42) - growth of agency Whitley's as decentralised 
bargaining forums in the United Kingdom; Hyman (1975:165) - the 
expression of dissatisfaction with national settlements in the United 
Kingdom. 
29. Winchester furthermore observes that in the United Kingdom, local 
authorities have generally managed "to maintain a degree of autonomy in 
bargaining in spite of the increasing financial pressure" (Treu et 
al.1987:219). · 
30. Otherwise known as the National Personnel Authority. 
31. The benefit of incorporating both approaches was also advocated by the 
findings of the Donovan Commission which attributed the absence of strife 
in British local government during the 1960's to the practice of ~joint 
negotiation at the national level and joint consultation at. the local level" 
(Knowles, 1988:227). 
32. States where these mechanisms are frequently applied, include Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, 
United Kingdom and the United States of America (International Labour 
Organisation, 1989a:123). 
33. Lewin et al (1988:335) suggest that the effectiveness of mediation can be 
established by means of calculating the number of impasses settled during 
its application. · 
34. Useful attributes of a mediator include: Intelligence, aCl!men, practicality, 
tactfulness, diplomacy, and knowledgable (of all matters pertaining to the 
conflict) (Bendix, 1989:208). 
35. Bendix (1989:208) suggests that "the introduction of a neutral person could, 
especially if he is an experienced negotiator, serve to diffuse tensions and 
induce progress towards settlement" even when parties seem unable or 
unwanting to settle. 
36. A significant advantage of continuing negotiations is that by increasing the 
likelihood for agreement, costly alternatives in the form of industrial action 
can be averted (Independent Mediation Society of South Africa, 1985:1; 
Subbarao, 1988:122). 
37. Entrenched by means of the Slichter Law of 1947, the State settles 
disputes in essential services by: Mediation, an inquiry, continuing partial 
operation of the service affected, and seizure of work (Pankert, 1980:733). 
38. It is broadly accepted that essential services require special dispute 
settlement procedures. Although regulations vary, most dispute settlement 
arrangements have a legal basis "since they relate directly to the protection 
of the general interest which is primarily a prerogative of the public 
authorities" (Pankert, 1980:725,727). 
39. This trend can be illustrated in the case of the United Kingdom, where a 
dual approach exists comprising a form of Joint Regulation at the national 
level between employer organisations and trade union federations, and 
collective bargaining at the local level. 
40. In this regard Treu et al (1987:230) observe that "at all times voluntary 
disputes procedures agreed between unions and employers have been 
regarded as the primary method of regulating conflict" in the public sector. 
41. The Arbitration, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). Established 
under the Employment Protection Act (1975) it consists of one chairman 
and nine members representing, the trade unions, industry and academia. 
(Treu et al, 1987:232) 
42. For instance, in the United Kingdom, large-scale State intervention in local 





1. Regan (1982:59) describes intergovernmental relations as the "legal, 
financial and functional overlap" of interactions taking place between the 
various tiers of government. 
2. It is proposed by Page & Goldsmith (1985:175) that no specific m~asures 
can be applied in determining the precise nature of intergovernmental 
relations. Subsequently, they note: 
"Studies concerned with central-local relations, under whatever banner they 
march, have made relatively few steps forward in developing a comparative 
analysis". 
3. Decentralisation can be defined as: 
"Those [powers] which have been devolved in order to allow a local 
authority to act in its own discretion within certain prescribed limits - and 
to do so through officials appointed by itself (own italics)." (Heymans & 
Totemeyer, 1988:4) 
4. Other forms of central-local relations include: 
Deconcentration: Which is characterised by the role of local authority's as 
"administrative agencies" which serve their communities on behalf of 
central government (Heymans & T~temeyer, 1988:4). Deconcentration can 
also be described as the "geographical dispersal of functions, structures or 
staff by the central government" (Cameron in Heymans & Tlftemeyer, 
1988:49); 
Devolution: Which is characterised by a greater scope of local government 
discretionary powers. Devolution can also be described as "the legal 
conferring of powers [on local authority's] to discharge specified or residual 
functions" (Smith, 1979:215); and 
Delegation: Which is characterised by the conferral of powers by central 
government on local government within certain constraints and on an 
agency basis (Rondinelli et al., 1984 ). 
5. Corporatism can be defined as: 
"A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised 
or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange 
for observing certain controls on the selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports." (Schmitter in Rhodes, 1985:288) 
6. These characteristics apply to local government in general and not where 
such organisations are racially established. See Craythorne (1982:21). 
7. Local authority's can be distinguished by urban, city or town councils 
(Craythorne, 1982:21). 
8. It can be noted that the Local Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 
1993) has nominated municipal councils until the municipal election due at 
the end of 1994. 
9. Politics is defined as: 
"a struggle (own emphasis) among competing forces for the right to control 
the character of public policy." (Morrow,1980:3) · 
10. This trend has remained relatively stable over past years as indicated by 
Sing & Maharaj (1990:43) who estimated that the public sector composed 
of approximately 15.5% of the economically active population of South 
Africa in 1990. A similar figure was suggested by The Star (13/04/92) at 
the end of 1991 (approximately 1.68 million public sector employees). 
11. As noted previously, the win-lose approach is distinguished by the notion 
that "a gain for workers essentially means a loss for employers and vice 
versa" (Maller, 1989:1). 
12. Cloete (1978:218) noted that a lack of provincial expertise was lacking at 
the time: 
"Indeed, the provincial authorities are today totally unprepared to assist the 
municipal authorities to obtain professional personnel administration". 













Cloete (1978:218) for instance describes local government personnel 
administration practices in those times as a "sadly neglected field of work ... 
carried on haphazardly and mostly as a clerical function in an amateurish 
manner". 
However, according to Cloete (1978:215), this trend can be traced back as 
far as the 1970's where he noted that all 578 local authorities in Namibia 
and South Africa at the time were devising and utilising their "own labour 
policies and practices". 
The relative representation of each organisations is calculated according to 
average organisational size (i.e. number of employees). In 1990 the 
federation comprised: 
Municipal Employers' Organisation: three members; 
Cape Province Local Authorities Employers' Association: two members; 
Orange Free State Gold Fields Employers' Organisation: one member; and 
Major Cities Employer's Organisation: one member. 
(Sing & Maharaj, 1990:49) 
For instance the Roman Catholic Church criticised existing legal provisions 
for their lack of equity in due process: ''The purpose of the law should be 
to ensure that bargaining between workers and management was free and 
fair so that a balance of interests was reached and maintained" ("Church 
calls for labour policy change" 'in Rand Daily Mail, 9/11/1980). 
Similarly, within section 65 of the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 1956) 
[as amended], as with the prohibition of the right to strike for local 
government employees, the right of employers to a lock-out is proscribed 
(Bendix, 1992:545; Sing & Maharaj, 1990:44). 
It is stressed by Pillay & Bendix (1993:49) that essential services in the 
South African context are listed by the Labour Relations Act (Act 28 of 
1956) [as amended] according to the criteria of employer and employee, and · 
are not defined. 
Brassey et al (1987:125) argues that the prohibition of the right to strike for 
all essential services undermines the notion that the right to strike is a 
fundamental right: 
"Macfarlane points out [that] a strong case can be made for partially or 
wholly depriving certain employees of the right [to strike] whose services 
are vital to the welfare of all. The case has been strong enough to be 
accepted by the legislature here. Striking is prohibited ... for employees of 
municipalities ... This tends to suggest that the answer to the question we 
as lawyers should be asking ourselves - namely, whether legislature regards 
the right to strike as fundamental - is "no"." 
21. The sanction, in some cases, of industrial action in local government by the 
industrial court has been broadly founded on a measure or degree of the 
undesirability of strikes in terms of potential violence or harm to the public 
interest. Where an overt "threat" to public interest has not been found to 
exist then in some instances industrial action was sanctioned. 
(Christie,1992:25) For example, a nation-wide work stoppage which 
occurred during 1992 involving an estimated seventy-five percent of the 
total workforce for a period of eleven days was sanctioned on the grounds 
that "it did not pose an imminent danger to the public" (Pillay & Bendix, 
1993:54). 
22. Cameron, Cheadle & Thompson (1989:75) stress the notion that the 
difficulty of determining a strict definition of strikes is particularly relevant 
to essential services where they are prohibited outright: 
"The classification of such conduct may be of critical hp.portance to 
essential services. In this sector, if a work-to-rule qualifies as a strike it is 
not merely enjoined pending the outcome of the statutory conciliation 
process - it is prohibited outright." 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
ENDNOTES 
1. Reference to the racial nature of industrial action in local government 
is based on historical distinctions and in no way reflects the opinion of 
the writer. However, it is submitted that this characteristic has played a 
key role in local authority labour disputes, as elsewhere, and 
subsequently, the more militant disposition of "non-white" trade unions 
to the highly repressive measures applied in terms of their fundamental 
rights. These characteristics are described further within the context of 
the following causes of labour disputes. 
2. Independent trade union are also referred to as workerist or populist 
trade unions (Institute for Industrial Relations, 198~48). 
3. The growth of political demands for change by trade unions was clearly 
felt throughout South Africa. This trend can be illustrated by a survey of 
the Graduate School of Business at the University of Cape Town in · 
1989 involving 35 private sector organisations in the Western Cape who 
all indicated a high level of concern with the politicisation of labour 
relations in their organisations (Horwitz, J991b:ll). 
4. This dilemma was clearly echoed by the question: 
"What is a black unions' priority? Is it to struggle to improve the wages 
and working conditions of its membership? Or is it to struggle to create 
a democratic South Africa?" (Institute for Industrial Relations, 1988!43) 
5. In some instances, employers were vocally suspicious of emerging trade 
union politicisation, criticising their role as "communist" (Reese, 
1983:48). 
6. "Political uncertainty" may be defined as: 
"The process leading to the emergence or development of a post-
apartheid society" (Du Plessis, 1990:63). 
7. Wood (1987:183) attributes part of the politicisation of trade union 
demands to State exigencies in this regard: , 
"Whilst the direct causes of most strikes remained strictly economistic, 
subsequent state action (most commonly by the riot and security police) 
cast an unmistakable political pallor over subsequent collective action." 
8. Despite their political role, some trade unions highlighted a clear 
commitment to their members: 
"Trade unions are not political parties. Trade unions are organisations 
of workers ... We cannot pretend that all our members are politically-
conscious people ... Our strength lies in our ability to unite in the 
workplace with the possibility of stopping production." (Municipal and · 
General Workers union in MacShane et al, 1984:170). 
9. . One school of thought suggested that "political issues" involved 
"everything" (Institute for Industrial Relations, 1988:40). 
10. For example, the removal of municipal By-Law 1994 which endorsed 
"racial provisions in the employment field" at the Cape Town City 
Council (Cameron, 1986:73). 
11. Otherwise coined the Living Wage Campaign. This campaign was 
initiated by the independent trade union movement in May 1987. The 
objective was to set a legislated minimum wage level for workers at the 
bottom of the wage scale. An example was the proposed minimum wage 
level demanded in.1991 of around R1500 per month as determined by 
COSATU. The campaign was initiated by means of joint action with 
trade unions sympathetic to the cause, inter alia, local government trade 
unions. (Andrew Levy & Associates, 1991:25; Roux, 1990:21) 
12. Suggestions by trade unions have included the introduction of market-
related salaries for public sector employees. However, employers have 
refused this proposal on the basis of the uncompetitive and tax-based 
nature of public sector institutions and therefore the argument that such 
a policy would ultimately place a further financial burden on ·its citizens. 
(Cameron in Institute for Industrial Relations, 1988a:37) 
13. As Levy (1991) suggested:· 
''It depends on the skill of the .worker a streetsweeper [for example] 
would not be able to call the tune, he would have to rely more on his 
union because his job may be easily replaced." 
This can be illustrated by the Black Municipal Workers Union strike at 
the Johannesburg City Council in 1980. The strike was triggered in 
reaction to the formation of an "in-house" trade union by employers 
which was claimed to be "representative" of all council workers and 
would effectively represent all their interests. Subsequently, the "non-
white" employees formed the Black Municipal Workers Union which 
the council refused to recognise. This led to a strike by thousands of 
members of the Black Municipal Workers Union at Orlando Power 
Station demanding recognition. However, the council threatened an 
ultimatum for strikers lo return to work, and failing this, initiated large 
scale dismissals. However, after further sympathy strikes by other trade 
unions in other local authorities and public sector organisations, many 
of the dismissed workers were reinstated. (Wood, 1987:153-154). 
Notably though, the fear of retrenchment did not go unnoticed by Die 
Vaderland which commented at the time: 
" ... no one seems to have spelt out the economic implications to him 
[the "black man"]. His large numbers makes his labour cheap and 
readily replaceable." (29 /07 /1980) 
and again, 
"They ["black workforce"] are not as indispensable as they have been led 
to believe by those who organised the strike. They are easily replaceable 
and it is thus easy to dismiss them." (30/07 /1980) 
14. This legislation can be ascribed to an all-out effort by the State since 
the· 1940's to curtail trade union powers (Du Toit, 1976:21). Notably, as 
early as the 1940's ministerial prerogative (under the auspices of Dr 
Malan) demanded a curtailment of fundamental labour rights such as 
the right to strike and bargain as well as the elimination of "self-
government in industry [which] only gave rise to industrial unrest" (Du 
Toit, 1976:21). 
15. The Bantu Labour Relations Regulations Amendment Act (Act 70 of 
1973) defined "bantu" as "any member of an aboriginal race or tribe of 
Africa" (Du Toit, 1976:47). 
16. This view is echoed by the Employment Law journal which states· that 
judicial inconsistency has been a cause of labour conflict as: 
"A principle of equity is no sooner established than the court begins to 
qualify it" (1991:86). 
17. Explanations regarding the dualistic legislative system vary. Golding 
(1985:50), for example, suggests that the distinction between the labour 
rights of both sectors can be attributed to the fact that "unlike the 
private sector, where an individual and competing firm is usually 
confronted, workers in the public sector are up against the entire state 
network". 
18. As Bennett (1988:70) echoes: 
"Years of painstaking organisation by African unions ... resulted in the 
inevitable recognition of basic trade union rights in the private sector. 
Unless significant changes are made in South Africa to acknowledge 
labour rights for all workers ... significant labour conflict could develop in 
the State's back-yard." 
19. Ernstzen (1991:3) for instance noted that in 1990 alone the majority of 
strikes (over 50) declared by the South African Municipal Workers 
Union (SAMWU) concerned union recognition alone. These were 
broadly successful in that 0 employers entered into negotiations ... and 
recognitiOn agreements were won, or are being negotiated". 
20. The lack of recognition by the State given to the majority of independent 
public sector trade unions has been conspicuous in local authority's. The 
usefulness of registration was the safeguards it provided to trade unions 
in the form of protecting of striking members from dismissal (See Die 
Vaderland, 31/07 /1980 for example). Howeve·r, the prejudicial 
conditions laid out by the State m(!de registration tantamount to 
"collaboration with the state" often resulting in "long, bitter and violent" 
campaigns by unregistered trade unions for employer recognition 
(Community Resource and Information Centre, 1989:12; Ernstzen, 
1991:32). 
In 1983 however, led to the formal adoption of recognition agreements 
(at the employers discretion) as "a new system of governance in place of 
unilateral action" (Douwes Dekker, 1986:99; Ernstzen, 1991:31). 
·Recognition agreements were characterised by "a sequence of 
negotiation, followed by mediation, followed by arbitration" 
(In~ependent Mediation Society of South Africa, 1985:4). 
A further source of contention for unregistered trade unions in local 
authority's and other public sector organisations was the policy of forced 
membership by the automatic registration of certain employee 
categories with a specific registered trade union (The Argtis, 26/11/1988; 
Rand Daily Mail, 9 /11/1980). 
21. As Craythorne (1982:374) suggests: 
"When the general body of officialdom· sees its leaders appear as 
playthings, squeezed between forces which affect their power and status,· 
linked with increasing central government interference there must be a 
serious affect on moral." 
22. As Magwaza (in Botha, 1990:30) contends: 
"We have a very powerful trade union movement, which is very militant 
and politically charged because of the environment that we are living in. 
This creates an inherently explosive and violent situation where a 
powerful union force is running up against a very intransigent 
opposition." 
23. As Craythorne (1990:215) explains: 
" ... because justice and equity demand a machinery which of necessity 
takes time. to get going, there are local authorities that "play the system" 
by delaying a resolution of the issue for as long as possible." 
"One tactic is to state that there is no dispute; or that the employees' 
demands or requests are still being considered, while in fact there is no 
real intention of agreeing." 
24. The principle of mutual benefit suggests that the State assumes a policy 
setting role, while in return for employer indulgences, ensure the 
protection of employer interests (Albertyn, 1989:83). In this context, the 
Institute for Industrial Relations (1988'!'43) contends that the kinship 
irrevocably drew both the State and employers closer together as a 
result of the repressive laws applied by the former in benefiting the 
latter: 
"If employers make use of the law to repress legitimate protests by 
black South Africans then, in the eyes of those people and their 
supporters in the world outside, they declare themselves to be part and 
parcel of the apartheid legal system." 
25. For claims to the contrary see Du Toit (1976:154) who countered that 
mutual suspicions between employers and trade unions were becoming 
more diluted in the 1970's. 
26. Poppleton (1985:18) suggests that the sudden emergence of militant 
trade unionism in local authorities left employers unprepared: 
"A particular problem in local government in South Africa [is that] the 
pressure of a fairly amicable white union over the past years hardly 
provided the line manager with a learning situation in preparation for 
the sudden appearance of active and often aggressive black unions." 
27. According to the Labour Research Service (1990:i), this trend can be 
further attributed to trade union expectations of a "post apartheid 
dividend" based on their relative size. 
28. It is suggested that a key outcome of external trade union interest in 
local authority's has been the increased use of confrontational tactics, 
often at the cost of negotiations, in order to attract prospective 
membership (King, 1990:28). In local authorities this trend has been 
reflected at two levels of the labour relationship, in particular: 
* Firstly, between the independent trade unions, as 
illustrated by th~ rivalry between the South African 
Municipal Workers Union and the National Union of 
* 
Public Sector Workers; and 
Secondly, between professional associations and 
traditionally "white" trade unions and the independent 
trade union movement (although largely ameliorated by 
the recent annulment of "forced membership" policies in 
local government) (ErllStzen, 1991:32; King, 1990:28; 
South African Institute of Race Relations, 1988:662). 
It can be noted that in the latter case, Mullins (1988:5) suggests that 
"white" trade union militancy can also become an emergent feature of 
labour disputes in local authority's due to the decline in State 
protectionism and the possible affects of affirmative action on 
employment. 
29. The latter sense of frustration is echoed by Bendix (1992:553) who 
notes: 
"Strikes hinging on wages or unknown causes are often indicative of 
generalised dissatisfaction." 
30. The use of police and the military has been a feature of labour relations 
in South Africa (Wood, 1987:259). This assertion is exemplified by the 
International Labour Office (1986:23): 
"Increasingly, since Blacks were permitted to enter trade unions there 
has been considerable use of security and other legislation by the 
authorities in the face of industrial action by workers and the increasing 
unity of newly emerging unions with mainly Black leadership." 
31. To sum up, Roux (1989:11) describes the role of the State as 
undermining the power base of independent trade unions in the public 
sector: 
"Brutal disciplinary codes and a proliferation of "sweetheart" staff 
associations which reinforce the skills hierarchy, have all combined to 
weaken organisations and dilute the demands of the majority unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers." 
32. The emplacement of officials sympathetic to the States cause can be 
historically illustrated in the case of the Cape Town City Council: 
In 1965 the Diemont and Slater Commissions concluded that irregular 
staffing practices were taking place at the council due to the "unfettered 
power of the staff' (Cameron, 1986:66). 
In 1975 the De Klerk Commission proposed the establishment of a 
Municipal Services Council (established eventually in 1981) with a 
senior council member as chairman, making the local authority one 
"whose employer\employee ·relationships are (sic) largely administered 
by an administrator-appointed body" (Cameron, 1986:68). This allowed 
"the provincial authorities to politicise the Cape Town municipal 
service, to give secret orders on the recruitment of the staff to 
Commissioners and to destroy the governing power of the City Council" 
(Craythorne in Cameron, 1986:70). 
· 33. See for instance the Labour Relations Training Programme written by 
the Labour Relations Unit of the Cape Town City Council which 
indicates one of the main causes of local authority labour grievances as 
a "retardation in communication structures" (1990/l:n.p.). 
34. According to Magawaza (in Botha, 1990:29) management misperception 
may be deliberate in that demands put forward may be perceived as 
unrealistic by employers but on the other hand justified by th~ trade 
unions concerned. This situation gives rise to labour conflict: 
"If one starts off saying that demands are unrealistic and unjustified, 
that in itself is going to give rise to conflict." (Magawa.Za in Botha, 
1990:29) 
35. Ineffective interactive communication structures, are according to 
Coetzee (1985:140), a major source of conflict in larger municipalities 
where the enormity of the workforce can obstruct useful liaisons 
between employers and employees. 
36. As Thompson explains: 
"[This is] a feature which has been entrenched in recent years with the 
creation of an Appellate Division. This rule-building process, ancillary 
to the collective bargaining process, plays a vital part in 
institutionalising industrial conflict in contemporary industrial societies. 
It is labour laws' expression of the rule of law." (Thompson, 1992:504) 
37. Other forms of striking include, secondary or sympathy strikes and 
partial or intermittent strikes (Cameron, Cheadle & Thompson, 
1989:75-76). 
38. "Strikes" in this context broadly refer to all forms of industrial action. 
39. These figures were calculated on the basis of a mean total of 9936 
strikes over the period 1972-1992 as provided by Bendix (1992:549-556) 
and the Central Statistical Services (1993). 
The calculation involved: 
Total number of strikes /years = average strikes· per year. 
40. It can be noted that at this time, the lack of "unfair labour practice" 
applications provided employers with far-reaching rights in terms of 
retrenchment without notice or due process. 
41. The cost of industrial action can be estimated according to the number 
of "man-days" or "value-days" lost. "Man-days" or "man-hours" 
(multiplied by 24) are calculated, as the term suggests, by the amount of 
working days or hours lost as a result of industrial action. "Value-days" 
or "value-hours" are calculated by the "unit cost" of each employee. The 
formula, notably for local government, usually involves: the total of their 
annual salary, pension, medical group insurance, thirteenth cheque and . 
long service allowance divided by 2000 (Municipal Employers 
Organisation, 1988-1992). · 
42. According to Bendix (1992:553) wages have generally been the most 
popular cause of industrial action in South Africa. 
43. Public sector wage expenditures account for a vast portion of the State 
budget, for example the estimated wage expenditure for 1992 came to 
R48 billion. (Business Day, 5/02/1992) · 
44. Average wage increases amounted to 12%, 1.5% lower than the 
inflation rate of 13.5% at the time (Andrew Levy & 
Associates,1992/1993; Von Holdt,1993:38). 
45. This feature was ascribed to the relatively low base from which salary 
and wage adjustments were made during this part of the year. 
46. "Strikes" in this instance refers to all forms of industrial action unless 
otherwise specified. 
47. The rapid escalation of strikes as a result of wages and other issues can 
be attributed to a broad shift in trade union focus from macro-political 
and economic issues to specific organisational concerns (Andrew Levy 
& Associates, 1992/1993; Von Holdt, 1993:38). 
48. Please note that in this context strikes refers to all forms of industrial 
action. 
49. The "Living Wage Campaign" resulted in a demand for a set minimum 
wage level for all workers in South Africa. Key criteria proposed for 
calculating these minimum levels included, the age, marital status and 
number of dependents of each individual. However, the "Living Wage 
Campaign" was broadly halted in the late 1980's and replaced by other 
political and economic forms of mass action. 
50. In local government, services which have contributed to job insecurity as 
a result of proposed privatisation included refuse removal, the 
maintenance of parks and recreational facilities and security services 
(Bennett, 1988:69; Ernstzen, 1991:33). 
51. Notably, the growing demand to redress racial inequities in local 
government employment hierarchies as a result of historical imbalances. 
52. Local authorities have been generally viewed as vestiges of apartheid 
which enforced racial interests through "control and punishment" (The 
Argus, 17 /10/1992; T<Stemeyer in Heymans & T(jtemeyer,1988:8). 
Cons~quently, a key feature of the "independent" trade union movement 
· has involved the demand to transform existing structures into more 
representative and democratically-elected bodies (Ernstzen, 1991:33). 
53. A feature of political campaigns was the close association between the 
South African Municipal Workers Union and the African National 
Congress, and with relevance to local authorities, the demand for the 
resignation of certain councillors (see Erntzen, 1991:37). 
54. Craythorrte (1990:215) suggests that the costs of industrial action can ·be 
much broader, such as an overall loss of worker efficiency and poor 
productivity as a result of low worker morale. · · 
55. Industrial Councils are established in terms of the Labour Relations Act 
(Act 28 of 1956) [since amended]. 
56. The use of voluntary arbitration in an Industrial Court refers to the 
prior consent of both parties in dispute to settle matters directly by 
means of this mechanism rather than applying other optional measures. 
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The following list categorises questionnaire respondees 
according to occupation. It can be noted that the occupations 
listed below are those provided in the survey. The figure in 
brackets indicates the number of respondees in each category. 
Employers: 
Clerk - Personnel Services (1) 
Control Personnel Officer (1) 
Labour Relations Officer (1) 
Personnel Officer (2) 
Personnel Manager (4) 
Personnel practitioner (1) 
Industrial Relations Officer (1) 
Senior Personnel Officer (5) 
Assistant Head - Personnel Services (1) 
Chief Personnel Services (1) 
Deputy Director (1) 
Director ( 1) 
Trade unions: 
Collective Bargaining Officer (1) 
Vice-chairman (1) 
Understudy to the General Secretary (1) 
Deputy Secretary (1) 




Deputy Director (1) 
Assistant Secretary (1) 
Assistant Town Secretary (1) 




Provided is a list of short-answer questions. Please tick the 
relevant boxes or comment where required. Additional space is 
provided at the end of the questionnaire for your clarification. 
1. Occupation: ............................................. . 
2. Broadly speaking, how would you describe present labour 
relations in South African local government: 
a) Cooperative/ good .•••..••....•... ( ] 
b) Grudging/ accepting ••••••....•.•• ( ] 
c) Hostile/ bad .•••••..•.•..•••.•... ( ] 
3. What role do you feel the state should play as regulator 
of local government labour disputes? 
a) Interventionary role ..•.. ( ] 
b) Advisory role ........•... ( ] 
c) No role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( ] 
4. Which level of collective bargaining do you consider most 
appropriate for settling labour disputes? Why? 
a) Central level . . • • . • . . • • . . . . . • • • . ( ] 
b) Local/ organisational level ..•.• [ ] 
c) A mix of both levels •••••.•••... ( ] 
(Kindly justify at the end of the questionnaire) 
5. What causes would you attribute to the recent upsurge in 
local government labour disputes? 
1 . ................................... • ...... ~ ........... . 
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 
3 . . . . • . . . . . . . • . • • • . . • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . • . . 
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5 ...................................................... . 
6. A major area of contention is the issue of the "right to 
strike". Which of the following options do you consider 
most suitable in the case of local government? 
a) Allowing an unlimited "right to strike" ••. ( ] 
b) Allowing a limited "right to strike" •..••• ( ] 
c) Prohibiting any "right to strike" .....•..• ( ] 
(Kindly justify at the end of the questionnaire) 
7. Rank the following dispute settlement mechanisms and 
structures according to how effective you consider them to 
be in resolving local government labour disputes 
satisfactorily: 
[ 1 = very effective, 2 = effective, 3 = average, 




= [ ] 
= [ ] 
= [ ] 
Works Councils . . . . • . . . . • . • . . • • . • = [ ] 
Industrial councils .••••..•••••• = [ ] 
Conciliation Boards .•.......•••• = [ ] 
Industrial Court\ Judiciary ••••• = [ ] 
8. To what extent should unions be allowed to participate in 
determining employee policies in local government? 
a) Be allowed to participate fully in all issues ... ( ] 
b) Participate in some issues/ in some instances ... [ ] 
c) Not participate at all ....•••••••••••••.•••.•.•• [ ] 
(Kindly justify at the end of the questionnaire) 
9. Local government is broadly defined as being an "essential 
service" sector. Do you agree with this definition? 
a) Yes • • • [ ] 
b) No .•• ~ [ ] 
(Kindly justify at the end of the questionnaire) 
10. Very broadly, do you consider present dispute settlement 
structures and procedures as adopted by local government, 
satisfactory for promoting a healthy labour relations 
environment? 
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT! 
ANNEXURE 1C 
EMPLOYER QUESTIONNAIRE 
Provided is a list of short-answer questions. Please tick the 
relevant boxes or comment-where required. Additional space is 
provided at the end of the questionnaire for your clarification. 
1. Occupation: .............................................. . 
2. How would you describe present labour relations in your local 
authority: 
a) Cooperative/ good .....•.••• ( ] 
b) Grudging/ accepting ...••.•. ( ] 
c) Hostile/ bad ...•..••..•..•. ( ] 
3. How often are the following issues collectively bargained for 
in your local authority? Please rank according to the scale 
provided below: 
[1= very often, 2= often, 3= not so often, 4= hardly ever] 
a) Wages . • . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . • . . . . . • ( ] 
b) Conditions of service •..•••••••• [ ] 
c) Union rights • • . . . . . . . • • • . • • • • • • • ( ] 
d) Disciplinary issues ...•...•.•••• [ ] 
e) Dispute settlement procedures ••• ( ] 
Other/s [please rank]: ...................................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . . . . . . . . 
4. Do you feel that collective bargaining should take place at 
the central level (i.e. national), local level (i.e. within 
your local authority) or at both levels? 
a) Central level •.•. [ ] 
b) Local level ••••.. [ ] 
c) Both levels ...... ( ] 
(Kindly justify your answer at the end of the questionnaire) 
5. What were/are the most common causes for strikes at your local 
authority in the past five (5) years? 
1 . .......................................................... . 
2 . • . . • • • • . • • . . . • • . . • . . • . . • . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . . . . . . • 
3 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . • . . . . • . . . . . • . •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(Please list any further "triggers" in the space provided at 
the end of the questionnair~) 
6. Describe briefly the steps your local authority undertakes to 
follow if a strike is declared: 
1 ........................................••••......•........ 
2 • • • • • • • • • • . • . • • • • • • • . • • . . . . • . • • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
3 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
4 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ~ • • • • • • • • • • • 
(If any additional measures a~e followed kindly note these in 
the space provided at the end of the questionnaire) 
7. Which of the following options do you consider most feasible 
for sound labour relations in terms of the "right to strike"?: 
a) Allowing an unlimited "right to strike" [ ] 
b) Allowing a limited "right to strike" ...••. [ ] 
c) Prohibiting any "right to strike" •.•.••••• [ ] 
(Kindly justify at the end of the questionnaire) 
8. Rank the following mechanisms and structures according to how 
effective you consider them to be in settling labour disputes 
at your local authority?: 
[ 1 = very effective, 2 = effective, 3 = average 
4 = not so effective, 5 = ineffective/ useless ] 
Arbitration = [ ] 
Conciliation = [ ] 
Mediation = [ ] 
Works Councils . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . = ( ] 
Industrial Councils ...... ~ ••..•..... = [ ] 
Conciliation Boards ...............•• = [ ] 
Industrial Court/ Judicial system .•. = [ ] 
9. Broadly speaking, hbw successftll are negotiations between ttie 
local authority and the unibns within it? 
a) Very successful . . . . . . . . . . [ ] 
b) Normally successful . . . . . . [ ] 
c) Hardly ever successful ... [ ] 
d) N/A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ] 
10. Is there any input from the unions in your local authority 
concerning matters relating to employee policies and 
practices? 
a) Yes • ~ • [ ] 
b) No . • • . [ ] 
(Kindly clarify your answer at the end of the questionnaire) 
' 
( 












broadly defined as being an "essential 
you agree with this definition? 
(Kindly explain in the space provided at the end of the 
questionnaire) 
--------------------------------------------------------------
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT! 
ANNEXURE 1D 
TRADE UNION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Provided is a list of short-answer questions. Please tick the 
relevant boxes or comment where required. Additional space is 
provided at the end of the questionnaire for your clarification. 
1. Position in Trade Union: .....•.....•••.•..•......••...•..... ~ 
2. How would you describe present labour relations in your Local 
Authority: 
a) Cooperative/ good •.......•• [ ] 
b) Grudging/ accepting ........ [ J 
c) Hostile/ bad . . . . • . . . . . . . . • • [ ] 
3. How often are the following issues collectively bargained for 
with your Local Authority? Please rank according to the scale 
provided below: 
[1= very often, 2= often, 3= not so often, 4= hardly ever] 
a) Wages . • . • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . [ ] 
b) Conditions of service •.•.•.••.•. [ J 
c) Union·rights ••••..............•• [ ] 
d) Disciplinary issues •...•.••..••. [ J 
e) Dispute settlement procedures .•. [ J 
Other/s [please rank] : ................................ , ..... . 
. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4. Do you feel that collective bargaining should take place at 
the central level (ie national), local level (ie within your 
council) or at both levels? 
a) Central level • • . . [ ] 
b) Local level . • . • • • [ ] 
c) Both levels •.•... [ ] 
(Kindly justify at the end of the questionnaire) 
5. Has your union declared a strike over the past five (5) years? 
a) Yes • • • [ ] _ 
b) No • • • • [ ] 
If Yes, please list the main reasons why?: 
1 .......................................................... . 
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3 . . . . . . ~ . . . • • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . • • . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
6. Which of the following "right to strike" ·options do you favour 
for promoting a healthy labour relations environment within 
your Local Authority?: 
a) Allowing an unlimited "right to strike" ••. ( ) 
b) Allowing a Limited "right to strike" ••••.. ( ) 
c) Prohibiting any "right to strike" •••...••. ( ) 
(Kindly justify at the end of the questionnaire) 
7. Broadly speaking, what course of action does your Local 
Authority undertake when strikes are declared by unions within 
it? 
a) Call for military/ police intervention ••• ( ) 
b) Seek a court interdict ...••••••••.••••.•. ( ) 
c) Attempt to negotiate~···················· ( ] 
d) Do nothing ............................. ~ . ( ] 
e) N/A ...••.............. ~.................. [ ] 
Other reactions: ........................................ . 
. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . 
8. Rank the following mechanisms and structures according to how 
effective you consider them to be for settling disputes at 
your Local Authority?: 
[ 1 = very effective, ·2 = effective, 3 = average 
4 = not so effective, 5 = ineffective/ useless ) 
Arbitration = [ ] 
Conciliation = ( ) 
Mediation = ( ) 
Works councils . . . . . . . . . • . • • . • • • . • . • • = [ ] 
Industrial councils ..••••.•.•••....• = ( ) 
Conciliation Boards .•••••.••.••.•••• = ( ) 
Industrial court/ Judicial system.~. = ( ) 
9. Broadly speaking, how successful are negotiations between 
your union and the Local Authority?: 
a) Usually successful ..•...• ( ) 
b) Sometimes successful ..•.• [ ] 
c) Hardly ever successful ..• [ ) 
d) Not applicable .••.•.•..•.• (.] 
10. Does the Local Authority ever consult with your union in 
matters concerning employment policies and practices (e.g. 
recruitment and selection policies, salary reviews)? 
a) Yes . • . ( ) 
b) No [ ] 












broadly defined as being an "essential 
you agree with this definition? 
(Kindly explain in the space provided at the end of the 
questionnaire) 
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MllNICll'AI. AND l.OCAI. AllTllORITY 
,\111alµ ;1111ah.:d M1111icipal E111pl11yccs "'""·ia1io11 ............ . .... ....... .... ........ ..... .. .. l'ITI I 
llloc111f11111.:i11 M1111ii.:ipal II lad Work..:r' l111io11. . ................. ............. ..... ... 1 Tll I 
llloc111f11n1cin Munisipalc Wcrkne111ersvere11iging ........... .•......... ..•..........•. ....... .. ............................... 11 .A. 
Cape Town Municipal Professional S1aff Ass1K:ia1ion ........ ................................................... ....... ..... .. .. U.A. 
Dc1111K:ra1ii.: ln1egra1cJ Municipal Employees S1K:icty ....... ..... ..... ...... ...... ... .... .... .. .. .. ... .... ... ...... ... .. ... ... U.A. 
Durhan Municipal EmployccsSociety ..... ....... ....... ............. .. ................... ......... ............................. .... .. U.A . 
Durban Municipal Professional Staff Association .... .. .. ... ... .. ....... ....... ....... ... ... ..... .... ............... ... ......... U.A. 
Durban Municipal Workers Union ... ..... ............................................................ ..... ................... ..... .... .. U.A. 
Easl Cape I .ocal Au1hori1ies Employees Union ........................................... . _. .. .. ..... ... ... .. .. ...... .... ... ...... U.A. 
1:as1 LonJon Municipal Workers Union ... ......... ....... ...... : .................... .... ... ........................ .... ... .. .. ... .. .. FITU 
Ea,1 RanJ Municipal Workers Union ... ... .... ... ........ .. ...... ... .. .. ... ...... ....... .. ... .... ........ ... ....... ... ....... ........ ... U.A. 
l'cJcralion of Municipalily, Heahh anJ Allied Workers .. ..... ... ...... ..... .. ... ... .. .......... .... .. ....... ... .... .. .... ...... .. Naclu 
Johannc,hurg MunicipalComhincJ Employees Union ........... .......... ..... ..... .. .. ...... ..... .... .. ......... .. ...... .. U.A. 
J11hannc,burg Municipal Employees Asso1.: ia1ion ...... .... .... ... ............................. ..... .... ... ...... ... ...... ... ..... U.A. 
Johannc~hurg Municipal Waler Works Mechanics Union ..... ....... .. ......... ................ .' ....... ... ....... ... ........ U.A. 
Johannc,burg Municipal Workers Union ... ... ..... .... ... .... ...... .... .... ............................. .. .................... .... .. . U.A. 
Johannesburg Transporl and Municipal Workers Union ................. ................. ........ .. ........... ....... ..... .. U.A. 
Kimberley Association of Municipal Employees .. ... ... .. ... .. .. ... .. .... .... ...... ... .......... ................ .. .......... .... U.A. 
Kimhcrlt:y Municipal W1>rkcrs Union ..... ........ ........... ...... ........................ ..... ... .... ...... ..... ... .... .. .... .... .... U.A. 
Municipal and AllicJ Workers Union .. ....... ... .. ..... ..... .. ....... ......... ..... ... ......................... .. ..... ...... ... ...... . U.A. 
Municipal , S1a1c, farm anJ Allied Workers Union .............. .... ......... .......... ... .. .... ............ ..... ............... U.A. 
Na1al Ass1K:ia1ion11fE111ployeesofBlack Local Au1hori1ics .... ................ : ......... ................... ... .. .............. . U.A. 
National Uni1111 of Employees of L1K:al Au1h11ri1ics ....... . ........................... ................................ ..... ... l J.A. 
Paarl Muni,ipalc Wcrkcrwcrcuiging ..... 
I'"' " 111n·I vnl' 11i1,i11g v; 111 tli,· Haa.111p l'laa,likl' ll1·,11111r,; i;111µ«kl'11ll..-1 li-
(_)11n·11 :-. low11 f\ l11111 :-.1p;1k Wc1i..11t ·111cr:-. 1111it• .. . 
S ./\ . " ' ""'ia1io11 ofMu11ic1pal b11pl11yccs .. 
S.A. En11.:rgcm:y Scrvi.:cs Union .. ......... ... .. ... ...... ..... .... ... .. 
S.A. Munii.:ipal Workers Union ......... ..................... .... . 
. ... II .A. 
........ ...... ... ....... l 1./\ . 
. .. .. . l 1.t\ . 
. lnbal 
. ....... 11./\ 
. ....... .... ... ... (\"all1 
UnionofJohan11c,hurgMunii.:ipal Workers ..... ..... ..... ... ..... ..... ...... ......... ... ........... ... .... ..... .. ................ U.A. 
Vcrcuiging van Ad111ini,1r;11icwc I loollicamptcs van Plaa,likcOwcrh<:dc .... ........................ .. ........ ... 1 J.A. 
Vcrula111 lndi a11 l'vl1111il·ipal l:111ployccs As"...:ialion .... .. ... .. ............. ..... .. . ... .......... ....... ... ... .... .. IJ .A. 
Walvi , baai ~1111.i , ipalc l'crs1111cclvcrcnigi11g .. ...... ....... . . ........... ... ............. ... .......... U.A. 
Wc, 1,·rn l'rovim:c I .1...:al /\u1h11ri1y Workers Ass1K.:ia1ion ..... ...................... U.A. 
SOURCE: OFFICIAL TRADE UNIONS DIRECTORY AND INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS HANDBOOK. (1993:1144-115) 
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Table 5: Average frequency of categories of industrial action 
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ANNEXURE 7B 
Table 1 : Number of striking workers i n l oca l authorities 
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Table 1: Wages as a cause of industrial action in South 
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Table 2: "Wages and other" issues as a cause of industrial 
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Table 3: Work conditions as a cause of industrial action in 
























Table 4: Trade union matters as a cause of industrial action 
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ANNEXURE 7C 
Table 5 : Disciplinary issues as a cause of industrial action 
in South African local authorities (%man-hours lost, 1988-
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Table 6 : "Other " issues as a cause of industrial action in 
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Table 1: Industrial Action triggers in South African local 
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Table 3: Industrial action triggers in South African local 
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Table 4: Industrial action triggers in South African local 
authorities during 1991. 
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Table 1: Industrial action triggers in South African local 
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ANNEXURE 7F 
Table 1: Costs of industrial action to South African local 
authorities (1988-1992) (number of man-days and value-days 
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POSTSCRIPT 
Since the submission of this thesis, South Africa has undergone a poignant political 
transformation. In the field of labour relations, as noted in the Conclusion, the 
challenges of consensus-based practices have been undermined in local government by a 
degree of uncertainty and apprehension regarding the future of such institutions and 
their personnel. 
The labour movement faces a host of pressures in separating its new responsibilities and 
interests from those of the incumbent Government. 
Firstly, as a legitimate institution, the distinction between the role of the labour 
movement and Governance requires refinement. In particular, this notion is challenged 
by a tradition of confrontational dynamics adopted by trade unions during the previous 
political era. Secondly, labour focus on socio-economic issues is convoluted by historical 
injustices which still prevail and reqllire redress. Importantly though, once more this 
challenge demands an understanding or compromise between due political process or 
national interest and labour demands. Thirdly, a complicated and bureaucratised 
jurisprudence undermines efficiency and a just legal system. This confusion in tum raises 
the opportunity for undermining the fundamental tenets of labour relations and opens 
the window of opportunity for self-privilege. Fourthly, and finally, organisational changes 
requiring transformation, such as affirmative action, need to be dealt with in a sensitive, 
timeous and fair manner. Consequently, in the final analysis labour relations based on 
consensus-based practices in South African local government provide the opportunity for 
such changes within the framework of justice founded on the notion of best-possible 
resolutions. rather than coercive contest. 
